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STATE OF IDAHO 
vs. 
Appealed from the District Court of the 5 .e:.t'\ 
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and 
for\)J\G,QIJI,,,. County 
Hon. ~i)hf' \I\.Y>\L.+\t_y District Judge 
~ok>trl: e . ~, \\, o.JttS 
Attorney_ for Appellant_ 
cbns+ope.~ x ~,MtAs 
Attorney_ for Respondent_ 
Filed this __ ..,_ day of ------, 20_ 
-----------Clerk 
By __________ Deputy 
CAXTON Pf'llf\J";Ef1S CALDWFI_L IDAHO 17S68S 
Vol Ll.r'I\L d--- J'/J'fi.J 
- , ~ - · ,, ,..., , .,. , l lit\ (..V 0 Q,"1'1J J,.j~ 
ROBERT E, WILLIAMS 
IDAI{OSTATEBARNO. 1693 
WILLIAMS~ MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Telephone; (208) 324-2303 
Facsimile: {208) 324-3135 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILED 
MAY 3 1 2011 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT _LINCOLN lDAHO ,J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIITH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER; 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-212 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM 
OF PLAINTIFF 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and through hjs attorney of 
record, Robert E. Williams of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits this Pretrial 
Memorandum pursuant to IRCP Rule 16(b ), 
A. THE NATURE OF THE ACTION, This case is primarily an action to quiet title in 
certain residential real property located in the city of Shoshonei Lincoln County, Idaho. In 
addition to seeking an order quieting title to the real property in himself, the Plaintiff has 
PRETRlALMEMOR.ANDUM O.l"PLAINTIFF -1-
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requested that the Court determine two (2) Deeds to the real property conveying interests to the 
Defendant be construed as mortgages securing loans on the real property and that the Court 
determine the amount owed on the loans. 
B. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS, The record ownership of the real property that is the 
su.bject matter of the action is presently in the Defendant as accomplished by a Warranty Deed 
from the Plaintiff recorded in 1997 and a Quitclaim Deed from the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
to the Defendant recorded in the year 2000 ("Deeds"). Defendant claims these Deeds were not 
intended to be conveyances of the fee simple ownership to the real property, but rather they 
were mortgages securing the repayment of loans from Defendant to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims 
that the Defendant loaned him $2,000.00 in the year 1997 and then made additional loans in the 
years 2000 through 2010 in the form of the payment ofreal property taxes on the real property 
subject in the total additional amount of $6,785.00. Defendant contends that she made 
additional loans to Plaintiff in the amount of$5,000,00 over and above the amounts that 
Plaintiff claims were loaned. 
C. ADMISSIONS OR STIPULATIONS. Although not formally admitted at this point, 
Defendant appears to agree that the two (2) Deeds were intended to be mortgages and not 
conveyances of the fee simple title to the real property. The Defendant also appears to agree 
that the $2,000.00 paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant in the year 1997 and the subsequent 
payment of real property taxes by the Defendant in the years 2000 through 2010 were all loans 
secured by mortgages on the real property in the fonn of the two (2) Deeds. Defendant also 
appears to agree with Plaintiff's contention that the proper interest rate to accrue on each of the 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OP PLAINTl.FF -2-
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loans is 12% per annum under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(3). 
D. AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. To fully try the relevant issues before the Court) 
Plaintiff requests that the complaint be amended to specifically provide, in addition to quieting 
title to the real property, that the Court declare that the two (2) Deeds are mortgages 
encumbering the real property and determine the amount owed on the loans secured by the 
mortgages as of the date of trial. 
E. REMAINING FACTS TO BE LITIGATED. A motion for summary judgment on all 
issues has been filed by Plaintiff and will be heard on June 21, 2011. Remaining facts to be 
litigated, if any, will be identified in the Court's ruling on the motion. 
F. ISSUES OF LAW TO :BE LITIGATED, Plaintiff does not believe that there are any 
remaining issues oflaw to be litigated. 
G. ORDERS TO EXPEDITE TRIAL Plaintiff does not believe there are any orders 
necessary to expedite the trial at this time. 
H. EXHIBITS. Plaintiff intends to offer the following exhibits into evidence in the 
trial of this matter: 
1. Warranty Deed from Defendant dated February 24, 1997 
2. Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and Defendant to Defendant dated May 8, 
2000 
3. Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1812 
4. Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1807 
5, Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1809 
PRETR1ALMBM0RANDUM Ol"PLAINTfFF •3-
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Defendant's handwritten note, dates February 25, 1997, March 3, 1997, 
1 
April 1, 1997, May 1, 1997 and June 1, 1997 in the left hand cohmm 
Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Document 1983/1984 
1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
December 20, 2000 
1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
May8, 2000 
1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
December 20, 2000 
1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
December 20, 2000 
2000 'tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
December 20, 2000 and June 20, 2001 
2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated 
December 21, 2001 a.TJ.d Jur1e 19, 2002 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2002 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2003 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2004 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year2005 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2006 
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Co1lectot for the 
year2007 
PRETR1ALMEMORANDUM OFPLA.lNTlf'F -4· 
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20. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax. Collector for the 
year 2008 
21. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2009 
22. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the 
year 2010 
23. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1997 
24. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1998 
25. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1999 
26. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2000 
27. History Report from the office oft.lie Lincoln Cou..11ty .Assessor for Lots 4 . 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the yeat 2001 
28. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2002 
29. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2003 
30. Histozy Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone; Idahoi for the year 2004 
31. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshonei Idaho, for the year 2005 
32. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2006 
33. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2007 
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34. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5i Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2008 
35, History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2009 
36. History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4 
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2010 
37. Affidavit of Donn W. Borde-wyk 
l WITNESS LIST AA'D ADDRESSES. Plaintiff intends to call the following 
witnesses at the trial in this matter: 
Donald E. Steuerer 
POBox9 
Shoshone,Idaho 83352 
Donn W. Bordewyk 
1833 Scutli Lincoln 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Linda Jones 
111 West B Street, Suite A 
Shoshone,Idaho 83352 
Cathy Gilbert 
111 Wyst f:lStreet, Suite T 
Shoshone,Idaho 83352 
N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards 
POBoxK 
Shoshone,Idaho 83352 
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" 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of May, 2011. 
WILL1AMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
9u)lL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~';/:y of 114.,; , 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear below 
by the method indicated; 
Alison E. Brace 
Attorney at Law 
Non Confrontational Legal Services, LLC 
PO Box 6061 
Boise ID 83707 
.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery D Court Folder 
D Facsimile Transmission 
0 Federal Express 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CV-2010-0000212 
Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 6/7/2011 
Time: 9:03 am 
Judge: John K Butler 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Candace Childers 
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli 
Tape Number: 
900 Court introduces case. Time and place for pretrial. 
Mr. Williams is present for the Plaintiff. 
Ms. Richards is present in Court with Counsel Ms. Alison Brace. 
Ms. Brace advises that case will go to summary judgment 
Issues remaining are rather was in fact a mortgage. 
Ms. Richards admits that it was in fact a loan and property was secured as collateral. 
Also question of interest to be paid rather compounded or annual and also the way it was 
calculated. 
905 Mr. Williams is pleased to hear what the Defendant thinks the remaining issues are. 
905 Ms. Brace also has a motion to withdraw. Ms. Brace advises that she took this case to 
help negotiate and Ms. Richards was aware of this and that she was not intended to be the 
trial lawyer and she told Ms. Richards this up front. Ms. Brace thought that they had a 
settlement but they didn't. Ms. Brace understands that Ms. Richards has another Attorney 
that may take this matter but does not have anything in writing at this time. 
906 :Mr'. "\Villiams objects to withdraw of CouriseL Former Cow;isel h~s gp].y qee11 out of 
the case for about 60 days. Mr. Williams would agree if new Counsel would abide by the 
current scheduling order, summary judgment hearing and the trial his client would be 
prejudice. 
906 Court advises that because motion to withdraw is not noticed up for today that Ms. 
Brace file her motion to withdraw and the Clerk will schedule for the next day that he is 
available and it will be taken up at that time. 
907 Comments from Ms. Richards. 
909 Courts comments to Ms. Richard as far as representation. Court explains that Ms. 
Brace will be her lawyer until hearing is held or new Counsel substitutes in as Counsel. 
910 All dates remain at this time. Recess 
COURT MINUTES 
ChristopherP.Sirmns 
Attorney at LawISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRJCT COLTR.T OF TIIB FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE .COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY 













MOTION TO CONTINuE 
AND RESET HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SlJM11AR Y JUDGMENT AND 
TRIAL SETTING 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, through counsel, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, 
and files this MOTION TO CONTINUE Al\TD RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUM1v1ARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING, and in support 
thereof states as follows: 
L This matter is set for court trial on July 13, 2011, with hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment set for June 21, 2011. 
2. Counsel for Defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record 
simultaneously v.rith the filing oftbis motion. 
MOTION TO CONTINlJE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION 1 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ANu TRIAL SETTING 
LOOO/tOOOWl 
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3. Defendant has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of whom filed, or 
moved to file a compulsory counterclaim. 
4. Defendant's prior attorney's failed to conduct discovery, and failed to respond to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. Defendant, by information and belief of counsel, is disabled, and appears to have 
cognitive impairments which may have contributed to lack of preparation for the defense. 
6. Counsel for Defendant requires time to investigate his client's mental status and 
how that issue may impact the case. 
7. Counsel for Defendant requires time to research the· facts and law of the case to 
provide Defendant with due process oflaw due to the failures of prior counsel. 
8. Continuing and resetting both the hearing·on Motionfor Summary Judgment and 
trial will serve the interests of Court efficiency and justice by avoiding a potential 
malpractice action against prior counsel, and/or issues arising on appeal due to former 
counsel's omissions. 
V/HEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order continuing 
and resetting hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial setting 
herein. 
STOPHER P. SIMMS 
AITORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
(/,JC, I 
DATED 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARJNG ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 2 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING 
LOOO/vOOD{[/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that ~n the t? day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
. of the foregoing MOTION TO CONTJNUE AND RESET HEARINU ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Al\1D TRIAL SEITING was delivered to 
Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 3 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT M1D TRIAL SETTING 
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FILED ~~1. 
JUN 1 5 2011 l 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB. #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
SUZANNE McCONNELL. CLERK l 
DISTRICT COU~l~~-OL~_IE_AH_O _i 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE comrTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY 













NOTICE OF HEAR1NG -
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
AND RESET HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY mDGMENT Af.JTI 
TRlAL SETTING 
TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARJNG ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR Sillv1MARY JUDGMENT Af.Jl) TRIAL SETTING on the 21st day of 
June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler, 
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard jf you so desire. 
TTORNEY AT LAW 
STOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
a .s. // 
DATED 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTJNUE AND RESET HEARING ON 1 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET 
HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL 
SETTING was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, 
Meservy, & Lothspeich, LU>, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, 
via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON 2 
PLATh.TTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
fitEtl ~~ .. l-1 
I JUN I i; zn11 , l ' I~ VII I 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT U~_C:_OLN IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 













NOTICE OF APPEAR.AJ~CE 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
C01v1ES NOW CHRISTOPHER P. STh1MS, Attorney at Law, and hereby enters 
his appearance for the Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, herein. 
L000 / 1000 ® 
STOPHER P. STh1MS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the/(;" day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE was delivered to Robert E. Williams, 
Attorney for Plain.1:iff: of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, 
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
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i-ax - N<.;L:S I o:Steuerer v. Richards; Motion to Withdraw (12088862458) 12:12 06116/11GMT-05 Pg 04-09 
NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
Alison Brace. Atfomey 
P 0. Box 6051 
Boise. !D 83707 
208-353-5213 
IS8. 6611 
"Ill l Lui. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of THE 
STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEURER. 
Plaintiff. 
vs 
N E.fvi RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES !-V, 
Defendants 
STATE OF lDAHO 
Count11 of Ada 
Case No CV-2010-212 
AFF1DAV!T OF ALISON BRACE 
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL OF 
RECORD 
f, Alison E. Brace. being first duly sworn upon oath do state as follows: 
I am counsel of record for N E.M Richards. aka Nicky Richards. ihe Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter 
2 I have represented Defendant since March 29. 2011. 
3. Al the time i was retained. Defendant and! agreed that I would attempt to negotiate a 
seWen1ent in the n1atter. 
4. H was agreed at ihe time counsel was hired that. if !he matter continued on to irial. 
Defendant would iocate another attorney to pursue the trial 
5. At ihe time Mr. Williams filed his Motion for Summary judgment. it appeared that a 
settlement was possible. 
6. However. since !ha( (ime. it has become apparent ihat settle;11ent is not an option in this 
Page I 244 
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mailer 
7 Counsel has informed Defendant that an extension of time for any of the trials is nol an 
option. and thai she must eiiher retain counsel or proceed prose al the June 21" Summary 
Judgment hearing. as well as the Ju'y 13"' couri tria!. 
/-
DATE;, //,J.,A',.,(_, / 5 . 2011 
Attorney 
SUBSCRIBE:D AND SWORN before me ihis IS' day of June. 2011 
SAttY V. SYACKU: 
No/or;,~ 
Sta!eof~ 
/ /",. _J 
~///JI~ 
v/NQTA.::v( PUBLIC FOR lDAHO 
/"i/ ,. 
;. ,,UUvJ 
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NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTlONS. LLC 
Alison Brace. At!omey 
P.O.Box6061 
Boise ID 837}7 
208-353-5213 
ISB 6611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, !N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEURER. 
Piainti:f 
vs 
N.EM. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN 00!::S !-V. 
Defendanis 
Case No. CV-2010-212 







L"1u1//· ll!f! s.Ji..Ji·i 
COMES NOW Alison E. Brace. from the firm Non Confroniational Legai Solutions. 
pursuant io Rule 11 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. and moves this Cour: for an Order 
allowing her to withdraw as attorney of record for N. E. M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards. 
DeTendanL 
Seid motion is supported by the Affidavit of Alison Brace. aitacr1ed. 
Oral argument is requested 
2011 
Attorney 
MOT!ON TO V·J!THOqf...\/\/. i 
r01; ' 
f~·,.--~ 
• ;2>._i- '1 . .. . . ' 
36 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below, by United States Mail: 
Robert E. Williams 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2 
/s/ Alison E. Brace 
Aiison E. Brace 
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CERTiFICATE OF SERVJCE 
I hereby certify l served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below. by United States Mail: 
NE.M. Richards 
P.O. 8:JX 950 
Shoshone, ID 83352 
Rober'. E. Williams 
Wil!iams, Meservy & Lothspeich LLP 
PO Box 168 
Jerome ID 83338 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Ida_ho 83333 
JUN 1 6 2011 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
SUZANNE Mee 
DISTRICT COUR?~~~'ECLL, CLERK 
• OLNIDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 












N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
------=Dc...::e=fe=n=dan=ts=, ______ ) 
NOTICE OF HEARING -
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
AND RESET HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
TRIAL SETTING 
TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will call up for hearing 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING on the 21st day of 
June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler, 
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard if you so desire. 
RISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
C :r. 11 
DATED 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON 1 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A.ND TRIAL SETTING I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET 
HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL 
SETTING was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, 
Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, 
via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
firistopher P. Simms 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON 2 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTINGPage I 250 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
JUN 1 6 2011 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DlSTRICT COURT LINCOLN lDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 












NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
-------==D=-=e=fe=n=d=an=t=s, ______ ) 
COMES NOW CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, Attorney at Law, and hereby enters 
his appearance for the Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, herein. 
STOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
DATED 
Pag~I 251 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the IS day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE was delivered to Robert E. Williams, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, 
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Pagezl 252 
Christopher P. Sim.1us 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
JUN 1 6 2011 
SUZANNEM 
D/SiRJCT cou';?uNN~LL, CLERK 
N,.,OLNIDAHO 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 










Defendants, ) -----~-~~------. 
CV-2010-212 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
AND RESET HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
TRIAL SETTING 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, through counsel, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, 
and files this MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING, and in support 
thereof states as follows: 
1. This matter is set for court trial on July 13, 2011, with hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment set for June 21, 2011. 
2. Counsel for Defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record 
simultaneously ,vith the filing of this motion. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING Page I 253 
3. Defendant has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of whom filed, or 
moved to file a compulsory counterclaim. 
4. Defendant's prior attorney's failed to conduct discovery, and failed to respond to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. Defendant, by information and belief of counsel, is disabled, and appears to have 
cognitive impairments which may have contributed to lack of preparation for the defense. 
6. Counsel for Defendant requires time to investigate his client's mental status and 
how that issue may impact the case. 
7. Counsel for Defendant requires time to research the facts and law of the case to 
provide Defendant with due process of law due to the failures of prior counsel. 
8. Continuing and resetting both the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and 
trial will serve the interests of Court efficiency and justice by avoiding a potential 
malpractice action against prior counsel, and/or issues arising on appeal due to former 
counsel's omissions. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order continuing 
and resetting hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial setting 
herein. 
RlSTOPHf'.R P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
DATED 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 2 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING Page 1 254 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;?day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING was delivered to 
Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 3 
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JUN 1 7 2011 
Cbristopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN TIIB DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
"STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY 












MOTION FOR LEA VE 
TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SU11MARY nJDGMENT 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M Richards tlrrough counsel, and files tlris 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, and in support thereof states as follows: 
1. This matter is set for hearing on Pfa111tit-'f's Motion for Summary Judgment June 
21, 2011. 
2. Counsel for Defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record on June 15, 
2011. 
3. Defendant's prior attorney's failed to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6000/ZOOOlm 
1 
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4. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing thereon were 
filed Yvith this Court on or about May 13, 2011, yet Defendant's prior attorney failed to 
respond in any way, either by opposing affidavit or Memorandum of Law. 
5. Defendant has credible, compelling affidavit testimony, clarifying that produced 
at deposition that will create material issues of fact preventing summary judgment from 
being entered. ( and that would be the basis for summary judgment for Defendant if prior 
counsel had filed such a motion) 
6. The relevant legal issues would be illuminated by allowing Defendant the 
opportunity to fully brief the court prior to oral argument on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendant has very strong, persuasive legal arguments to be made 
against summary judgment 
\V1IEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order granting 
leave of court to file late response to Plaintiff's Motion for Surn....ma.ry Judgment. 
RESPEC~ Y SUBMITTED, 
/j 
~/ti,.// 
C STOPHERP. SIMMS DAIBD 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SER\t1CE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /-J- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to Robert E. 
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East 
Main Street, PO Box 168, Jeromeldaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
MOUON FOR LEA VE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLA.INTIFF'S MOTION .3 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGME:t'<'T 
Page I 258 
6000/tOOO® 
PARCEL: RP S010000E004A A Hlti'l'U.KI l~.1-1.l'.. .J...J.:,, 
NAME/ADDRESS 
STEUERER, DONALD E 
BOX 686 
SHOSHONE ID 83352 
LEG.AL DESCRIPTION 
SHOSHONE 
LOTS 4 & S 
BLOCK E 
CODE AREA 10000 
CAT RY QUANTITY UN 
20 1993 
VALUE HO MRKT HO ED!P CB MRKT RS MR.KT 
4176 
41 1993 1000 1000 500 
TOT~LS 5176 1000 500 
Fl:Help F3=Exit F5=N'EXT HISTORY F7:LEGAL F8:CAT F12=MASTER 




PO BOX K 
SHOSHONE rn· 83352 






LOTS 4 & 5 
BLOCK E 
CODE ARE.A 10000 
VALUE HO MRKT HO EXMP CB MRKT RS MR.KT 
4176 
3 000 3 000 1500 
7176 3000 1500 
Fl=Relp F3=Exit F6=NEXT HISTORY F7=LEGAL FB=CAT Fl2=MASTER 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idabo 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FILED AM /° 
PM v, If I rr_J b1 
JUN 1 7 2011 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN" AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RJCIM..RDS, ak.a l\TICKY 













MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
I.R.C.P 7(b)(3)(A) 
CO:MES NOW Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, by and through her attorney of 
record, Christopher P. Simms and files this MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME and in 
support thereof states the following: 
1. Defendant retained present counsel on or about June 15, 2011 and entered bis 
appearance on her behalf that same day. 
2. Defend.ant was represented by prior counsel· who utterly failed to respond to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sum.mazy Judgment, by opposing affidavit ormemorandum oflaw. 
3. Present counsel has judiciously yet expediently apprised himself of the facts of 
the case at hand, as well as the relevant case law and statutory provisions and prepared a 
response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the form of an AFFIDAVIT OF · 
N.E.M. RICHARDS IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR Sillv.Th1ARY 
JUDGMENT, and DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME I 
Page I 261 
6000/9000 [£] 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, which response is late in the context of 
I.R.C.P. 56. 
4. Counsel for Defendant filed contemporaneously herewith MOTION FOR LEA VE 
TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SlJMMARY 
5. In that Counsel for Defendant was retained a full week after the deadline to file a 
response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it was impossible to produce a 
timely response. 
6. Defendant would be greatly prejudiced if she is not permitted to formally respond 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, as will prior counsel. 
7. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1)(3)(A) states, "A written motion, other than 
one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the 
court, and served so that is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) says before 
the time specified for the hearing." 
8. Due to prior counsels' collective failures to adequately represent Defendant, and 
the necessity of present counsel to be retained to properly defend against the actions of 
Plaintiff, the time limits of the civil rules should be shortened such that Defendant's 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, can be heard at9:00 am., June 21, 2011 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable Court, in the interest of justice, 
enters an Order granting Motion to Shorten Time. 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 2 
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6000/9000 !Pi 
HRISTOPHER P. STh{MS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r;,/ /, 
DATED 
I HERFBY CERllFY that on the/?- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME was delivered to Robert E. Williams, 
Attorney for Plain:tiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, 
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 3 
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6000/LOOO~ 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
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SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STElJERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.ka 1'HCKY 




) NOTICE OF HEARING -
) 
) MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
) · AND MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
) FILE LA TE RESPONSE TO 
) PLA.IN!IFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY WDG1\1ENT 
) 
TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will call up for hearing 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME AND MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE LAIB 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT on the 21st 
day of June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler, 
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard if you so desire. 
STOPHERP. SIMMS 
A1TORNEYFORDEFENDANT 
RNEY AT LAW 
DATED 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME A.ND MOTION FOR 1 
LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUM:MARY 
JUDGtvIBNT 
Page I 264 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /-7-- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME M1D 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FlLE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SlJ1iMAR.Y JUUGMEN"T was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of 
Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome 
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORIBN TIME AND MOTION FOR 2 
LEAVE TO FILE LA TE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUM:MARY 
mDGMENT 
Page I 265 
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FILEU 
\ JUN 1 7 2011 
NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
Alison Brace, Attorney ~ SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK L DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
P.O. Box 6061 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-353-5213 
ISB: 6611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEURER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES 1-V, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
Case No. CV-2010-212 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE 
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL OF 
RECORD 
I, Alison E. Brace, being first duly sworn upon oath do state as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. 
2. I have represented Defenclant since March 29, 2011 . 
3. At the time I was retained, Defendant and I agreed that I would attempt to negotiate a 
settlement in the matter. 
4 . ft was agreed at the time counsel was hired that, if the matter continued on to trial , 
Defendant would locate another attorney to pursue the trial. 
5. At the time Mr. Williams filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, it appeared that a 
settlement was possible. 
6. However, since that time, it has become apparent that settlement is not an option in this 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO WITHDRAW -1 
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matter. 
7. Counsel has informed Defendant that an extension of time for any of the trials is not an 
option, and that she must either retain counsel or proceed prose at the June 21st Summary 
Judgment hearing, as well as the July 13ih court trial. 
DAT~ J 5~ 2011 @A(i]£f/lae1, "" 
Alison E. Brace / 
Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this / .!( day of June, 2011. 
~p~~ 
Residing at: ,;6014-e ,~ 
My Commission Expires:~o// 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO WITHDRAW-2 
Page I 267 
NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
Alison Brace, Attorney 
P.O. Box 6061 





JUN 1 7 2011 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEURER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES 1-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-212 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
COMES NOW Alison E. Brace, from the firm Non Confrontational Legal Solutions, 
pursuant to Rule 11 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civli Procedure, and moves this Court for an Order 
allowing her to withdraw as attorney of record for N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards, 
Defendant. 
Said motion is supported by the Affidavit of Alison Brace, attached. 
Oral argument is requested . 
.....,-, 
DATE-<iUbV'- 15 , 2011. 
' ~: j -~// . ·. f,..,A ) . ! ? _ CL4-1C;11..J [; .1 o~ 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW-1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below, by United States Mail: 
N.E.M. Richards 
P.O. Box 950 
Shoshone, ID 83352 
Robert E. Williams 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW -2 
·{~8~ 
Alison E. Brace / 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
j JUN 2 0 2011 
I 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN lDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTHJUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 












DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
and thereof states as follows: 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Defendant, Ms. Richards, has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of 
whom conducted any discovery. Plaintiff's deposition has not been taken, and no 
interrogatories or requests to produce documents were propounded on behalf of Ms. 
Richards. In addition, prior counsel failed to interview Ms. Richards to determine the 
true nature of the facts of the case, or advise her as to the legal framework guiding this 
litigation. Therefore, this matter will come on for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment without adequate factual discovery having occurred, and without 
Plaintiff's own testimony, unfiltered by counsel's authorship, before the court. If 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 1 
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permitted by the Court, Defendant will file counterclaims, conduct discovery, and pursue 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on those claims, and as to Plaintiffs claim, in due 
course and in compliance ·with any litigation schedule ordered by the Court. 
Plaintiffs "sworn statements" as contained in his affidavit in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and "verified statements" drafted by counsel, are unchallenged 
by the test of cross-examination. The Court has only the deposition testimony of 
Defenda.11t, lead by opposing counsel, without objection from Defendant's counsel, to 
provide background factual narrative. Defendant submits simultaneously herewith the 
Affidavit ofN.E.M. Richards in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
(Richard's Affidavit) to provide a more complete, balanced factual background reflecting 
the intent of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, is a single, disabled woman, age sixty, (60) residing 
in the City of Shoshone, Idaho. (Richards Deposition pg. 9; Richards Affidavit, pg 1, 
parag. 1 & 2; hereinafter referred to for citation as "RD" and "RA" respectively) Ms. 
Richards met Plaintiff, Donald Steuerer in the late 1980s when she purchased a home, 
located at 115 N. Greenwood in the City of Shoshone, across the street from the home in 
which Plaintiff resided, 110 N. Greenwood, legally described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of 
the Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, according to the official plat map 
thereof. (hereinafter also referred to as "the real property in question" or "at issue") (RA 
pg. 2, parag. 2) 
In the late 1990s Ms. Richards began providing money to Mr. Steurerer, at his 
request, because he said he could not pay the real prope1iy taxes due on the above 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
2 
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described real property which Steuerer represented to be delinquent, and upon which a 
tax sale was imminent. (RA pg 2, parag. 5) Ms. Richards believed Steuerer ovmed the 
property, and had no knowledge other than provided by Mr. Steuerer regarding taxes, or 
of other liens or encumbrances relating to the real property. (RA pg 2 parag. 6) Prior to 
February of 1997 Ms. Richards had provid~d Mr. Steuerer two thousand dollars ($2,000). 
(RA pg 2, parag. 8) 
On or about February 24, 1997, Donald Steuerer, as Grantor, executed a \Va.rra.11ty 
Deed and delivered same to Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as Grantees, 
whereby the property in question was conveyed from Plaintiff solely to Plaintiff and 
Defendant jointly. As a result of this transaction Ms. Richards believed herself to be the 
one half (1/2) ovmer of the property in question. In 1997 Ms. Richards believed the value 
of the property to be approximately six thousand dollars $6,000, or the value determined 
by the Tax Assessor. (RA pg 3, parag. 11) 
Between 1997 and 2000 Ms. Richards provided Mr. Steuerer, in addition to the 
two thousand dollars ($2,000) referred to above, five thousand dollars ($5,000) more, 
again under the same circumstances. (RA pg 3, parag. 14) In May of the year 2000 Ms. 
Richards learned that Donald Steuerer had not in fact paid real property taxes past due on 
Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, as he had led Ms. Richards to believe. (RA pg. 3 
parag. 15) 
On or about May 8, 2000, Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as 
Grantors, executed a Quitclaim Deed and delivered same to N.E.M. Richards as Grantee, 
whereby the property in question was conveyed from joint ovmership of the parties, to 
the sole ownership of Ms. Richards. As a result of this transaction Ms. Richards believed 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ~ 
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herself to be the sole owner of the property in question. (RA pg 4, parag. 18) In 2000 
Ms. Richards believed the value of the property to be approximately seven thousand 
dollars ($7,000), or the value determined by the Tax Assessor. (RA pg. 4parag. 19) 
At the time of the Quitclaim deed in the year 2000, Ms. Johnson had given Mr. 
Steuerer seven thousand dollars ($7,000) up to this point in time, and he had not repaid 
her any money. (RD pg. 27, ln. 1-22, pg. 17, In. 11-15) Ms. Richards believed and 
believes; she had an agreement with Mr. Steuerer that he \Vould repay her seven thousand 
dollars, ($7,000) consisting of the first two thousand dollars ($2,000) provided to Steurer 
prior to 1997, and the five thousand dollars ($5,000) provided to Steuerer between 1997 
and 2000, as soon as possible, within the time frame, and that she would not charge him 
rent; and if he paid her back, within the time frame, she would reconvey the property in 
question. (RA pg. 5 parag. 22) No specific time frame, or date was discussed or agreed 
to for repayment and reconveyance, other than, as soon as possible. (RA pg. 5, parag. 22) 
Beginning on or about May 8, 2000, Ms. Richards began to pay back due and 
owing taxes on the property at issue and has paid all taxes due relating to said real 
property from that date forward representing tax years 1996 to present. (RA pg. 4, parag. 
21) Ms. Richards made these payments because she believed she was the sole owner of 
the real property. (RA pg. 4 parag. 21) Based on the agreement she had with :tv1r. 
Steuerer she would have reconveyed the property in question to him upon repayment of 
funds provided, if he had done so as soon as possible within a reasonable time. (RA pg. 
5, parag. 21, RD pp. 16, ln.11-21, pg. 17, In. 2-4, pg. 26, ln. 8-12) Mr. Steuerer made no 
effort, nor tendered any payment to Ms. Richards for years, and years. (RA pg. 5, parag. 
23) 
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As time passed Ms. Richards determined that any agreement to reconvey the 
property had expired, because Mr. Steuerer had not repaid her as soon as possible within 
the time frame of providing him the funds. (RA pg. 5 parag. 24) Apparently, Mr. 
Steuerer learned in 2009 or 2010 that a third party had a commercial interest in the 




Defendant does not dispute Plaintiffs legal recitation of the typical standard of 
review regarding summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issues of material fact are pre:sented based upon the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions on file together with any affidavits. The current posture of this case presents 
genuine issues of material fact, only resolved by the Court's ability to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. 
Defendant vigorously disputes Plaintiffs strained and incomplete version of the 
facts. Plaintiff cites to pages 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 26, 29, 35, 38, 51 and 52 of Defendant's 
deposition for the proposition that "They have always agreed that upon repayment of the 
loans, the Real Property would be reconveyed to Steuerer, in that the deeds constituted 
security devices for the repayment of the loans." Plaintiffs conclusory assertion is 
incomplete and intentionally leaves out crucial factual information testified to by Ms. 
Richards. 
Ms. Richards has always believed she held ownership, but did in fact use the term 
"loans" for the sums provided Mr. Steuerer, conditioned upon repayment as soon as 
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possible, within the time frame of the loans. (Richards Deposition transcript "RD" pg. 
16, ln. 14-22; pg.;17, ln. 4; pg. 24, ln. 13-25; pg. 25, ln. 4-20; pg. 26, ln. 8-12; pg. 28; pg. 
51, 10-17; pg. 52, ln 1-20; pg. 56, ln. 17-20, RA pg. 1, parag. 3, pg. 3, parag. 11, pg. 4, 
parag. 18 & 21, pg. 5, parag. 22) Even if Ms. Richards understood exactly what a 
"security device" was, she didn't believe that's what she held. (RD pg 51 ln. 20-25, and 
see citations above for belief in ownership) She has repeatedly stated she has believed 
from tlie time of the W a...1Tanty Deed that she owned, first half, and after the Quitclaim 
deed, all the property in question. It is true she agreed to reconvey the ownership 
interest, if she were repaid as soon as possible within the time frame of the payments. 
However, timely repayment did not occur. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The law is abundantly clear that conveyance of real property by deed is 
conclusive as to transfer ownership. LC. § 55-606. Here the instruments used to transfer 
title were first a warranty deed, and secondly a quitclaim deed, both fully satisfying the 
statute of frauds, and providing certain covenants and warranties of title. LC. §§ 9-503, 
55- 612. In addition to those warranties and covenants implied by statute for all grants, a 
warranty deed expressly provides, among others, covenant to provide defense of title as 
to all claims. Amonson v. Idaho Development Co., 25 Idaho 615, 139 P. 352 (Idaho 
1914) (Black's Law Dictionary-warranty deed definition) 
The law presumes that the holder of title to property is the owner thereof Erb v. 
Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 at 331, 824 P.2d 903 (Idaho App. 1992); Hawe v. Hawe, 89 
Idaho 367, 406 P.2d 106 (1965); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958). 
Plaintiff would have this court believe he didn't understand that he conveyed first half, 
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then the entirety of the property in question to Ms. Richards, when the deeds were 
absolutely clear as to that plain fact. Plaintiff implies that somehow it was he, not Ms. 
Richards who was taken advantage of; he who took thousands of dollars from an 
emotionally challenged disabled women; he who never repaid a cent or showed any 
interest in recovering the real property until a third party showed valuable interest. 
Plaintiff argues that these deeds, absolute on their face were in fact mortgages. 
Idai.11o Cou...rts have repeatedly rejected similar claims. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 
799,241 P.3d 972 (Idaho 2010); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 
2006); Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916), "It is a 
well-settled rule of law that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a different 
construction from that clearly appearing on its face, claiming that it is a mortgage, he 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with the 
right to repurchase, was intended." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, at 
1091-92. (Idaho 2006) 
A person may purchase lands, and at the same time contract to reconvey them for 
a certain sum, without the intention of either party that the transaction should in effect be 
a mortgage." Id at 1092, quoting Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207 
(1930). The transaction at issue here is clearly such a case. Ms. Richards plainly viewed 
the transaction as one whereby she took ownership, but under certain, somewhat unclear 
circumstances, she would have reconveyed the property to Mr. Steuerer. The factual 
difficulty with the case is lack of a written agreement to repurchase or re-convey. In this 
regard it is Plaintiff's burden by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the legal 
presumption. Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) 
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The Hogg Court recited the factors to be considered when deciding whether a 
deed absolute on its face is a mortgage; (a) the existence of a debt to be secured, (b) the 
satisfaction or survival of the debt, ( c) the previous negotiations of the parties, ( d) the 
inadequacy of the price paid, (e) the financial condition of the grantor, and (f) the 
intention of the parties. In Hogg, the Court affirmed the trial court, finding a conveyance 
of title rather than a mortgage. The Court emphasized that no evidence was presented of 
any pressure to enter into the transaction. The court also referenced the fact that, like in 
the case at bar, no effort was made to re-acquire the property. 
"Whether a debt was to be secured is less than abundantly clear on the facts before 
the court, certainly if a debt it was, it has not been repaid. The parties' recollections are 
at odds concerning their negotiations. Plaintiff argues that the price paid was inadequate 
and that "The fair market value of the Real Property was substantially in excess of the 
loans made by Richards to Steuerer at the time they were made." This contention is in · 
obvious contradiction to the only evidence on this issue, the Tax Assessors Records. 
(Attached hereto) 
In 1997 the Assessor valued the land at four thousand one hundred seventy six 
dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), while Ms. Richards 
paid two thousand dollars ($2,000) for her purchase of a one half (1/2) interest thereof. 
In the year 2000 the Assessor continued to value the land at four thousand one hundred 
seventy six dollars ($4,176), while the improvements had risen to three thousand dollars 
($3,000), while Ms. Richards paid five thousand dollars ($5,000) in addition to the two 
thousand dollars ($2,000), previously paid, for a grand total of seven thousand dollars 
BRJEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
mDGMENT 
8 
Page I 277 
($7,000) for her outright purchase of the property. In other words, the evidence proves 
that Ms. Richards paid to Mr. Steuerer almost the exact amount the Assessor determined 
to be the value of the property. 
As to the last two factors, Ms. Richards only knows what Mr. Steuerer told her 
about his financial condition, and his intentions regarding their transaction. Ms. Richards 
did discover that Mr. Steuerer had not used the initial sums provided to Mr. Steuerer to 
pay· real property taxes. l\1s. PJ.chards car1 state vlitl1 certain(y v1hat her intentions ,;vere 
with regard to the transactions; that she believed she gained an ownership interest by 
payments to Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards confirmed that belief in her ov.rnership by 
consistent payment of real property taxes commencing the very same day she acquired 
fee simple title, by Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. Mr. Steuerer on the other hand, 
made no actions and took no steps, confirming in any way that he believed the 
transactions were mere mortgages. 
Idaho Court's have rejected the proposition, put forth by Plaintiff here, that when 
at the time of execution of an absolute conveyance a separate agreement to reconvey is 
also executed, that trans~ction will constitute a mortgage. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 
355, at 362,399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) 
The rule above stated is too narrow. See criticism, note 3, p. 234, LR.A. 
[N.S.] 1916B. It fails to incorporate other necessary and controlling 
elements, and eliminates the question of intention of the parties, and 
encroaches upon their right to contract. In effect, literally speaking, this 
portion of the opinion holds that a deed, in form an absolute conveyance, 
expressing the intention of the parties, coupled with possession, payment 
of taxes, assertion of ownership, and with a positive understanding by the 
grantee that he had an absolute conveyance and his positive refusal to 
accept anything but an absolute conveyance, cannot be upheld as such, if 
at the time of the execution of the deed an agreement was entered into to 
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reconvey the property. Such a holding is contrary to the great weight of 
authority, and not in harmony with prior and recent decisions of this court. 
Whether a deed, absoiute in its face is to be deemed a mortgage depends upon the 
intention of the parties in regard to it at the time of its execution. "In order to convert a 
deed absolute in its terms into a mortgage, it is necessary that the understanding and 
intention of both parties, grantee as well as grantor, to that effect should be 
concurrent and the same." Clontz, 88 Idaho 355 at 362, 399 P.2d 949 at 952. (emphasis 
added) Therefore, even if this Court believes Plaintiffs current claim that he believed 
these transactions were mortgages and not conveyances, it must also find that Ms. 
Richards also held the same belief. No evidence has been presented to support such a 
finding, quite the contrary. Ms. Richards has uniformly and consistently held out that she 
owned the property. 
STANDING I EQUITY/ LACHES I ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff comes to this court seeking to have this cou..."'i declare the transaction of 
the parties an equitable mortgage. "In attempting to have a deed declared a mortgage, 
equity requires the party so asking to tender and offer to pay the amount of the debt and 
interest before he is entitled to any standing in a court of equity. Shaner v. Ratgdrum 
State BariJz, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) citing (Hicks v. Hicks (Tex. Civ.), 26 
S.W. 227; Dawson v. Overmyer, 141 Ind. 438, 40 N.E. 1065; Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76 
Tex. 225, 13 S.W. 296; Jones on Mortgages, 2d ed., par. 1095.) No evidence has been 
presented that Plaintiff ever even discussed repayment of the monies provided prior to 
2010, and no evidence that money has ever been tendered. Therefore, the question of 
whether Plaintiff has standing to request equity from this court is presented. 
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\Vhen seeking equity one must approach the court with clean hands deserving 
equity. This principal and estoppel by laches was explored by the Court in Clontz v. 
Fortner at 363. Here, like in Clontz no evidence exists that plaintiff even spoke to 
defendant about the transaction for years and years. Like in Clontz, the defendant 
expressed public displays of ownership of the property, while plaintiff sat silent. The 
Clontz court found the Plaintiff to be estopped from claiming the deed, absolute on its 
face, to be a mere mortgage. The Cou.,_rt, at page 364 cited a California case, Hmnud v. 
HavVihome, 52 Cal.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959), at some length, quoted below, 
It was not until plaintiffs learned of the interest of an oil company in the 
subject property that they bestirred themselves to ascertain whether such 
property was worth an effort on their part to reclaim it. As commented in 
Livermore v. Beal (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 535,549, 64 P.2d 987, 'one is not 
permitted to stand by while another develops property in which he claims 
an interest, and then if the property proves valuable, assert a claim thereto, 
and if it does not prove valuable, be vvilling [399 P.2d 954] that the losses 
incurred* * * be borne by the opposite party. This thought was expressed 
in one case by the following language: 'If the property proves good, I want 
it; if it is valueless, you keep it." (See also Robison v. Hanley (1955), 136 
Cal.App.2d 820, 824-825[1-2], 289 P.2d 560.' 338 P.2d at 392. 
The following statement from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 59, p. 105, 1s 
applicable here: 
'A party who has the right to treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage 
and to redeem from it must be reasonably prompt in asserting such right; 
very Jong delay, run,ou11tin_g to laches on his part, maydefeat his right to 
have the deed declared to be a mortgage and his right of redemption, 
especially if interests of third persons have intervened, or if the grantee has 
been allowed to deal with the property in such manner that a redemption 
would seriously prejudice him, and one conclusively chargeable with full 
knowledge of his rights will not be permitted to excuse his delay in 
seeking relief on the ground of ignorance of his rights.' 
And the following from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107, pp. 547-548: 
'The term 'quasi estoppel' has been applied to certain legal bars which are 
in some respects analogous to estoppel in pais and which have the same 
practical operation as an estoppel in pais, but which nevertheless differ 
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from that form of estoppel in essential particulars. Thus, it has been held 
that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, 
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. 
'The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election, 
ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the 
principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a 
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him. The doctrine 
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistentwith one in which he __ acquiesced, or of which he 
accepted a benefit.' 
Here, Steuerer was perfectly content to allow Ms. Richards to believe she ovmed 
the property for some thirteen years. Steuerer sat idle while a disabled woman paid real 
property taxes on the home she believed she owned. Steuerer was perfectly content to be 
pitied as man who couldn't pay rent. Mr. Steuerer 'took not one step to assert ownership, 
nor obligation, with regard to the property in question until he learned that it was not a no 
rent hovel, but a developable parcel of commercial land. Under these circumstances this 
Court, like the Clontz and Hamud Courts, should send away the opportunist. Mr. 
Steuerer's claim is barred by laches and equitable estoppel. 
RESPECTULL Y SUBMITTED, 
STOPHERP. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
DATED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / :/- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of 
Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome 
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
CHRISTOP 
, 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
JUN 2 0 2011 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN A"ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 











Defendants ) -----~~~~------. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
CV-2010-212 
AFFIDAVIT OF N.E.M. 
RICHARDS IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows; 
1. · I am a single woman, residing in the City of Shoshone, Lincoln County, Idaho. 
2. I am a disabled veteran and suffer from a host of physical and mental conditions 
that impair my abilities to concentrate, and recall information quickly. I have been 
hospitalized for long periods of time due to my conditions and heavily medicat~d for 
same. 
3. I am the sole fee simple title ovmer of the real property located in the City of 
Shoshone, Lincoln County, Idaho, legally described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of the 
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Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, according to the official plat map thereof, of 
record with the Lincoln County Recorder, by conveyance through a Quitclaim Deed 
dated May 8, 2000. 
4. I am acquainted with Donald Steuerer as my neighbor who has resided across the 
street from my home for many years. 
5. In the mid 1990s I began to provide money to Donald Steuerer, at his request, 
allegedly, because he could not pay the real property taxes due on the above described 
real property which Steuerer represented to be delinquent, and upon which a tax sale was 
imminent. 
6. I had no knowledge, other than provided by Mr. Steuerer regarding taxes, of other 
liens or encumbrances relating to the real property described as Lots 4 &5, Block E, City 
of Shoshone, and believed Mr. Steuerer to be the owner of the property. 
7. I felt sorry for Mr. Steuerer and did not want to see him lose his home and 
become destitute. 
8. I provided Mr. Steuerer two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to February of 1997. 
9. On or about February 24, 1997, Donald Steuerer, as Grantor, executed a Warranty 
Deed and delivered same to Donald E.K. Steuerer and myself, N.E.M. Richards, as 
Grantees, whereby Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, State of 
Idaho was conveyed by the grantor to the grantee .. 
10. Said Warranty Deed was recorded on February 26, 1997, as Instrument No, 
16173, Lincoln County Idaho Recorder of Deeds. A true and correct copy of said 
Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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11. I believed, by virtue of the money provided to Donald Steuerer, and the Warranty 
Deed referenced above, I was the undivided one half (1/2) owner of Lots 4 & 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon. 
12. I believe the value of the real property legally described as Lots 4 & 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon, had, in the year 
1997, a value of approximately six thousand dollars $6,000, or the value determined by 
lhe Tax: ltssessor. 
13. I believed a verbal agreement was reached with Mr. Steuerer that he would repay 
me the two thousand dollars as soon as possible, within the time frame, and that I would 
not charge him rent, and if he paid me back, within the time frame, I would reconvey my 
interest in Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone. No specific time frame, or date was 
discussed or agreed to for repayment and reconveyance, other than, as soon as possible. 
14. Between the years 1997 and 2000 I provided Mr. Steuerer, in addition to the two 
thousand dollars ($2,000) referred to above, five thousand dollars ($5,000) more, again 
under the same circumstances. 
15. In May of the year 2000 I learned that Donald Steuerer had not in fact paid real 
property taxes past due on Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, as he had led me to 
believe. 
16. On or about May 8, 2000, Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as 
Grantors, executed a Quitclaim Deed and delivered same to N.E.M. Richards as Grantee, 
whereby Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, State of Idaho was 
conveyed from grantor to grantee. 
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17. Said Quitclaim Deed was recorded on May 8, 2000, as Instrument No. 168006, 
Lincoln County Idaho Recorder of Deeds. A true and correct copy of said Warranty Deed 
is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
18. I believed, by virtue of the momes provided to Donald Steuerer, and the 
Quitclaim Deed referenced above, I become the sole fee simple owner of Lots 4 & 5, 
Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon. 
19. I beliei/e the ·value of the real property legally described as Lots 4 & 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon, had, in the year 
2000, a value of approximately seven thousand dollars $7,000, or the value determined 
by the Tax Assessor. 
20. I believed a verbal agreement was reached with Mr. Steuerer that he would repay 
me seven thousand dollars, ($7,000) consisting o_f the first the two thousand dollars 
($2,000) provided to Steurer prior to 1997, and the five thousand dollars ($5,000) 
provided to Steuerer between 1997 and 2000, as soon as possible, within the time frame, 
and that I would not charge him rent; and if he paid me back, within the time frame, I 
would reconvey my interest in Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone. No specific time 
frame, or date was discussed or agreed to for repayment and r.econveyance, other than, as 
soon as possible. 
21. Beginning on or about May 8, 2000, I began to pay back due and owing taxes on 
Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone and have paid all taxes due relating to said real 
property from that date forward representing tax years 1996 to present. I made these 
payments because I believed !'was the sole owner of the real property. 
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22. I believed the agreement with Mr. Steuerer arising from the monies provided 
beginning in the year 1997 through the year 2000 was that Mr. Steuerer sold me half, 
then all of the real property constituting Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, with a 
right to repurchase said property, if said repurchase occurred within the time frame of the 
monies provided. No specific date was discussed or agreed upon, other than as soon as 
possible. 
23. As time passed and !vir. Steuerer made no effort to contact me or offer to 
repurchase the property it was my belief that his right to do so expired. 
DATED this /'{, day of June, 2011. 
( 
N.E.M. RJCHARDS · 
SIGNED Al\TD SWORN before me on the~ day of June, 2011. 
r 
[ SE.AL J 
N;tjrry Public: . 
Residing at: th, z1 h A-krV 
My Commission Expi es: 2{) () c_ ,-
AFFIDAVIT OF N.E.M. RJCHARDS 
2-01/ 
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"l'ff~·::,· !:.,_ 1 ~ .... ...:~~ NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
Alison Brace, Attorney 
P.O. Box 6061 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEURER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES 1-V, 
Defendants. 
c~sp Nn. t'.\/-2010-212 
ORDER ALLOWING COUNSEL 
TO WITHDRAW 
This matter came on for review on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw, and good cause 
appearing thereof; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the firm of Non Confrontational Legal Solutions, LLC., is 
allowed to withdraw as attorney of record for the above-named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant appoint another attorney to appear or 
Defendant shall appear in person by fiiing a written notice with the court stating how she will 
represent herself within twenty (20) days from the date of service or mailing of this Order to 
Defendant. 
Defendant's attorney shall, with due diligence, serve copies of this Order upon Defendant, 
whose last known address is P.O. Box 950, Shoshone, Idaho, 83352, and all other parties to this 
action, and shall file proof of service with the Court. 
DATED this iz2-/ day of June, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I served a copy of this Order to all the parties named below, by United States Mail: 
Alison E. Brace 
Non Confrontational Legal Solutions, LLC 
P.O. Box 6061 
Boise, ID 83707 
Robert E. Williams 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
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CLS To:Attn: Chris Simms (12087882300) 
Chri,wpher Simms, Esq. 
Trlt: ~IWdS LAW fJRM 
P.O. BDx l 861 
Hailey, lD 83333 
Ph: (208! 788-2XOO 
Fax: (20:-?) 7gg_23(i() 
17:04 06/20/11GMT-05 Pg 02-03 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tf-JE FfFTH JU)!CIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF tDAHO, H'>i AND FOR THE C(H!Yl"Y OF LINCOLN 
vs. 
NY.Vt. RIC! lARDS, ab, NICKY 
J-rn't/i\RDS. and .I OJIN DOES l- V. 
Notice to All Parties 
Case No.: CV .:?OJ0<212 
NOTJC[ OF SUBSTJTUTION or 
COUNSEL 
Nn1ice i;; hcrchy given 1lrn1 Chriswpher Simms. faq .. or !he law firm n/' Tl 1;-: s1M\-1S IA w 
FIRM, appc,1rs a;; a11omcys ,li' record for Defcnda111. N.li.iVI. Richards_ nnd /\lison E. 
Brace, Esq. wirhdraws as a!\orncy (.)(record !"or Dci'cndanL N.E.M. Richards. l'lease send 
all Ji1turt correspondence and pieading,; relating lo 1h.is rnauer to: Till-: si:v1MS LAW Frn,v1, 
ATTN: CHRISTOPH ' S!1v: S 
tl;'"~ 
Christopher Simms. Esq. 
/1.ppe~ring_ Counsel 
.0. Box !861, 1-fai!ey, Idaho 83333. 
. day or J unc.. 20 l l. 
Alison E. Brace_ Esq. 
\Vi1hdrawing Counsel 
NOTJCE OF .Sl.iBS1Tn.'TION OF COUNSEL Page l 
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V 
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l__ ) 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK I 
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m:MyF NCLS To:Attn: Chris Simms (12087882300) 17:04 06/20/11 GMT--05 Pg 03-03 
Cei·titkare of mailing or hand ddivery 
l certil\ th,,1L on June 20. 201 l. I served a true :md rnrrc:c1 copy of rhc NOTJCli 01' 
SUBSTJTUTiON 01· COU!\SJ:L upnn ihc 
designa1cd: 
Robert E. Williams 
\Vil:iams. \.kscrvy & Lmhspcid1, L!.P 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome. JD 1n:n 8 
US J\·1nil O I land-delivered 
:_J Facsimile (208) J24-:l 1 J5 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CV-2010-0000212 
Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards 
Hearing type: Motion to Withdraw 
Hearing date: 6/21/2011 
Time: 9:02 am 
Judge: John K Butler 
Court reporter: Candace Childers 
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli 
902 Court introduces case 
Ms. Richards present \Vi.th Counsel Mr. Simms 
.Mr. Williamson present in Court for the Plaintiff. 
Discussion of Ms. Brace motion to withdraw . 
.Mr. Simms has brought signed stipulation for substitution of Counsel. 
Court will allow substitution. 
903 Mr. Simms argues for continuance of motion for summary judgment and trial 
settings. 
906 Mr. Williams argument against continuance 
912 Mr. Si1Tirns farther cmnn1ents. 
913 The Courts comments and decision on motion to continue. 
The Courts scheduling order does clearly require that for a motion for summary judgment 
to be heard it must be filed and served not later than 60 days before trial. 
Scheduling to be heard is less than 30 days before trial 
Court trial has been scheduled since January 18, 2011. 
The Court notes that some discovery has been performed mostly from the Plaintiff in this 
matter . 
.. ·-"'' --... -----·--·. ·--·-··---.--··-· -·-· " ... ____ ,.,_, ... ,. .. ,. ... ~ ....... , .... _.,.,,_, __ "'"' ---·----- -···----·- -- -·. --·--··-··· - -- ... -·-- ·-···--·. ·---· 
The Court further recognizes the importance of a quick resolution in this matter to both 
sides. 
The Court advises that there is one criminal trial set on that day in Lincoln County as 
well as one in Jerome County on same date. If criminal trials are to go they would take 
priority over this matter. However if those matters do resolve or are c continued 
Then this trial will be heard. If this Court trial was to be continued it would be in excess 
of 6 months and court does not feel that is fair to either side. 
Court recognizes that Mr. Simms would like to do some discovery. Court vacates the 
hearing on summary judgment because it does not comply with the Courts scheduling 
order. The Court trial will be left on July 13th_ The Court will allow Mr. Simms to depos 
Mr.Steurer for purposes of trial before trial while the Court recognizes that is beyond the 
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cutoff date in the Courts scheduling order that is the only discovery that he will permitted 
prior to July 13th_ 
Court will know by July 5th if trial date is still available for Cou .. 11.sel. If the Court has to 
vacate the trial because of those proceedings then we will basically be starting over at 
that time and Mr. Williams would be able to re notice his motion for summary judgment 
917 Recess 
Attest 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants, ) _____ =...;c,;===------
I.R.C.P. 30 & 34 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD 
. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will take the 
deposition of Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, upon oral examination on Friday, July 1, 
2011, at the hour of 11 :00, at the location of the Lincoln County Courthouse Jury Room, 
111 W. B Street, Shoshone, Idaho 83352, before a Notary Public or authorized individual 
to administer oaths who may be present at said time and place. 
NOTICE IS FURTHER HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named witness will be 
required to produce, then and there at ·the taking of the said deposition, for examination, 
all documents, papers and items described in Exhibit A ofthis Notice. 
NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM Page l-j96 
If said deposition is not complete on the aforementioned date, the taking thereof 
will be continued from day to day thereafter at the same place until completed, Saturdays, 
Sundays and holidays excluded. 
Dated this 21st day of June, 2011 
CH STOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTO~"l\TEY FOR DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM was 
deljvered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & 
Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile 
to 208.324.3135 . 
NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM Page li97 




The term "document" refers to the originals ( or legible copies where originals are 
unavailable) of any and all tangible items and writings in your possession, custody or 
control, or in the possession, custody or control of your representatives, empioyees, 
agents, or attorneys, including but not limited to records, books of accounts, checks, 
reports, correspondence, telegrams, electronic communications, facsimiles, records of 
telephone conversations or other conversations, meetings or conferences, diaries, 
appointment books, notes, tape recordings, studies and agreements of any kind and 
description. 
II. 
DOCUMENTS CALLED FOR BY THIS NOTICE 
The following sections specify the documents called for by this Notice. Any 
document withheld on the grounds(s) of any alleged privilege or any ot11er basis is to be 
specifically listed with a statement of the ground(s) for withholding each document. 
1. Each and every document you intend to offer as an exhibit at the trial of this 
action. 
EXHIBIT "A" NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM Page I f-98 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73 
P .O. Box 1861 
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FA.X 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N .E.M. RlCHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 










Defendants, ) ----~~==c..i._ ____ _ 
CV-2010-212 
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF 
DOCUMENT ARY EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW, the parties hereto, through counsel, and hereby stipulate to admission of 
the following Exhibits for purposes of Admission into evidence in the trial ofthis matter; 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
1. Warranty Deed from Defendant dated February 24, 1997 
2. Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and Defendant dated May 8, 2000 
3 . Check Stub for Defendant's check number 1812 
., . . . 
4. Check Stub for Defendant's check number 1807 
5. Check Stub for Defendant's check number 1809 
6. Defendant's handwritten notes, dates February 25, 1997; March 3, 1997; April 1, 1997; 
May 1, 1997 and June 1, 1997 in the left hand column 
7. Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Document 1983 & 1984 
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
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1 
8. 1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000 
9. 1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated May 8, 2000 
10. 1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000 
11. 1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000 
12. 2000 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000, 
and June 20, 2001 
13. 2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 2i, 200i 
and June 19, 2002 
14. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2002 
15. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2003 
16. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2004 
17. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2005 
18. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2006 
19. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2007 
20. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2008 
21. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2009 
22. Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2010 
23. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1997 
24. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1998 
25. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1999 
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 2 
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26. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
27. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2001 
28. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2002 
29. Hi<:tnry Report frnm thP. Cif-fir.P. nfthP T.inr.nln Count Ac:<:ec:c:nr for T.nts 4 ;mr'i 5, Rlnck F, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2003 
30. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2004 
31. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln C~mnt Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2005 
32. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2006 
33. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2007 
34. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2008 
35. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2009 
# 
36. History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, 
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2010 
37. Affidavit of Donn W. Bordewyk 
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 3 
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3 8. Litigation Guarantee 
39. Check Register Notations - Shoshone Club 
40. Demonstrative Exhibit/ Interest Rate Calculation Annual Rate 12% 
Christopher P. Simms 
ROBERT E. WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Robert E. Williams 
Dated 
Dated 
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 4 
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IDAHO STATE BARNO. 1693 
WILLL\MS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Telephone: (208) 324-2303 
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135 
11 Attomey for Plaintiff 
FILED AM'. 7:ac,q r· 
PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-212 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and through his attorney of 
record, Robert E. ¥/illiams .of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, a...11d submits b..is Trial 
Brief in this matter addressing selective legal issues likely to arise during the trial. Trial is set 
to commence July 13, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff previously submitted a Brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was not held because the Court detennined 
the Motion for Summary Judgment to have been untimely filed under the Court's Scheduling 
Order, dated January 18, 2011. Some of the matters referred to in this Trial Brief are discussed 
TRIAL BRIEF - 1 
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!! -in m,-w,::, ,-1f'>hii1 in P1!'.linfrff' .« RriPf in snppnrt of Motion for S11mmary Judgment previously 
filed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an action to quiet title to real property located in the city of Shoshone, Idaho, 
more particularly described as Lots 4 and 5 of Block E, Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, 
II I 
Idaho in the Plaintiff, subject to a mortgage in favor of Defendant. The record ownership of 
the real property is currently in the name of the Defendant. In 1997, a deed to the real property 
from Plaintiff to himself and Defendant was recorded. In 2000, the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to the same real property, in favor of Defendant. 
Plaintiff contends that by verbal agreement of the parties the deeds were given in 
response to loans made by Defendant to Plaintiff and that the deeds were intended to serve as 
"collateral" for the repayment of loans made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. The Plaintiff 
contends that the Defendant loaned him Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) during the year 
1997 when the warranty deed was recorded and an additional Six Thousand Seven Hundred 
Eighty-Five Dollars ($6,785.00) was loaned to him over ten (10) years by Defendant paying 
real prgperty taxesfor the years 1996 throµgh fae first one'."half(l/2) of 2010, rr1ak.irJ,g total 
loans of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars ($8,785.00). Although 
Defendant is likely to contend that additional amounts were loaned, Plaintiff believes the 
evidence will establish total loans of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars 
($8,785.00). If the deeds were given as collateral, they are mortgages. Plaintiff owns the fee 
simple title to the real property subject to the Defendant's mortgage, and only the amount of 
the loans secured by the mortgage needs to be determined. 
TRIAL BRIEF - 2 




II. PAROLE EVIDENCE 
In Idaho, parole evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that a conveyance of 
land, absolute in form, is a mortgage. Credit Bureau of Preston vs. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 
440 P.2d 145, 149 (1968). 
III. INTENT OF THE PARTIES IS PARA.MOUNT 
Unlike the facts in several reported cases in the state ofidaho on the subject of when a 
deed absolute constitutes a mortgage, there is no written memorandum between these parties as 
to their understandings at the times the deeds were executed and recorded. The rule in Parks vs 
Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207 (1930), was cited by the Idaho Supreme Court as 
recently as 2006 in Hogg vs Wolsky, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, 1092 and 1093, that 
The intention of the parties at the· time an agreement to execute a deed is 
consummated is determinative as to whether title is irrevocably transferred or the 
conveyance is merely security for the debt for performance of an obligation 
is particularly significant 
In addition to the intent of the parties in determining whether a deed constitutes a 
mortgage, Idaho courts have examined factors including existence of a debt to be secured; 
survival of the debt after the mortgage was granted; the prior negotiations of the parties; 
adequacy of the consideration given for the mortgage; the comparative value of the real 
property at the time the deed was given to the amount loaned and the financial condition of the 
Grantor are factors in determining whether a deed was a mortgage. Dickens vs Hesston, 21 
P.2d 905, 908-910, 353 Idaho 91 (1933). 
TRIAL BRIEF - 3 




IV. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
A contention that the Deeds are to be construed as mortgages must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence. Shaner vs Rathdrum State Bank, 129 Idaho 576, 583, 161 P. 
90, 92 (1916). 
V. INTEREST ON LOANS 
Plaintiff believes the evidence to be produced at trial will establish that both parties 
characterized the transactions at the time of the recording of the two (2) deeds as loans, and 
that the understanding of the parties was that the loans would be repaid as soon as Plaintiff was 
able to, with no interest. 
It is anticipated that Defendant may allege that interest on loans made by her to the 
Plaintiff should be compounded annually. Compound interest does not appear to be available 
under I. C. § 28-22-104, Doolittle by and through Doolittle vs Meridian Joint School District 
No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 919 P.2d 334 (1996). 
Plaintiff believes the evidence at trial will establish that the parties made no agreement 
as to the payment of interest on the amounts loaned by the Defendant to him, and that the first 
time interest on the loans was mentioned was during 2010 when a conversation took place 
between the parties during which Plaintiff offered to pay interest to the Defendant for the 
money loaned to him in exchange for her cooperation in placing title to the real property back 
into the name of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff anticipates the evidence will further show that 
Def end ant did not respond to Plaintiff's proposal to pay interest as part of the loan transaction. 
TRIAL BRIEF - 4 
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II .. Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1)3 pro,.1ides that: 
"Vvhen there is no express contact in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (.12) on the hundred by the year 
on ... 3. money lent. .. " 
Idaho courts have upheld provisions of contracts expressly providing for no interest on 
a loan, requiring the payment of interest under I.C. § 28-22-104 only after a "no interest" 
ii obiigation becomes due. Jntemational Business M-achine Corporation vs Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 
94, 677 P.2d 507, 511 (Idaho App., 1984). Plaintiff believes that the evidence at trial will 
establish that the loans became due when Mr. Steuerer could repay them and that this date 
occurred in 2010. Thus interest under I.C. § 28-22-104(3) should be computed only from the 
year 2010, the year during which the loans became due because Mr. Steuerer had the ability to 
repay them under the rule affirmed in Intemational Business Machines Corporation vs 
Lawhorn, supra. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of July, 2011. 
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
O~J\L-
ROBERTE. WILLIAMS 
TRIAL BRIEF - 5 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of July, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear below by the 
method indicated: 
. Christopher P. Simms 
I . - -
Attorney at Law 
400 South Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333-8402 
TRIAL BRIEF - 6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
CV-2010-0000212 
Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 7/13/2011 
Time: 9:00 am 
Judge: John K Butler 
Court reporter: Candace Childers 
l\1inutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli 
900 Court introduces case 
Time and place set for Court Trial 
Mr. Steuerer present in Court with Counsel Mr. Williams 
Ms. Richards present in Court with Counsel Mr. Simms 
902 Plaintiff will not be making opening statement 
Defendant will make opening statement 
902 In chambers conference discussion of exhibit that was not provided in discovery. The 
Court will allow if foundation is laid for the exhibit. 
903 Mr. Williams addresses Exhibit 206 being allowed as to credibility 
904 M.,r. Simms has briefed the Court in written brief and will waive opening statement. 
904 Court will take case under advisement and briefs will be requested. 
905 Mr. Williams calls Donald Steuerer, Clerk administers oath to Mr. Steuerer. 
Mr. \Villiams begins direct exam. 
912 Objectiont())eading guestion/ sustained by.the Court .. 
915 Objection speculating/ sustained by the Court 
916 Objection not responsive to the question/ sustained by the Court 
918 Exhibit 101 is admitted without objection. Exhibit is handed to Mr. Steuerer. 
926 Mr. Simms asked the answer be stricken, Sustained by the Court. 
928 Witness turns to exhibit 102. 
929 Objection to answer/ sustained calls for yes or no answer. 
936 Objection to answer/ sustained 
936 Objection/ overruled 
941 Objection not responsive to question asked/ sustained by the Court. 
946 Objection not responsive to question/ sustained by the Court 
COURT MINUTES 
947 Objection asked and answered/ overruled 
948 Objection personal knowledge yes or no answer/ sustained. 
949 .Mr. Simms begins cross exam of.Mr. Steuerer 
955 Objection on grounds of relevance . 
.Mr. Simms advises of relevance. 
956 Sustained how many jobs is not relevant, may ask about annual gross earnings. 
1005 Objection/withdrawn 
1012 Objection/ sustained by the Court 
1014 Court recesses for 20 minutes 
103 7 Back on the record 
.Mr. Simms continues cross exam of Ms. Steuerer. 
1042 Objection, Court notes for the record that there is a conflict in the testimony and 
affidavit filed. 
1049 Court advises Mr. Simms that question has been asked and answered. 
1050 Mr. Simms asks that answer be stricken. Court sustained. 
1051 Not responsive .... overruled. 
1053 Mr. Williams re direct of.Mr. Steuerer. 
1055 Objection to the leading nature of question/ sustained 
1059 Mr. Steuerer steps down. 
1059 Mr. Williams calls Donn Bordewyk General Manager from Valley Co-op. 
Clerk administers oath to Mr. Bordewyk. 
.Mr. Williams begins direct exai-n. 
1108 Objection outside witness personal knowledge. Question rephrased. 
1111 Objection to anything that is settlement negotiations/ overruled 
1113 Cross exam by Mr. Simms 
1113 Mr. Borde\\yk steps down and the Plaintiff rests. 
- "-·- -· ' -· . 
1113 Mr. Simms calls Ms. N.E.M Richards 
Clerk administers oath to Ms. Richards. 
1115 Mr. Simms offers all exhibits 101 through 138 
Exhibits 101 through 13 8 are admitted 
1116 Mr. Simms begins direct exam. 
1127 Objection leading ...... Court requests that Mr. Simms rephrase question. 
1132 Objection asked and answered ..... Overruled 
1135 Court asks .Mr. Simms to rephrase question 
1135 Mr. Williams is allowed to ask question in aide of an objection. 
Court advises to clarify time period. 
1138 Mr. Simms hands witness exhibit 206 
COURT MINUTES 
1142 Mr. Simms offers Check carbons as exhibit 212 
1144Mr. Williams believes this exhibit has been marked as 103,104 and 105. 
1145 Mr. Simms agrees that they are repeated exhibits 
Mr. Simms apologies that original was not.produced until now. 
1146 Exhibit 212 is admitted. 
1146 Court asks clarifying question. 
1147 Mr. Simms offers Defendants 213 
1148 Mr. Williams comments as to this defendant's exhibit 213. Objects to exhibit 
because of repeated requests in discovery 
1150 Objection to question/ sustained 
1151 Offers defense exl1ibit 214 and 215 
1152 Mr. William.s's objections to exhibits 
1153 Objections noted and exhibit 214 and 215 are admitted. 
1154 Objection leading/ sustained 
1156 Objection/ sustained 
1157 Objection/overruled 
1203 Afternoon recess 
1227 Back on the record. 
Mr. Simms continues with direct exam of Ms. Richards. 
1234 Objection to discussion of attorney's fees/ sustained 
1234 l\tir. Vlilliams requests that disposition be published. Court allows. 
1235 Mr. Williams begins cross exam of Ms. Richards. 
1241 Objection forces legal conclusion/ overruled 
1244 Witness is handed deposition. 
1247 Objection to deposition being read when it has been published/ sustained 
1251 Objection/ overruled 
1254 Objection no evidence money was paid in the year 2000/ sustained 
102 Objection/ deposition testimony is deposition testimony 
_ 103 Obj~ction asked llll~ answered/ te~imony has alre11-dy tJeen established 
111 Answers to interrogatories are handed to Ms. Richards. 
114 Court advises that copies are not verified. Mr. Williams advises that they were filed 
by Ms. Richards' s attorney. 
121 Objection asked and answered and assuming facts. 
122 No re direct. Ms. Richards steps down. 
123 Mr. Simms offers Defendants exhibit 211. 
124 Defendants exhibit 211 admitted. 
125 Mr. Steuerer retakes the stand and is reminded he is still under oath. 
COURT MINUTES 
Mr. Williams will have a redirect question to Mr. Steuerer as to education and also 
rebuttal questions. 
127 Mr. Simms further re cross. 
129 Court has question for Iv.Ir. Steuerer. 
130 Both sides rest. 
130 Discussion of the parties being allowed time to get records from the parties bank 
accounts if available for that time period. 
Counsel will go today 
133 Court asks that he be advised if records are not available, upon that date that is when 
the matter would be deemed concluded. Counsel would then begin putting together th~ir 
. l . 1 . ..J r- ,.. - 1 ": .. .. s1n::m,tanecus vmtten Closmg argum.ent, proposeu nnarngs, proposea concms10ns ana 
filed within 14 days send copies to chambers in Jerome then each side would then have 7 
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NOTICE RELATING TO 
COLLECTION OF EVID . .illCE 
AND DUE DATES FOR: .>QST-
TRIAL BRIEFING 
Defendants, 
COMES NOW THE PARTIES HERETO, each through the respectve coUIJSel 
and file this Notice Relating to Collection of Ev.idence and Due Dates fo1 Post-Trial 
Briefing, and state as follows; 
J, This matter came on for court trial on Juiy 13, 2011 !, on 'Whlch date t11e case was 
. . 
submitted with the exception of certain bank records 1hat were to be retrieved · ,y counsel. 
2. Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant each served subpoenas on certain institutions 
and each counsel received confirmation from all institutions th.a! the reque!.ted records 
were not available because of expu:ation of time. 
NOTICE RELATmG TO COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND DUE DATitS FOR 1 
POST~ TRIAL BRIEFING 
f:00016000 le] xv..:i zs:n nov101f:lo 
JS/ 2011 15:42 FAX 2083243135 
3. The Court reauested counsel to each submit Prooosed FindinJ?S oj Fact and 
,:,. .ii, --
Conclusions of Law V'lithin fourteen (14) days of the close of evidence~ and to submit 
their respective reply 'Witl;tln seven (7) days thereof. 
\VHEREFORB. the parties will each submit proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on or before August 16, 2011 and their respective R,;ply on or 
before August 23, 2011. 
RESPECTULLYSUB:MITTED~ 
NOTICE RELATING TO COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND DUE DATI.S FOR 2 
141003 
POST-TRlAL BRIEFING P;,f" 1 1>1q 
r. DO 0/£000 lPl "Yt!J t:"C ;:;;T TTnJ /·1 n /c.1n 
08/18/2011 15:58 FAX 2083243135 
ROBERT E. WILLIAu'1:S 
IDAHO STATE BARNO. 1693 
\VILLIAM:S 1 M:ESERVY & LOTHSP'EICH, LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTR{CT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
bON_A;LD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RlCHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-::12 
PLAINTIFF'S 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
COMES NOW, the Plair1tiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and th··ough his attorney of 
:record, Robert E. Williams of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits his Closing 
.. ,Argument ttia.! of this matter before the: court co11ducted July 13'11, 2011 . 
Plaintiff seeks to quiet title in him to real property located at 110 North Greenwood 
Street in the City of Shoshone, Idaho. He claims that two (2) deeds execu1ed in1997 and 20001 
respectively, which on their face conveyed interests in real property to the Defendant N,E,M, 
Richards, were not intended to transfer title to the real property, but rather were mortgages 
intended to provide her collateral securing the: repayment ofloans. Plaintif t' also seeks the 
determination of the: amou.i."lt ow{:d by him to Defondant on the Joans. 
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I 
'fHE TWO (2) DEJEDS WERE INl'.ENDED TO BE MORTCAC;Es 
The primary issue in this cas:e is whether the Warranty Deed signe :! by the Plaintiff in 
favor the Defendant and himself in 1997, and the subsequent Quitclaim Deed given by Plaintiff 
and Defendant to the Defendant in 2000, -both for the real property locatec. at 110 North 
11 Greenwood Street, Shcshone1 Idal10, were intended to be ab:solute transfei s of title,, or instead, 
mortgages to secure the repayment ofloans. 
The primary rule for determining whether deeds to n;al property au e absolute transfers 
of titli:\ or instead constitute security for the performance of a debt or other obligation, was 
announced in Parks v. A1uledyi 49 Idaho 546> 551,290 P. 205,207 (1930) as follows: ''The 
intention of the parties at the time an agreement to execute a deed is constmmated is 
determinative as to whether a title is irrevocably transferred, or the conve3 .ance is merely as 
security for the debt or perfo:rmaince of an obligation." This basic rule wa;; cited approvingly as 
late as 2006 in Hogg v. Wolski, 130 P Jd 1087'1 1092,. 142 Id,aho 549, 545 12006). 
The evidence produced at trial e.stablished th.at the parties did not reduce their agreements or 
U..'tlderstandings to ~rriting at th.e time: of the recording oftlle two (2) deeds or at any time 
before or after, However1 p:!i:!'Ol evidence is admissible to establish that a ( onveyance of land 
was intended to be a mongag1e, Idaho Code §45-905; Credfr Bureau of Preston v. Sleight 92 
Idaho 210~ 216 440 P.2d 145, 149 (1968). 
Mr. Steuerer testified that th<! two (2) deeds were always intended to c1mstitute "collateral" 
for the repayment of loans matde by Ms. Richards to him. In her depositio ''.l, Ms. Richatds also 
testified that it was the intent of the parties that the deeds constitute collateral. Throughout her 
deposition, and again at triaJ, Ms. Richards referred to her transactions \VJ.th Mr. St~uerer as 
loans. In 2010 Donn Bordewyk, General Ma:nager of Valley Co-Ops, Inc. testified that Ms. 
Richards referred to the transactions between she and Mr: St1euerer as loan~. In Responses to 
Interrogatories promulgated by the Plainti:ff1 Ms. Richards, thxough her c01msel of record at the 
time, also characterized the transactions between she and the Plaintiff as lc,ans. In some of her 
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deposition testimony, and also in some of her testimony at trial, Ms. Rich~ rds testified tltrat she 
"ovv11ed" an interest in the real property as a result of the recording of the (Leeds. However, she 
also recognized in he:i: testimony that she had a duty to recon.vey the real property 10 Mr .. 
Steuerer if she was paid what she was owed1 and did not testify that the tr msactions betvveen 
she and 1vfr. Steuerer were ones of purchase and sale. Ms. Richards never took possession of 
the real property at 110 North Greenwood Street, never requested rent, an< I never demanded 
, payment of any kind from ?>-,fr" Steuerer. The intent of the pfu-ties that the (Leeds constitute 
mortgages, and that the underlying transactions were loans, is therefore dearly established. 
Although the intent of the parties, as discussed earlier, is determinativr of whether the 
deeds were mortgages, other factors identified in Dickens v. Heston, 21 P.'.~d 905, 908-910, 53 
Idaho 91 (l 933) also support the conclusion that the deeds were mortgage!,. Those relevant 
factors applied to the evidence produced at trial are: 
1) A debt was in existence and survived the :recording of the deed; 
2) The parties negotiations involved the making and repayment of loans, not the sale and 
purchase of real property; 
3) The amounts advanced by Ms. Richards were less than the fair mruket value oftlhe real 
property at the time of'the advances as shown by Plaintiffs Exhibics 123 through 136. 
4) .M'.r. Steue:rer had no significant financial resources available to hirr at the times the 
loans were made, 
Finally; the court in Hogg -v. Wolski, supra, at 1093, observed that the WoJsk.is, the alleged 
mortgagors in that case, never attempted to regair1 possessioa of the real property they had 
conveyed to the Hoggs, who had taken possessio~ and that:, ... a mortgagc,r ofreal property 
typically does not part with possession". Here, Mr. Steuerer,, the mortgagc,r, has always 
maintained possession of the Real Property, 
The evidence produced at trial establishes that the tw,o deeds were dfectively 
mottgages given pursuant to loan transactions, and were inte;rided to consti tutc security for the 
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repayment of the loans. The totality of the evid~nce also me:ets the requir(1d "clear and j 
convincing evidence" standard of proof required in such cases. Shaner v. 1cathdrum State Bank, 
29 Idaho 576,583, 161 P. 90, 92 (1916). 
II 
AMOUNT OWED ON LOANS 
The second substantial issue before the court is the E!l:nmmt of the money owed to :Ms. 
Richards by Mr. Steuerer, The parties are in agreement that $2,000.00 wa~ loaned i;o the year 
1997. The parties are also in agreement as to the amount of property taxeE, paid by Ms. 
Richards for Mr. Steuerer in the years between 2000 and 2009. Ms. Richards contends that she 
loaned an additional $5,000.00 to Mr. Steuerer between 1997 and 2000. Despite repeated 
opportunities to do so, Ms. Richards was unable to produce any form of documentary evidence 
in support of her contentions of additional amounts loaned, until the date cf the trial when she 
produced a copy of a check ledger introduced and admitted as Defendant' i. Exhibit No. 215. 
The checks numbered 425 and 495 in Defendant's Exhibit 215 corroborak handwritten notes 
constituting Plaintiff's Exhibit 106 as to date, amount, and check number. A separate check, 
No. 511 1 under date of "7/1'", made payable to the Shoshone Club, not identified in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 106, is also identified in the ledger, apparently in support of the contention by Ms. 
Richards that additional amounts were loaned over and above the original $2,000.00. fo his 
testimony at trial and at deposition, Mr. Steue~·er t,estified th~t he received .:i total of $2,000.00 
in checks from Ms. Richard:s, and no more. At trial, Ms. Richards did not explain why check 
No. 511, da.ted 7/1 in the amount of$500.00, admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 215, was not 
entered on Plaintiffs Exhibit l 06. Ms. Richards, both at her deposition and at trial, testified 
that her memory was faulty .and that she could not recall facts easily. She ~ould not testify as 
to specific amou..nts of money distributed to Mr. Steuerer, or the dates upoH which the 
distributions occuued. Mr. Steuerer consistently testified that besides the ;)roperty tax 
payments made by Ms. Richards, the only money he received. from her wa3 $2,000.00 in 1997. 
The preponderance of the evidence is that the only money loaned or advanced to :rvrr. St~:uerer 
by Ms. Richards was $2,000.00 m 1997, and a total of $6,784.91 in propercy taxes, in the 
amounts and on the dates established b;y Plaintiff's Exhibits 108 through 122. 
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Idaho Code §28-12-104(3) provides that in cases of money lent, interest accrues at the 
rate of 12% per annum if there was ;no express agreement in ~ting other.vise. Here, money 
was leant and there was no ex.press agreement in miting establishing inte1 est to be paid,, 
although l\1r. Steuerer a..TJ.d Ms. Richards both testified that there was neve- an agreement to pay 
interest on the loan. The first time interest on the amounts loaned was dis,;ussed was in a 
conversation be:rwe,en :Mr. Steuerer and Ms. Richards in t.1)e year 2010. .:tvfa. Richards did not 
IJ ' ' 
accept Mr. Steuereri s offer to pay interest at that time. During her testimcny in deposition, Ms. 
Richards neverthele:ss testified that she would not convey the real propert) to Mr. Steuerer 
unless she was paid unspecified interest and attorney's fees. Interest owed Ms. Richard:s 
should be detem.tined under Idaho Code §28~22-104, in the amount set forth in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 137. Defenda."li:'s Exhibit No. 211 is not a con:ect calculation of interest for 
several reasons. It does not correctly identify the dates upon. which monies were advanced by 
to or on behalf of Mr. Steuerer, and it assumes an additional $5,000.00 lo;m to l\1'.r. Steuerer by 
Ms. Richards on De:cember 31~\ 1997 that is not supported by the preponderance of the 
evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 137 is actually generous to the Defendant in that it assumes 
the entire $2,000.00 loaned in the year 1997 was loaned on .February 24t1\ J 997, whereas t.i-ie 
evidence at trial establishes that the $2,000.00 was advanced in the form of four (4) $500.00 
increments, paid around the first of each of the months of M:'ll'ch, April, May and June of 1997. 
The loans: secured by the mortgages total $8)784.91.00 in principal and ac,1rued interest of 
$8,651.29 through August 16th, 2011, with per diem interest thereafter ofS,2.89 to the date of 
judgment 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f-6_± day of August, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of August, 2011 1 I sened a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addre1,ses appear below by 
the method indicated: 
Christopher P. Sim.ms 
Attorney at La.w 
I . • I P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
j ~J.S. Mail) pos.age prepaid 
1 0 Hand Delivery - Court Folder 
D Facsimile Transmission 
D Federal Expte5Sl 
ROBERT E. WILLLAMS 
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ROBERT E. WILLIAMS 
IDAHO STATE BARNO, 16.93 
WILLIAJlv1S, MESERVY &; LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Telephone: (208) 324-230j 
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135 
11 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~ 008/01 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C01JNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E, STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
N.E.M. FJCHARDS, aka NlCKY RJCHA.RDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-:212 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STBUERER, by and th.rough his attorney of 
record, Robert E. Williams of Williaim.s, Meservy & Lothspi:dch, LLP, and proposes that the 
foHovvb:lg Findings of Fa.ct and Conclusions of Law be a.dop1:ed by .the court following the Trial 
of this matter conducted JuJ;y 13r\ 2011. 
FINDINGS OF FACl' 
1. Donald E. Steuerer, is a 67 year old individual who resides at 110 North Greenwood, 
Shoshone; Idaho. 
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II 
"2, Mr. Steuernr has resided at 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idalto, continuously since 
he became a perm.anent tesident of the state of Idaho in 1991. Prior to :m,( •ving to Idaho 
permanently, Mir. Steuerer was a resident of the state of New York He was reared and 
educated in the state ofNew Yotk and graduated from High School there. Mr. Steuerer 
attended one business school class after his high schi::,ol education was completed. 
3. Mr. Steuerer served in the United States Mari..ne Corjp and was hotorabiy dlscha.rged. 
If 
4. The real property loc,ated at 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Ida 10, is legally 
described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of the Shoshone Town.site, Lincoln County, Idziho, as the 
same is platted in the official plat thereof now of record in the office of tt1J,.; recorder of said 
county (here111after tht) "Real Property"). 
5, Mr. Steuereir purcha:;ed the Real Property from the Odd Fellows oiganization in 
Shoshone in 1987 during a visit to Idaho. He: paid Three Thousand a:nd N )/100 Dollars 
($3,000.00) for the p1operty in i.Jn.stallments over six months, 
6. When Mr. Steuerer purchased the Real Property from the Odd Fellows no written 
agreement was ,entered into, When me purchase price had breen fully paid the Odd Fellc1ws 
gave Mr. Steuerer a deed to the Rea1 Property. 
7. Mr. Steuerer did not consult an attorney at t..1,e time he purchased tJ 1e Real Property 
from the Odd Fellows. Mr. Steuerer had no prior experienc{;: in owning or acquiring real 
property before his ·transaction vrith the Odd Fellows, 
8. Mr. Steue:i:er's only cum::nt source: ofincome is from Social Securi·:y. He last filed 
Federal or State Income Tax Returns in 1996, Prior to receiving retireme11 t Social Security 
benefits, :Mr. Steuerer received Social Security Disability Benefits for sevciral years. He suffers 
from diabetes and other conditions. 
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Ii 9, After 1991, Mi. Steuerer was sporadically employed on a parMim! basis. The longest 
single period of time that M[r. Steuerer v.,-as employed full-time after 1991 was for a few 
months when he worked as a dishwasher. 
10. Ms. Richards is a single individual 61, years of age, :residing at Sh, )shone, Idaho. She 
holds a degree in veterinary medicine from Washington State University. She owns real 
property across Greenwood StreJet from the Real Property, and was a neig 1bor of M..r. Steuerer 
II in 1991. 
11. Ms, Richards claims that she is C'l.m'ently disabled as the result of r 1edical conditions 
and that she takes prescriptions for those conditions. She cannot recall tht specific: conditions 
causing her disability. She testi:fied that she has troub.le with her memory in recaHing specific 
facts. 
12. Ms. Richards has: worked part-time in a veterinarian's office but is not currently 
employed. 
13. Ms. Richards was in the milita.ry for several years. 
14. The Real Property is improved by an old, two-story framed dwellillg, After he 
purchased the Real Property, Mr, Steuerer' s pla.11 for it was to remodel the structure a.'!ld open a 
bar. To that end, he made improvements to the Real Property after 1991, :,ome of which 
included the bar itse:lf, and plumbing improvements that would allow him to accomplish his 
purposes. 
15. Mr. Steuerer met Ms, Richards, shortly after he returned to Idaho in 199L Ms. 
Richards o,1,,11ed real property dfrectly across Greenwood Street from Mr. :,teuerer's residence. 
Mr. Steuerer frequently visited Ms. Richards residence, and 1;-onsidered her a friend. 
16. In 1997 Mr. Stew::rer' and Ms. Richards had a convers;atiori concerning Mr. Steuerer's 
plans for thie Real Property. 1'v1r. Steuerer explained he had plans to open ,ii bar on the Rc:al 
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11 Property, but that he did not have suffic~ent funds; to allow him to do so, 1-Ie intended to na..rne 
the enterprise the Shoshone Clu.b. 
17. During the l 997 conversation Mr. Steuerer advised Ms. Richards· hat he thought it 
would take $5,000.00 to accomplish the tasks necessary to open the bar, ln 1997 Mr. Steuerer 
did not have suffident funds to pay the back property taxes on the Real Property that then 
existed, nor did he have sufficient funds to pay t"l-ie costs inc:ident to the opening of the bar. ]'-.1r. 
11 
Steuerer estimated his income for the year 1997 to have bee:a $ 81000, 00. 
18. During the 1997 conversation, Ms. Rfohards agreed to loan Mr. SL:uerer $5,000.00. 
Mr. Steuerertestified that he was paid $2,000.00 in the form of four (4) checks for $500.00 
each, written by Ms. Richards in consecutive months in 1997. Mr. Steuer,.:Jr agreed to execute 
and deliver a deed for a one-half interest in the Real Property to serve as (>collateral" for the 
repayment of the loan. 
19. Plaintiffs Exhibit 106, handwritten notes of Ms. Richards, indicates a total of 
$2,000.00 was paid to Wrr. Steue:rer in 1997. Defendant's Exhibit 212 are duplicates of 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 103, 104 and 105) and conoborate the pa.yme11t of $2,(iOO.OO to Mr. 
Steuerer by Ms. Richards in c:onformance with Plaintiffs fa:hibit 106. 
20. The parties agreed that Ms, Richards would reconvey the Real Pro Jerty to Mr. Steuerer 
when he had paid tile amounts loaned back to her. The parties did not agr,.=e upon a spedfic 
d~te for the repayment of the loan. 
21. In the 1997 convers2tti.on the parties did not discuss or consider the transaction between 
them to be a sale whereby ?vir. Steuerer transferred his one-half (1/2) owm·rship interest in the 
Real Property to Ms. Richards in consideration of the payment of money fo Mr. Steuerer. 
22. On Febru~y 24th, l9971vfr. Stcuerer executed and. deilivered to Ms Richards a 
Warranty Deed conveying the: Real Property to Mr. Steuerer and Ms. Ricb3l'ds. Mr. Steuierer 
l"LAfNTIFF'S PR.O?OSED F'INDTNGS OP f ACT AND CONCJ..US!ONS OP I..A II'• 4 
\\S.ER Vl'!R\sH,o,RJ~\DA'l'A ISTBUEP.ER, DONALO\R[CHAI\DS\PUJNTIFP'S PR0/'09£!) fOF & COL.oocx 
Page I 324 
@012/ 
11 
did not consult an attorney at the time he made this agreem~:nt with Ms. F ichards1 or when he 
executed and deliYered the W arrau,ty Deed to her. The Warranty Deed was recorded in the 
records of Lincoln Courity, Idaho onFebruary26t11~ 1997, as: Instru.rnent:J\o. 161973. 
23. Subsequent to 1997, Ms. Richards advised lVir. Steuerer that she drd not have the funds 
to loan the additional $3,000.00 that had been requested by :Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards never 
did loan the addJ:tional $3,000.00 that would have :made foe total loan $5/100.00. 
24. In the 1997 conversation the parties did not discuss whether the lo,m made by Ms. 
Richards to Mr. Steuerer would accrue interest. 
25. After 1997, 1\1r. Steuere1· had difficulty in maintaining communications with Ms. 
Richards. Ms. Richards moved from her residence in Shoshone to a resid,:nce in the 
countryside outside Shoshone. Mr. Steuerer attempted to rea.chMs. Richerds by telephone and 
mail on several occasions to discuss repaying the loan that had been made, but received no 
response .from Ms. Richards:, 
26. Ms. Richards testified that she loaned Mr. Steuerer ru1 additional $.3,000.00 in 1997, and 
an unspecified amount in 1994, The:se amoW1ts were alleged to have been loaned in addition to 
the original $2,000.00 loaned., No corroborating evidence in. the fom1 of viritten oz· printed 
. docu..Tltlents was produced by Ms. Richards pdor to trial, despite Requests for Production and a 
· Notice of Deposition which requeS'!ied such information, On the day oftri,t.l.,.Ms. Richards for-
the first time produced a checkb1:>ok ledger which contained an entry for a check of $500.00 
made payable to "Shoshone Club'' on "7/1)'. This was part o,fwhat was ccntained in 
Defendant's Exhibit 215. 
27. M:r. Steuerer and Ms. Richards next spoke a.bout the 1997 loan in the year 2000. 
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:: 28. During the 1:onversation of the parties in 2000, Ms. Richards was ooncemed about 
delinquent real property taxes on th1;i Real Property. fo 2000 Mr, Ste:uerer did not have the 
funds to bring re:al propc:rty tax(:s current on the Real Propeity, or to pay t11ern. 
29, During the cm".lversation of the parties in 2000 Ms. Richards agreed to pay the 
delinquent real property taxes on the Real Property as an additional loan t,1 Mr. Steuerer. 
30, During the conversation of the parties in 2000, Ms. Richards reqm sted additional 
collateral for the payment of real property taxes in th.e fonn ,of a deed fron I Mr, Steuerer 
conveying all of his interest in the Real Property to Ms, Richards. The pa1ies did not 
characterize this transaction. as a sale and purchase of the Real Property. 
31. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties on or about May 81\ 2000 Mr. Steuerer and 
Ms. Richards executed a Quitclaim Deed for the .Real Property in favor of Ms. Richards. The 
Quitclaim Deed was :rec()tded as: Instrument No. 168606 Lin.coln County, [daho records, on 
May 8111, 2000. On the same dat,e, Ms. Richards paid $466.02 in back property taxes on the 
Real Property. 
32. Ms, Ri~,hards paid real p-toperty taxes for the Real Property on the follov.ing dates in 
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33. Ms. Richards h~1 never requested that Mr. Steuerer vacate the Real Property. Neither 
has she ever demanded payment of rent from .Mr. Steuierer for his continued occupancy of the 
Real Property. 
34. Ms. Richards has never made any demands to Mr. Steuere:r for re~payment of the leans 
she made ta him. 
35. Mr. Steuerer did not consult an attorney concerning the transactions entered into 
between he and Ms. Richards in 1997 or 2000. 
36. After the year 2000, Mr. Steuerer continued to have difficulty reac.:ting Ms. Richards 
for purposes of discussing the loans that had been made . 
37, During the yeair 2007, M:r, Steuerer spoke to Ms. Richards by telephone while she was 
confined at a Veterans' Administration.hospital Mr, Steuert~r discovered ·hat Ms. Richards 
was suffering from an illness tha,t might have resulted in her death and Mr Steuerer was 
concerned about what would happen to the Real Property in that event. In response to 1\,1.r. 
Steuerer's question as to how the Real Property would be dei!ded back to l,im Ms. Richards 
responded that ht,r friend, Ofer fobar, would sec that the Real Property wo J.ld be deeded back 
to Mr. Steuerer if Ms. Richards should die. 
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38. During the year 2010 Valley Co-Ops, Inc, through its General Maitager, Don.--i 
BordeV!Jk, contacted :tvfr. Ste:uerer to inquire about the posslibility of purchasing the Real 
Property. 
3 9. Valley Co~Ops, Inc. mvris real property immediately adjacent to tr e Real Property. A 
few years prior to 2010 Valley Co-Ops, Inc. completed. a m.cJor remodeiin g of its property 
which consists of a convenience store and fuel station, 
40. In 2010, Mr. Steuerer was able to contact Ms. Richards to discuss ·.he interest of Valley 
Co-Ops, Inc. in purchasing the Real Property, During that conversation Mr_ Steuerer informed 
Ms, Richards that he vvished her to deed the Real Property back to him, mid that he would 
repay her what he owed her together with interest No specific rate of interest was discussed in 
that conversation. 
41. During that same conversation1 :M:s. Richards told :tvfr. Steuerer that he o!lJy needed to 
repay her the amount that she ha.cl loaned him, and that payn::1ent of intere-s would not be 
necessary. Tht:: parties had Mver discussed or contemplated the payment of interest on the 
_ loans until the conversation held by them in 2010. 
42. Mr. Steuerer testified the loans were due when he had the ability tt repay them. Ms. 
Ricbards testified that th,e loans were to be repaid as soon as possible. Mr. Steuerer would 
have the ability to repay the loans if the ~roposed sale transaction with Va ley Co-Ops were 
consummated. 
43. Mr. Steuerer is c1l.Il'ently :in possession of a written ·offer from Valfoy Co-Ops, Inc. to 
purchase the Real Property for $110:.000.00. 
44. The Real Property consists of two (2) lots in the Shoshone Townsi1e. In 2006 Valley 
Co-Ops, Inc. purchased other real property consisting of tbree (3) lots adjacent to its 
PLAJNTJFF'S PROPOSED· FtNO!NCrS Of FACT AND CoNCWSl0N6 OF LAW• 8 
\\SE.R V£RISH1,.RElnATA\S'f£UER.BR, Dow1LPIRJCHA.RDSIPWN'I'!J?l'1£ PROl'OSl!P PO!' & COL.DOCX 
Page I 328 
~016/01 
08/1S/201i 16:01 FAX 2083243135 
convenience sto:re and fueling station for $140,000.00. In 2007 Valley C< 1-0ps, Inc. purchased 
other real property consisting of four· ( 4) lots adjacent to its convenience store and fuei station 
for $180,000.00. 
4 5. The properties purchased by Valley Co-Ops, Inc. in 2006 and 200' r were improved. 
Valley Co-Ops, Inc.' s interest in those properties was for the~ lots only anc the existing 
improvements were either removed er razed. Valle;'' Co-Ons. Inc.'s intew in purchasing ihe II • >- ~ . ._. 
Real Property at 110 North Greenwood Street would be to mze the structure now located on it 
and expand its business operations. 
46. From 1991 fonvard Mr. Steu.erer believed the Real Property to be ·.vorth more than the 
$3,000.00 he paid for it because of improvements that he had made on the Real Property. 
4 7. Assessment records of Lincoln County, Idaho, estimated the fair rr arket value of the 
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48. Donn Bordcwyk is the General Manager of Valley Co-Ops, Inc. During the yeacr- 2010 
Donn Bordewyk attempted to contact Ms. Richards several times to discuss his company's 
interest in the Real Property vvithout success. Eventually, hie was able to discuss the matter 
\Vi.th her by telephone sometime during 2010. During that conversation Ms, Richards 
characterized the transactions behve-.en she and Mr. Steuerer regarding the Real Property as 
loans. 
49. In her deposition taken the 14tli day of March, 2011; Ms. Richards on multiple 
occasions referred to the transactions between she and :Mt. Steuerer as loans, and the two (2) 
deeds she received as constituting collateral for the loans. 
50. Ms. Richards refonre:d to the transaction between Mr, Steuerer and herself as loans in 
response to written discove1y requests promulgated by Mr. Steuerer, whictJ. responses were 
executed by her attorney of record at the time they were made. 
51. Ms. Rfob.a.rds referred to her tra.11saction with :Mr. Ste:uerer as loam in her testimony a1 
trial and in cross-examination. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L The two (2) deeds dated February 24''\ 1997, and May 8tl1, 2000, and recorded, 
respectively, on February 261\ 1997, as Instrument No. 161973, ar,d May f·h, 2000; Instrument 
No. 168606, Lincoln Coun°t'J, Idaho records, were mortgages intended to s~.cure loans made by 
Ms, Richards to Mr. Steuere:r, ar1d to, constitute collateral for those loans. l\.s such, these:i two 
(2) deeds are mortg,":Lges and did not convey absolute title in 'lhe Real Prop1!rty to Ms. Richards. 
2. Mi, Steuerez· is the fee simple o\Vlle1· of the Real Property located at 110 North 
Greenwood Street1 Shoshoni:, Idaho, legally described as Lo'ts 4 and 5, Bl<•ck E of foe I Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, as the same is platted in the ocficial plat thereof 
PLAINTIFF'S J'ROl'OBED f:rNDfNGS OF FACT AKD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW· !O 
\\SERVER\!JJlpJ\E;\D;.'rAIS1'£UER.ER, lDON11LPIRICHAr©S\plAJNTJPF'S PROros1;0 FOP & COL.DOCX 
Page I 330 
Vel/ lb/iUll 16:01 FAX 2083243135 ~018/0 
now of record in the office of the recorder of said county! and title tc, the Real Property be 




3. Ms, Richards loaned Mr. Steuerer $2,000.00 in 1997. She made alditional loans to him I 
' .. " 
totaling $6,784.91 between 2000 and 2010, by paying taxes on the Real Ptoperty in that 
amount. The total amount of the loan obligations secured by the mortgag,:.s is $8,784.91.00 fa 
principal, together with accrued inte:rest of $8,651.29 through the 1601 day of August, 2011, and 
per diem intere.st thereafter of $2.89 to the date of judgment 
4. Upon Mr. Steuerer paying the amount owed on the loans to Ms. R chards as detennined 
above, Ms. Richards should be required to execute and caus,;:: to be record,!d in the records of 
Lincoln County, Idaho, a suitab]e satisfaction of the tv,,o (2) mortgages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBi.\1JTTED th.is ~y of August, 2011. 
\ MS, ,~V- & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 












FINDINGS OFF ACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
_____ D_e:fi_e_n_d_an_t_s. ______ ) 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this, 
her PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and therefore 
states as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 28, 2010, Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, filed a Complaint to Quiet 
Title to Real Property against Defendant, N.E.M. Richards. Mr. Steuerer alleges and 
concludes in his complaint that deeds executed and delivered by him to N.E.M. Richards, 
relating to certain real property located within the City of Shoshone, were intended not to 
be absolute transfers, but rather to be mortgages. Mr. Steuerer requests judgment 
quieting title in himself; declaring the deeds to be mortgages, and for the Court to 
determine the indebtedness owed by himself to Defendant Richards. Defendant filed an 
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Answer admitting Plaintiff executed and delivered deeds absolute on their face, denying 
the deeds were intended as mortgages and propounding a host of affirmative defenses. 
The issues were tried to the Comi on July 13, 2001. The only witnesses to testify 
were Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, Defendant N.E.M. Richards and Donn Bordewyk, the 
General Manager of the Valley Co-Ops, Incorporated. Documentary Evidence offered 
was admitted by stipulation of the parties. In addition to those exhibits included on the 
parties' Ex...bibit Lists, Defendant offered original check reg1sters, original check stubs, 
and a copy of check written by Defendant Richards to Plaintiff. 
This document is filed in compliance with the Court's Order for submission of 
post-trial proposed findings by each party. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT 
Plaintiff filed a verified Complaint swearing that on May 8, 2000 he executed and 
delivered to Defendant a Quitclaim Deed, to secure a two thousand ($2,000) loan, for 
Real Property legally described as; 
Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho 
according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln County, 
Idaho recorder. 
Plaintiff, in his verified complaint, makes no mention of the fact that on February 24, 
1997, he, as Grantor, executed a Warranty Deed and delivered same to himself, Donald 
E.K. Steuerer, and N.E.M. Richards, as Grantees. Steuerer swears in his verified 
complaint that the May 2000 Quitclaim Deed was intended "not be an absolute transfer 
of title but rather stand as a mortgage to secure a loan of $2,000 made by Defendant 
Richards to Plaintiff on or about May 8, 2000." Plaintiff goes on in his verified 
complaint, paragraph numbered 12, to state, "On or about May gth, 2000 Plaintiff was 
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without any funds necessary to pay debts which were then due and oVving ... " Steuerer 
makes no reference in his complaint to the nature of the debts due and owing in May of 
2000. In addition to his verified Complaint, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, which is before this Court. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, for the first 
time acknowledged that not only had he executed and delivered a Quit Claim Deed to 
Richards in 2000, he also executed a.11d delivered a \X/arranty Deed in Febrnary 1997. 
Plaintiff, in his affidavit swears the 1997 Warranty Deed, not the 2000 Quit Claim Deed, 
was given in exchange for a $2,000 loan made, not in 2000, but in 1997. In his affidavit 
Steuerer swears the purpose of this $2000 loan made in 1997 was "I was significantly 
delinquent in the payment of real property taxes to Lincoln County, Idaho and needed 
money to pay real property taxes ... " (paragraph# 5 Steuerer Affidavit) 
At trial Plaintiff testified he resides at 110 N. Greenwood Street in the City of 
Shoshone. Plaintiff's testimony regarding his background and work history was vague. 
Plaintiff was unable to provide the court with an accurate employment history. Plaintiff 
did testify that he worked for many years as a trader on Wall Street, and thereafter in the 
roofing business, prior to his residence in Idaho. Plaintiff testified he first came to 
Shoshone in 1987 with an unidentified friend, at which time he entered into an un\vritten 
agreement to purchase the real property and improvements commonly knovm as 110 N. 
Greenwood, more fully described above. (hereinafter referred to as "the real property at 
issue" or "in question") Steuerer testified he agreed to pay Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000) in exchange for title to the property in question, with a Five Hundred Dollar 
($500) down payment and the remaining balance to be paid off over time. 
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Plaintiff testified that he returned to New York and the roofing business, during 
which time he fully paid the balance owed and acquired title to the property in question. 
Mr. Steuerer testified he returned to Shoshone in 1988 or 1989, and has resided there 
ever since. Mr. Steuerer stated he became acquainted with Defendant, Ms. Richards in 
approximately 1990, as his neighbor across the street. Steuerer testified he approached 
Ms. Richards in the summer of 1997 in an effort to borrow money to open a bar at the 
propert)i in question. Steuerer testified he a..11d 1vfs. Fichards agreed she ,,.1;ould loan him 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) in order for him to open the bar, and in exchange he would 
"put her on Y:z the property." Mr. Steuerer testified there was no agreement when the 
money would be paid back. Mr. Steuerer described the purpose of the deed as to provide 
Ms. Richards with collateral. Steuerer testified there was no discussion of payment of 
delinquent taxes. 
Mr. Steuerer testified he received four (4) checks from Ms. Richards in 1997 over 
four (4) consecutive months, each in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500), for a 
total of two thousand dollars ($2,000). Mr. Steuerer testified Ms. Richards never gave 
him more than the two thousand dollars ($2,000) as described. Steuerer testified he used 
some of the money from Ms. Richards to pay taxes that were due and the rest to fix up 
' 
the building. Steuerer testified that thereafter, he rarely saw Ms. Richards. Mr. Steuerer 
testified that in the year 2000 Ms. Richards appeared at his home and informed him that 
taxes were delinquent on the property in question, but offered to pay the taxes in return 
for a deed "turning it all over to her." Steuerer testified that this second deed was to 
serve as further collateral for Ms. Richards. Again, Steuerer testified that no agreement 
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was reached as to when the money was to be paid back, or the exact amount of money 
owed. 
Mr. Steuerer testified he ran into Ms. Richards in 2004, and informed her he was 
receiving social security and may be able to pay her back. Steuerer testified his next 
conversation with Ms. Richards was after he was contacted by Valley Co-Op regarding 
purchase of the property in question. Steuerer testified he presented himself to Ms. 
Richards a..11d told her he may be able to sell the property ai--id pay her back. Steuerer 
testified he offered to pay her back five thousand dollars ($5,000) plus interest, and that 
Richards told him to just pay her what he owed her. Steuerer testified he spoke with 
Richards only once more about the subject, while she was in the hospital, when he 
alleges Richards said if anything happens to me my friend will deed property back over 
to him. Steuerer testified he made several other attempts to communicate with Ms. 
Richards prior to filing suit; once by mail, returned as undeliverable, and a few phone 
calls, where he "couldn't get through." 
On cross-examination Mr. Steuerer was asked about the basis of his opinion that 
the actual fair market value of the property in question was significantly larger than the 
amount of loans. Mr. Steuerer testified that he had made continuing upgrades to the 
building, including installation of a bar. However, Steuerer admitted the building had no 
heating system other than a wood stove. Steuerer also admitted the building was open to 
the weather, in that the roof was failing, and that he had never painted the exterior of the 
building. Mr. Steuerer admitted he had rarely worked during his residence in Idaho and 
that he hadn't filed an income tax return in more than a decade. Mr. Steuerer also 
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admitted he had never actually tendered up any money to repay money given to him by 
Ms. Richards. 
During his cross-examination Mr. Steuerer was confronted with his Affidavit in 
support of Motion for Summary Judgment, sworn on May 13, 2011, wherein he swore 
the purpose of the monies provided to him by Ms. Richards was to repay delinquent 
taxes, in contract to his trial testimony. The affidavit, in contrast to the verified 
complaint, s,xlore that not onl~,r did Defenda.i."tJ.t execute ai.rid deliver a Quitclaim Deed in 
May of 2000 he also executed and delivered a General Warranty Deed to Richards in 
February of 1997. Steuerer's verified complaint, paragraph numbered six (6) swore that 
a two thousand dollar ($2,000) loan was made by Richards to Steuerer on or about May 
8, 2000. Whereas, in Steuerer's affidavit and at trial he swears that a loan of two 
thousand dollars ($2,000) was made to him by Richard's in the year 1997. Steuerer goes 
on to swear in paragraph numbered five (5) of his affidavit that Ms. Richards offered to 
loan him two thousand dollars ($2,000) in 1997 because he was financially destitute, 
significantly delinquent in payment of real property taxes to Lincoln County and needed 
money to pay real property taxes. Mr. Steuerer, in contrast with his testimony at trial, 
made no reference in his affidavit to a need for money to open a bar. 
Thus, Mr. Steuerer has, under oath, told the Court three distinctly different stories 
regarding the nature and purpose for the deeds in question. This Court finds the 
credibility of Mr. Steuerer to be questionable. At best Mr. Steuerer' s memory is less 
thru1 clear on the pertinent facts of his claim. 
In addition to his own testimony, Plaintiff called Donn Bordewyk, general 
manager of Valley Co-Ops, Incorporated. Valley Co-Ops is the owner of Valley Country 
I 
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Store, a gas station and convenience store situated adjacent to the property in question. 
Mr. Bordewyk testified that the gas station and convenience store were rebuilt in 1998. 
He further testified Valley Co-Ops had an interest in acquiring the property at issue in 
order to expand corporate operations on the site. Mr. Bordevvyk testified the corporation 
had already purchased other parcels in the immediate area in 2006 and 2008. Mr. 
Borde-wyk testified the corporation had paid one hundred thirty thousand dollars 
($130,000) for a three (3) lot parcel and one hundred eighty thousa.TJ.d dollars ($180,000) 
for a four (4) lot parcel. Bordewyk testified the property in question is two (2) city lots. 
Bordewyk learned in 2010 the property in question was not titled in Steuerer, but later 
stated he began attempting to contact Ms. Richards in 2008. 
Bordewyk testified the Valley Co-Ops has offered to purchase the property in 
question for one hundred sixty thousand dollars, ($160,000) which offer remains open. 
Ivfr. Bordewyk testified that counsel for Plaintiff, is actually working for Valley Co-Ops 
and confirmed Valley Co-Ops has paid Mr. Williams fees relating to his representation 
of Mr.. Steuerer in this litigation. Plaintiff rested. 
Defendant, prior to calling N.E.M. Richards to the witness stand, offered into 
evidence Plaintiff's exhibits 101 through 13 8. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties each 
exhibit was admitted into evidence. The documentary evidence included: both the 
warranty and quitclaim deeds; copies of check stubs and handwritten notes of Richards 
evidencing some of the monies paid to Steuerer; tax records relevant to the property in 
question for years 1993-2010; Assessor's records relevant to the property in question for 
years 1997-2010; the affidavit of Donn Bordewyk and a Litigation Guarantee. 
Defendant also offered into evidence exhibits 201-211, which were admitted pursuant to 
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stipulation of the parties. Each of these documents were duplicative of Plaintiff's 
exhibits, with the exception of Exhibit 211; a demonstrative exhibit displaying all monies 
paid from Richards to or on behalf of Mr. Steuerer and exhibiting a cumulative interest 
calculation. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 123 and Defendant's Exhibit 209 are the same, a 1997 Lincoln 
County Assessor's Report relating to the property in question. For tax year 1997 the 
Cou .. 11ty Assessor valued t.11e property in question at four thousa..11d one hundred seventy 
six dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), for a total value 
of five thousand one hundred seventy six dollars. ($5,176). Plaintiffs Exhibit 126 and 
Defendant's Exhibit 210 are the same, a 2000 Lincoln County Assessor's Report relating 
to the property in question. For tax year 2000 the County Assessor valued the property 
in question at four thousand one hundred seventy six dollars ($4,176) and improvements 
at three thousand dollars ($3,000), for a total value of seven thousand one hundred 
seventy six dollars. ($7,176) 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 103-105, and Defendant's Exhibits 203-205, are duplicates of 
check stubs 1807, 1809, and 1812, written by Defendant to Plaintiff on February 25, 
1997, March 3, 1997 and May 1, 1997, in the amounts of four hundred dollars ($400), · 
one hundred dollars ($100) and five hundred dollars ($500), respectively. The check 
stubs each contain a notation, which in order of the check numbers read: $5,000 Balance 
$4,600; Bal. March 1, $500; and May Bal. $3,500. Also admitted into evidence were 
certain of Ms. Richards handwritten check register entries and notes relating thereto. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106, and Defendant's Exhibits 206, 207 and 208 reflect these notes. 
Exhibits 208 and 209 are copies of actual check register entries, whereas, Exhibit 
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206/106 reflects Ms. Richards summary, not made contemporaneously with the writing 
of the checks. These records indicate that in addition to checks numbered 1807, 1809 
and 1812, in the total amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000); check number 435, 425 
and 511, each in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) were written to Mr. Steuerer 
on April 1, 1997, June 1, 1997 and July 1, 1997. 
Richards testified that she was disabled and currently receiving United States 
Vetera...11.'s Ad..Tinistration Disability benefits. Ms. Richards had difficulty stating the 
exact nature of her disability. She .did testify that she was taking a host of medications 
and that she has difficulty with her memory and quickness of her thinking. Richards told 
the court she had served in the military during the Vietnam era, and had pursued a degree 
in veterinary medicine following her active service. Ms. Richards testified she moved to 
Shoshone to work in the veterinary clinic, which she did for many years. Ms. Richards 
testified she resides at 115 N. Greenwood, in Shoshone, across the street from the 
property in question. 
Ms. Richards testified she became acquainted with Plaintiff in the early 1990s, as 
her neighbor across the street. Richards testified that she used to allow him to use her 
water and periodically fed him. Ms. Richards testified that Mr. Steuerer approached her 
in the mid 1990s and asked for money because he was delinquent in payment of real 
property taxes. Richards testified she felt sorry for Steuerer and didn't want to see him 
lose his home. She testified she gave him two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to 
February of 1997 when she decided she needed to get something to assure repayment. 
Richards testified the purpose of the Warranty Deed executed by Steuerer to Steuerer and 
herself in February 1997, was to assure repayment or compensation for monies 
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previously given to Steuerer. Richards testified that she believed she had acquired a one 
half (1/2) interest in the property as a result of the warranty deed, but that she would have 
deeded the property back to Steuerer if he had paid her back. 
Ms. Richards testified that in 1997 she and Steuerer agreed she would give him 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) more, in order for him to get caught up on his delinquent 
taxes, and to establish a bar business on the prope1iy in question. Richards testified that 
($500) per month, and paid over, in addition to the two thousand dollars ($2,000) given 
to Steuerer prior to 1997, an additional five thousand dollars ($5,000) beginning in 
February of 1997. Ms. Richards acknowledged that she could not find documentary 
records to verify all payments, but insisted she had given Steuerer a total of seven 
thousand dollars ($7,000). 
Richards did offer exhibits 212 through 215 as additional documentary support 
for her testimony. Exhibit 212 was an original packet of check stubs, while Exhibits 213 
and 215 were original check registers. These exhibits, in fact, confirmed Ms. Richards' 
hand ·written notes by providing authentic originals of entries made contemporaneously 
with the writing of the checks. Exhibit 214 is a copy of check number 425, in the 
amount of five hundred dollars ($500), ,vritten to Donald Steuerer on June 1, 1997. 
These exhibits together provide conclusive documentary evidence confirming payment 
by Richards to Steuerer of at least two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) between 
February 25, and July 1, 1997. 
Ms. Richards testified that in May of 2000 she learned that Steuerer had not in 
fact used the money she had given him to pay real property taxes that had become 
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delinquent on the property. She testified that she agreed to pay the back taxes, and, in 
that no monies had been repaid to her, to, accept a quitclaim deed to the property in 
question, in order secure the indebtedness. Ms. Richards testified that she felt the 
instrument conveyed an actual OvV11ership interest in the property, but that she would 
have agreed to deed the property back to Steuerer if he were to repay her all money due 
to her, as soon as possible. Thereafter, Ms. Richards testified she paid all property taxes, 
past due, and current, V"-\rhen such taxes became due.. Ms. PJ.chards testified that Steuerer 
never offered to pay her a cent back, nor· even raised the issue, until the time Valley Co-
Ops became interested in the property. 
In summary Ms. Richards testified that she loaned Steuerer two thousand dollars 
($2,000) prior to 1997, and accepted a warranty deed for a one half (1/2) interest in the 
property instead of payment; that she gave Steuerer another five thousand dollars 
($5,000) in 1997, and in 2000, not having been paid back, accepted the quitclaim deed 
for that debt. She testified that she would have deeded the property back to Steuerer had 
he made repayment, but that repayment never came. Richards believed any agreement to 
re-convey the property had expired. The Court finds Ms. Richards to be a credible 
witness, whose testimony has been consistent throughout the case. The documentary 
evidence, in the form of check registers, check stubs, and a check copy, are all consistent 
with Ms. Richard's testimony. Furthermore, the documents disprove Mr. Steuerer's 
testimony that he received only two thousand dollars ($2,000) from Ms. Richards. Bank 
records from the 1990s are no longer available to conclusively prove or disprove the 
amount of monies given by Defendant to Plaintiff. 
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Lincoln County Tax Collector Records, submitted into evidence as Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 107-122 collectively prove that real property taxes on the property in question 
became delinquent for tax years 1993-1999. The Tax Collector records indicate that on 
April 2, 1997 Steuerer paid two hundred fifty eight dollars and fifty eight cents ($258.58) 
in delinquent taxes. \Vhile Mr. Steuerer testified at trial that he used the money he says 
he received from Ms. Richards in 1997 to pay off delinquent taxes, the records clearly 
indicate he did not in fact do so. The records verify no payment was made for delinquent 
taxes until December May 8, 2000, when Ms. Richards began making payments clearing 
the delinquency. Ms. Richards paid all real property taxes due from 1995 through the 
first half of 2010. Mr. Steuerer made a real property tax payment in June of 2011, with 
money provided by the Valley Co-Ops Incorporated. Richards paid a total amount of six 
thousand eight hundred ninety four dollars and seventy cents ($6,894.70) in taxes for the 
property in question. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The law is abundantly clear that conveyance of real property by deed is 
conclusive as to transfer ownership. LC. § 55-606. Here the instruments used to transfer 
title were first a warranty deed, and secondly a quitclaim deed, both fully satisfying the 
statute of frauds, and providing certain covenants and warranties of title. LC. §§ 9-503, 
55- 612. 
The law presumes that the holder of title to property is the OVv'Iler thereof. Erb v. 
Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 at 331, 824 P.2d 903 (Idaho App. 1992); Hawe v. Hawe, 89 
Idaho 367,406 P.2d- 106 (1965); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958). 
Plaintiff would have this court believe he didn't understand that he conveyed first half, 
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then the entirety of the property in question to Ms. Richards, when the deeds were 
absolutely clear as to that plain fact. Plaintiff implies that somehow it was he, not Ms. 
Richards who was taken advantage of. The Court does not accept this proposition. 
Plaintiff argues that these deeds, absolute on their face were in fact mortgages. 
Idaho Courts have repeatedly rejected similar claims. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 
799,241 P.3d 972 (Idaho 2010); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 
well-settled rule of law that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a different 
construction from that clearly appearing on its face, claiming that it is a mortgage, he 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with the 
right to repurchase, was intended." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, at 
1091-92. (Idaho 2006) 
A person may purchase lands, and at the same time contract to re-convey them for 
a certain sum, without the intention of either party that the transaction should in effect be 
a mortgage." Id at 1092, quoting Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207 
(1930). The transaction at issue here is clearly such a case. Ms. Richards plainly viewed 
the transaction as one whereby she took ownership, but under certain, somew]1at unclear 
circumstances, she would have re-conveyed the property to Mr. Steuerer. In this regard it 
is Plaintiff's burden by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the legal presumption. 
Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916). Plaintiff has 
failed to meet his burden and has not overcome the legal presumption. 
The Hogg Court recited the factors to be considered when deciding whether a 
deed absolute on its face is a mortgage; (a) the existence of a debt to be secured, (b) the 
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satisfaction or survival of the debt, ( c) the previous negotiations of the parties, ( d) the 
inadequacy of the price paid, (e) the financial condition of the grantor, and (f) the 
intention of the parties. In Hogg, the Court affirmed the trial court, finding a conveyance 
of title rather than a mortgage. The Court emphasized that no evidence was presented of 
any pressure to enter into the transaction. The court also referenced the fact that, like in 
the case at bar, no effort was niade to re-acquire the property. 
Whether a debt was to be secured is less tha..11 abundantly clear on foe facts before 
the court, certainly if a debt it was, it has not been repaid. No exact an1ount, nor date of 
repayment, was established by clear agreement of the parties. According to Ms. Richards 
she agreed to give Steuerer, first two thousand dollars ($2,000) and later five thousand 
dollars ($5,000), if she were paid back as soon as possible. Ms. Richards testified that 
Steuerer failed to make any effort at repayment and therefore excepted first a one half 
(1/2) interest in the property by Warranty Deed, and when the second sum of money had 
not been repaid, she accepted a Quitclaim Deed transferring full ownership to her. While 
she did testify she would have re-conveyed the property upon repayment, repayment 
never came. 
The parties' recollections·· are at odds concerning their negotiations. Both parties 
have described a transfer of an ownership interest in the property. Steuerer claims to 
have made efforts to contact Richards to discuss repayment, but has brought forward no· 
evidence to support tender, at least prior to Valley Co-Ops interest in the property. 
Plaintiff argues that the price paid was inadequate. This contention is in obvious 
contradiction to the only evidence on this issue, the Tax Assessors Records. 
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In 1997 the Assessor valued the land at four thousand one hundred seventy six 
dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), while Ms. Richards 
paid two thousand dollars ($2,000) for her purchase of a one half (1/2) interest thereof. 
In the year 2000 the Assessor continued to value the land at four thousand one hundred 
seventy six dollars ($4,176), while the improvements had risen to three thousand dollars 
($3,000), while Ms. Richards paid five thousand dollars ($5,000) in addition to the two 
thousand dollars ($2,000), previously paid, for a grand total of seven thousa.rid dollars 
($7,000) for her outright purchase of the property. In other words, the evidence proves 
that Ms. Richards paid to Mr. Steuerer almost the exact amount the Assessor determined 
to be the value of the property. 
As to the financial condition of the grantor, the Court can accept that Mr. Steuerer 
was not in a cash flush position in 1997. or in 2000. However, Mr. Steuerer' s financial 
condition at that time seems to have been of his own making. This criterion and others, 
are designed to consider the equity of the bargaining power of the parties. Here, the court 
finds no inequity in this respect. In considering the last of the Hogg criteria, the court 
finds the intention of the parties was to transfer an interest in real property in exchange 
for pre-existing debts, with an agreement to re-convey upon re-repayment as soon as 
possible within a reasonable time. 
Mr. Steuerer has testified inconsistently. Clearly, Mr. Steuerer did not use the 
initial sums provided by Ms. Richards to pay real property taxes. Ms. Richards stated 
·with certainty what her intentions were with regard to the transactions; that she believed 
she gained an ownership interest by payments to Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards con:firmed 
that belief in her ownership by consistent payment of real property taxes commencing the 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 15 
LAW Page I 347 
very same day she acquired fee simple title, by Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. Mr. 
Steuerer on the other hand, made no actions and took no steps, confirming in any way 
that he believed the transactions were mere mortgages. 
Idaho Court's have rejected the proposition, put forth by Plaintiff here, that when 
at the time of execution of an absolute conveyance a separate agreement to re-convey is 
also executed, that transaction will constitute a mortgage. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 
355, at 362, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) 
The rule above stated is too narrow. See criticism, note 3, p. 234, L.R.A. 
[N.S.] 1916B. It fails to incorporate other necessary and controlling 
elements, and eliminates the question of intention of the parties, and 
encroaches upon their right to contract. In effect, literally speaking, this 
portion of the opinion holds that a deed, in form an absolute conveyance, 
expressing the intention of the parties, coupled with possession, payment 
of taxes, assertion of ownership, and with a positive understanding by the 
grantee that he had an absolute conveyance and his positive refusal to 
accept anything but an absolute conveyance, cannot be upheld as such, if 
at the time of the execution of the deed an agreement was entered into to 
reconvey the property. Such a holding is contrary to the great weight of 
authority, and not in harmony with prior and recent decisions of this court. 
Whether a deed, absolute on its face is to be deemed a mortgage depends upon the 
intention of the parties in regard to it at the time of its execution. "In order to convert a 
deed absolute in its terms into a mortgage, it is necessary that the understanding and 
intention of both parties, grantee as well as grantor, to that effect should be concurrent 
and the same." Clontz, 88 Idaho 355 at 362, 399 P.2d 949 at 952. (emphasis added) 
Therefore, even if this Court believes Plaintiffs current claim that he believed these 
transactions were mortgages and not conveyances, it must also find that Ms. Richards 
also held the same belief. No evidence has been presented to support such a finding. 
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Quite the contrary, Ms. Richards has uniformly and consistently held out that she owned 
the property. 
NOW THEREFORE the Court HEREBY ORDERS, Plaintiffs claims are held for 
naught, and title to the property in question; Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone Townsite, 
Lincoln County, Idaho according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln 
County, Idaho recorder, is quieted to Defendant, N.E.M. Richards. 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF LEG,Li~L CONCLUSION 
STANDING I EQUITY/ LACHES / ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff comes to this court seeking to have this court declare the transaction of 
the parties an equitable mortgage. "In attempting to have a deed declared a mortgage, 
equity requires the party so asking to tender and offer to pay the amount of the debt and 
interest before he is entitled to any standing in a court of equity. Shaner v. Ratgdrum 
State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) citing (Hicks v. Hicks (Tex. Civ.), 26 
S.W. 227; Dawson v. Overmyer, 141 Ind. 438, 40 N.E. 1065; Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76 
Tex. 225, 13 S.W. 296; Jones on Mortgages, 2d ed., par. 1095.) No evidence has been 
presented that Plaintiff ever even discussed repayment of the monies provided prior to 
2010, and no evidence that money has ever been tendered. 
\Vhen seeking equity one must approach the court with clean hands deserving 
equity. This principal and estoppel by laches was explored by the Court in Clontz v. 
Fortner at 363. Here, like in Clontz, no evidence exists that plaintiff even spoke to 
defendant about the transaction for years and years. Like in Clontz, the defendant 
expressed public displays of ownership of the property, (payment of taxes) while plaintiff 
sat silent. The Clontz court found the Plaintiff to be estopped from claiming the deed, 
absolute on its face, to be a mere mortgage. The Court, at page 364 cited a California 
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case, Hamud v. Hawthorne, 52 Cal.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959), at some length, quoted 
below, 
It was not until plaintiffs learned of the interest of an oil company in the 
subject property that they bestirred themselves to ascertain whether such 
property was worth an effort on their part to reclaim it. As commented in 
Livermore v. Beal (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 535,549, 64 P.2d 987, 'one is not 
permitted to stand by while another develops property in which he claims 
an interest, and then if the property proves valuable, assert a claim thereto, 
and if it does not prove valuable, be willing [399 P.2d 954] that the losses 
incurred * * * be borne by the opposite party. This thought was expressed 
in one case by the following language: 'If the property proves good, I wai1t 
it; if it is valueless, you keep it." (See also Robison v. Hanley (1955), 136 
Cal.App.2d 820, 824-825[1-2], 289 P.2d 560.' 338 P.2d at 392. 
The following statement from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 59, p. 105, 1s 
applicable here: 
'A party who has the right to treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage 
and to redeem from it must be reasonably prompt in asserting such right; 
very long delay, amounting to laches on his part, may defeat his right to 
have the deed declared to be a mortgage and his right of redemption, 
especially if interests of third persons have intervened, or if the grantee has 
been allowed to deal with the property in such manner that a redemption 
would seriously prejudice him, and one conclusively chargeable with full 
knowledge of his rights will not be permitted to excuse his delay in 
seeking relief on the ground of ignorance of his rights.' 
And the following from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107, pp. 547-548: 
'The term 'quasi estoppel' has been applied to certain legal bars which are 
in some respects analogous to estoppel in pais and which have the same 
practical operation as an estoppel in pais, but which nevertheless differ 
from that form of estoppel in essential particulars. Thus, it has been held 
that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, 
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. 
'The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election, 
ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the 
principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a 
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him. The doctrine 
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistentwith one in which he acquiesced, or of which he 
accepted a benefit.' 
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Here, Steuerer was perfectly content to allow Ms. Richards to believe she O'Wlled 
the property for some thirteen years. Steuerer sat idle while a disabled wom&'1 paid real 
property taxes on the home she believed she o~ned, while not charging rent, due to pity. 
Steuerer was perfectly content to be pitied as man who couldn't pay rent, while allowing 
the property to deteriorate. Mr. Steuerer took not one step to assert o~ership, nor 
obligation, with regard to the property in question until he learned that it was not a no rent 
hovel, but a deve1opable parcel of corr ...... 'Tiercial 1&'1d. Under these circwustances this 
Court, like the Clontz and Harnud Courts, must send away the opportunist. Mr. 
Steuerer' s claim is barred by laches and equitable estoppel. 
NOW THEREFORE the Court HEREBY ORDERS, Plaintiff's claims are held for 
naught, and title to the property in question; Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone To'Wllsite, 
Lincoln County, Idaho according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln 
County, Idaho recorder, is quieted to Defendant, N.E.M. Richards. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
DATED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /0 day of August 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome 
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
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n ROBERT E. WILLIAMS 
IDAHO STATE BARN0.1693 
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 Easr Main Street 
P. 0. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Telephone: (208) 324-2303 
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135 
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IN THE DIS1R1CT COURT OF. TBB FlFTH JUDICJAL DISTR(CT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
t----------·---------~---------
bONALD E. STET)ERER, 
Plaintift~ 
Case No. CV-2010~:'.12 
vs 
N.E.M. PJCP.iARDS, a.lea NICKY R1CHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants, 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL 10 
DEFENDANT'; PROFOSEU 
FINDINGS OF FA CT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E, STEUERER ("Steuere1 "), by and through 
his attorney of record, Robert E. Williams of Williams~ Meservy & Lothsr,eich, LLP, and 
rebuts the Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of La:v, filed in this matter 
by attorney Christopher P. Simms on behalf of Defendant N.E.M. Richards a.k.a. 1\TJCKY 
RlCHARDS ("Richards") on the 161h day of August, 2011 as follows: 
I 
INACCURACIES 
A. Contrary to the contentions of Richards, the evidence does ;how that some of 
the $21000.00 lent by :llichatds to Steue:i:er in 1997 was used to pay delinqp1ent property taxes 
on the real property located at 110 North Greenwood Street1 Shoshone, Idaho (the "Real 
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Property"). Plaintiffs Exhibit 107 contains a reference that Steuerer paid delinquent property 
taxes m 1997. 
B. Steuerer did not testify that he worked as a tr;ader on Wall 1~treet as a11eged by 
the Richards, Steuerer testified1that he worked on Wall Street in several different capacities 
but did not work as a trader. 
C. Steuerer testified that he paid $3,000.00 for the Real Property from the Odd 
Fellows, not $5,000.00 as conte:n.ded by FJchards, 
D. Richards states that Steuerer testified that after a conversat on with Valley Co-
Ops, Inc., he offered to pay Richards back the total amount of $5,000.00 plus i.J1terest. Steu.erer 
I 
actually testified that he would pay Richards what he owed her together~ ith interest ! . I 
E. Steuerer testified that Valley Co-Ops, Inc. had offered to pirchase the Reial 
Property from Steuerer for $110,000.00, not $160,000.00 as stated by Ric 1.a.rds. ) 
I 
F. Defenda.rit's Exhibits No. 212,214 and 215 corroborate Plaintiff's Exhib:it no 
106 that a total $2,000.00 was paid to Mr. Steuerer in 1997. Plaintiff's E,. hibit No. 106 ~oes 
I 
not contain a reference to a check in the amount of $500.00 dated July 1 ~', 1997. Plaintiffs 
I 
Exhibit No. 215 contains a reference to check No. 511 dated "7/1" to the ;{hoshone Clul:l for 
' 
$500,00, That is the sole iti:m o,f documentary evidence produced by Richards to suppo:r her 
testimony that more than $2;000.00 was given by her to Stouerer in 1997. 
G. Steu.erer testified that he use,d some of the money he received from Richards in 
I 
1997 to pay back property taxes and that he also paid personal expenses a 1d costs related to his 
I 




Richards argues that her transactions with Steuerer in 1997 a."l.d 2000 amounted t6 the 
sale and pmchase of interests in the Real Property. She makes this argummt even thou~ in 
some of her testimony at trial, arnd in her testimony throughout her deposi .ion, Richards I 
referred to the transactions with Steu.erer as "loans'·'. She also referred to· he tr.ansactiorib as 
I 
"loans" in a conversation with Donn Bordewyk in 2010. She has also ide.·1tified the intent of 
! 
the parties in issuing and receiving the deeds to be that of providing collaieral for the 
repayment ofloans in her deposition testimony. 
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Richards consistently testified that she had a duty to reconvey the :teal Property to 
Steuerer when he p:aid her back. She also testified that she felt this obliga·.ion disappear<~d 
because of the lapse of time at some point) but that she never communicat )d that to Stenerer. 
During the fourteen (14) year pe:riod between. 1997 and 201 l Richards neYer did contact 
Steuerer i:o an effort to obtain piiyment for what she believed she was owd, nor did she make 
any demand for such payment. On the other hand, Steuerer made several Jttten:.pts to contact 
Richards to discuss the repayment of the loans beginr.i:ng in 2004, Richards either failed to 
respond to hls at'u:mpts at communication altogether, or remained silent a: to w:hat amount of 
payment she expected. In a tele-phone conversation between the .parties when Richards was 
seriously ill and confined in a V .A Hospital, she infonned Steuerer that if she should di1~, her 
friend Ofer Inbar would see that the property was conveyed to Steuerer. 
Ricihards argument ignores the basic rule cited in Hoggv. Wolski, 42 Idaho 549,, 130 
P.3d 210 87, (2006), that the intent'ofthe parties at the time the 'transactions were entered into 
determines whether the deeds, othe!'WlSe absolute on their face, were intended to be mortgages. 
Stcmerer' s testimony was consistent that the transactions were always loans, and that the deeds 
were intended to provide collatera!l for the rep.a)'D:IJent of the loans. Most of Richards' 
testimony was consistent with Steuerer' s in that regard. Unlike the factuai circc.nnstances of 
the cases cited by Richards in support of her arguments, in this case there . .s no express 
agreem.er1t, in writing or otherwise, between the parties, to sell o:r buy, and the:i:e wa.s no change 
of possession of real property from the person receiving the money to the person paying it. 
Contrary to Richards cor1tention.s, Steuere:r never characterized the transac:ion as a sale of an 
interest in real property, followed by the recording d~1 PY z.. separate 
agreement to reconvey that real property at a subsequent point in time. Cl 'mtz v. Fortner, 80 
Idaho 355,399 P.2d 949 Idaiho (1965) and many other Idaho cases, acknowledge that such an 
arrangement is possible, but, ff it exists, it does not necessarily mean that the separate 
agreement to reconvey constitutes a mortgage. Steuerel s position has alv. ·ays been that there 
never was an agreement of sale between the parties followed by an agree:n,ent to reconv~:y the 
Real Property, verbal or othenvise. As be has consistently maintained frorn the 
commencement of the case, the transactions between the parties were loan:;, and the deeds were 
to constitute collateral for the repayment of the loans. Richards testified a,;cordingly multiple 
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times. Further, Richards responses to Steuerer1s ,;i,1ritten disc,overy requesi s, signed by her 
counsel of record at the tirne, aclmowledge that the transactions w:ith Steiu~rer were loans. 
The term "mortgage'1 is defined in Idaho Code §45-901 as follows "Mortgage is a 
contract, excepting a trust deed or transfer in trust, .by which specific property is bypothecated for the 
performance of an act withoutthe necessity of a change of possession." Further, Idaho Code §4 5-904 
provides that: "Every transfer of an interest in property other than in trust to se,;u re the performance of 
wy obligation of the trustor or other person named in tbe trust instrument, made only as a security for 
11 the performance of another act, is to be deemed a morlgage." 
Here, both parties have always agreed that Steiuerer had an obligation to repay Richards what 
had been loaned to him. There wru, never any change of possessicm in the Real f toperty to Richards on 
account of the transfor of mon,ey to or for the benefit of Steuerer. Steuerer has heen in continuous 
possession of the Real Property. Tes;timony of both parties established that the deeds from 
Steuerer to Richards were given as co!lateral for the repayment of what was owe j her. This was not a 
case wherein the sale of the Real Property was contemplated by either party, and neither of them has 
ever chMacterjzed their transactions in such terms. To the extent that Richards b·alieve.d that she 
"owned" an interest in the Real Propie.rty as a result of the two (2) deeds being gi·1en tc, her, the 
evidence, without contradiction, estabJ lshed that she did so with the recognition 1 hat she had a duty to 
1 
transfor it back to Steuerer whi:m he: repaid tn.i:i loa.'ls, Thus, the deeds in th is case are mortgages in 
accordance with ldaho Code §45,901 and Idaho Code, §45-904, and the cas.e law that has been cited. 
To the extent that Richards sometimes testified that she "0Yv11ed" the Real Prop,e1 ty, she also 
acknowledged she had a duty to reconvey the Real Property whe:n she was repaic loans. Her 
description of the transactions in this manner perfectly squares with the mortgag,, definitions at Idaho 
Code §45-901 and §45-904, because there was no change of possession of the Rt,al Property and the 
deeds were given as ·security for the repayment of loans. There is no support int 1e record for bc,ot-
strapping Richards' occasional use of the term ''ownership" into turning the tranrn.crions between 
herself and Steuerer into the sale and purchase of interesrs in real property, when both parties have 
testified that they were Joans. 
Because the testimony of both parties has characterized the transactions hy which the deods 
were given and received as Joans, and that the deeds themselves were given as cc llateral, the ana.lysis of 
the factors in Dick.ens v, Heston~ 21 P.2d 905, 908-910, 53 Idaho 91 (1933) is more supportive of 
the deeds being mortgages than. they a.re determinative. The values of the Real P-operty as established 
by the Lincoln County Assessor's ()ffice, at the times monies were paid to or for :he be:nefit of Steuerer. 
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A debt was in existence at the time of the giving of the deeds and survived their recording. The parties' 
negotiations were for making 1:,f Joans, not the purchase and sale of an interest in real property. Steuerer 
had no financial reso1ilroes at the tirne the loans were made. 
Clontz v. Fortner, 88 ldaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 Idaho (1965), relied upon by Richards in .support 
of her argmnents is in apposite to the present case. This is not a c.ase, lilce Clonrz, supra, where there 
was a wdtten contract of sale between two (2) parties, followed by a contemporaneous writte11 
agreement for the original seller to purc:hase the property bMk. Clontz, the orighal purchaser, assigned 
" his pi:m:hase;' s inter~st in tt',f,i proper::-/ to one Brimm. When Ciontz could not m i.ke payments to his 
seller, he obtained the money from Brimm and gave him an ass{gnment of his pl trchar.er' s interest in 
the contract. Clontz sued Brimm and obtained a declaratory judgment that his a ,signment of his 
purchaser's interest was a mortgage. The court gave Clontz a specific amount oi time to repay Brimm 
what he was owed. The day b,efore: that time period expired, Clontz, pursuant to a new attomey 
prepared agreement, .sold his interest in the real property to one Fortner, who gave an option to Clontz 
to repurchase the real property. Clontz then paid Brimm what he was owed and ,·emained in possession 
of the real property through a tenant for sixty (60) dµys after the payme11~ at whi )h time Fortner 
removed the tenant and took possession of the real property, Fortner remained h pos3ession for more 
than five (5) years, until the action which found its way to the Supreme Court was initfated by Ciontz 
seeking once again to have a transfer of his interest in the reaJ property to be dee an;;d a mortgag,e. 
Summary Judgment in favor of Fortner was a..ffmned by the Supreme Court. Tht· contrast between the 
present state of facts and those in Clontz, supra, is stark. Here, there are no wrltt ~n agreements for the 
transactions between the parties. Both parties have characterized the transactloni: as loans, and that the 
deeds were not absolute conveyances of title. Richards, who paid money to or on behalf of Steuerer has 
never been in posSie.ssion of the Real Property, 11or has she ever requested possesdon. 
St:euerertestified as early ~s 2004 be contacts Richard,. to discuss paytng her 
back and receiving the reconveyance of his Real Property. Mostly, Richards faik:d to respond to those 
attempts at communication. Difficulty in communicating wirh Richards was alsc confomed by Donn 
Bordev.yk. When Richards did speak about these subjects she was unable to arti.;ulat~, the. amount of 
money that .she thought she WR.Sowed. Through fomteen (14) year.s, Richards m.1de no deman~: for 
payment or for possession of the Real :Property from Stieuerer. 
Hamudv. Hawthorne, 52 Cal.2cJ 78,338 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1959) is relied u ,on by Richards in 
support of her claim that equitable defenses of Iatehes, quasi~estoppel, and the me shou l(i prevent 
Steuerer from recovering on the cfaims he has asserted. There, Harnud sued Ha"'thome to recover 
possession of real property. Originally, Ha"'rthome had loaned money to Hamud on real property that 
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was already encumbered by two (2) prior deeds of trust. Hawthorne, at the time Jfth,e, loan, received a 
promissory note, a third de,ed of trust on the real property, and a quitclaim deed from Hamud to 
Hawthorne to be recorded iI1 the eventthatHamud defaulted on the note and thir:l deed of trust. 
Written escrow instructions were entered into between the parties as well. The e,cmw instructions 
provided that the quitclaim deed was to be recorded in favor of HaMhorne in the event that Harr1ud 
defaulted on the note secured by the third deed of trust. Ha.mud defaulted. The ,1uitcla.im deed from 
Hamud to Hirwthorne was recorded. Hawthorne, pursuant to the qultclaim dC1ed, then took possc)ssion 
11 of the real p:mpe:rt-y, rented it, and c:ommenced to make substantial improvement: and ?ay expenses on 
the property for a period of five (5) years. All this occurred without any objection from Hamud. Flve 
(5) years after Hav.rthome took possession of the real property, Hamod discovere:l the interest of an oil 
company in the property; found what they believed to be a technicality in the c.::,r veyance langua,ge of 
the quitclaim deed, illl.d brought an action to recover possession of the real prope1fy on the basis that the 
quitclaim deed was a mortgage. The California Supreme Collrt; in bank, reverse,i the trial court which 
had determined that the quitclaim deed was a mortgage, and giving Hamud an OJ: portunity to redeem 
the mortgage by paying Hav.-thorn :a sum certain by a specified date. The facts ir the present case are in 
total contrast. Richards has ne,ver had possession of the Real Property, nor has she made demands for 
possession, rent ot any other compensation from Steuerer. Richards has never made improvements to 
the Real Property, and the 011iy money she has paid was in the form of loans to S :euewr which Steuerer 
remains willing to repay. Richards has been evasive and non-committal when St;:uere.r attempted to 
contact her in an effort to pay lthe loans back. Steuerer first attempted to contact Richads to disc:-uss 
repayment of the loan many years prior to the time Valley Co-Ops, Inc, came int,, the picture, Steuerer 
is hardly an opportunist, arid the inequitable conduct in this matter, if any there ii, is that of Richards. 
conclusions of lttllf and judgment 
accordingly that: 
1. The two (2) deeds dated February 24th, 1997; and M?iy Srh, 2000, and recorded, 
respectively, on February 26r1\ 1997, as fustrument No. 161973, and M~iy 8'\ 2000, 
Instrument No. 168606, Linc,0ln County, Idaho records, were mortgages intended to 
secure loans made by Ms. Richards to Mr. Steuerer, and to constitl te collateral for 
those loans. As such, these two (2) deeds are mortgages and did not convey absolute 
title in the Real Property to Ms. Richards. 
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2. Mr. Steuerer is the fee simple ov.11.er of the Real Property loca.tedl ~ t 110 North 
Greenwood Street, Shoshone~ Idaho, legally described as Lots 4 ar d 5, Block E cif the 
Shoshone Tov.m:ite, Lincoln County, Idaho, as the same is platted in the official plat 
thereof now of ~:cord in the office of fue recorder of said county, rnd title to the Real 
Property be quieted in him subject to the two (2) mortgages in favor of Ms. Richards, 
embodied by the deeds. 
3. Ms. Richards loaned Mr.. Steuerer $2,000.00 in 1997. She made additional loans to him 
totaling; $6,784.91 between 2000 and 2010, by paying taxes on the Real Property in that 
amount. The total amount of the loan obligations seemed by the mortgages is 
$8, 784,91 .00 in principal, together ·with accrued interest of $8,651 29 through the 161h 
day of August, 2011, and per diem interest thereaft~r of $2.89 to tl.e date of judgment 
4. Upon I\1r. Steuerer paying the amount owed on the loans to Ms. R.Jcb.ards as determined 
above~ Ms. Richards should be required to execute and cause to be recorded in the 
records of Lincoln County, Idaho, a su.itable satisfaction of the twc (2) mortgages. 
4 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'JS day of August, 2011. 
{4' E:; Y & ~OTHSPEICH, LLP 
_____ ..,__ _ ~--=·-----
ROBERT E, WILLIAMS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 













DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING 
ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this, 
her Reply to Plaintiff's Closing Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and therefore states as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The testimony and evidence adduced at trial, and submitted in post-trial argument 
present mixed issues of fact and law. Both the factual and legal issues to be determined 
-- .. 
hinge on the credibility of the parties. Which party is to be believed? 
Plaintiffs testimony has been inconsistent; changing as more information became . 
available; is contradicted by opposing testimony, and is not supported by the existing 
documentary evidence. Defendant has been consistently vague in regard to the minutia 
and legal labels, but consistently emphatic on the ultimate facts . 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED FINDINGS 1 · ..
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Page I 361 
Fact issues for determination by the Court include: \Vhat was the intention of the 
parties at the time the monies were exchanged? \Vhat was the intention of the parties at 
the time the deeds were executed and delivered? How much money did Defendant give 
Plaintiff, and when? 
The initial legal issue to be detem1ined is whether Plaintiff has overcome the legal 
presumption and met his burden by clear and convincing evidence, that two separate 
rlePrlc:_ J:ihc:0l11te 0n thPir face, <:honlrl he cn11c:trrn>:rl ac: rnnrtgagec:, not ac: a tranc:fer with 
right of re-conveyance. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d1087 (Idaho 2006); 
Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) In determining the intention 
of the parties the Court is required to examine certain factors, including the existence of a 
debt to be secured and the satisfaction or survival of the debt. Hogg, at 1093. If the court 
finds for Plaintiff on the initial issue, it must then determine whether equity permits 
Plaintiff to recover, or whether laches and estoppel prevent recovery by Plaintiff under 
the circumstances. Clontz, at 953. Finally, if the Court finds Plaintiff should recover 
despite the lapse of thirteen to fifteen (13-15) years between the transaction and his 
claim, then the court must determine the amount of money due Defendant from Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff simply ignores the legal presumption, the plain language of the deeds in 
question, the inconsistency in his statements to this Court, as well as the lapse of time 
between the transactions and his claims to title. Plaintiff merely concludes that "the 
intent of the parties that the deeds constitute mortgages, and the underlying transactions 
loans, is therefore clearly established," despite Defendant's consistent testimony that she 
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believed she gained an ownership interest in the real property as a result of recording the 
executed deeds. Apparently, Plaintiff is asserting that because Defendant recognized an 
obligation to re-convey title if she were paid what she was owed, the transactions must be 
classified as mortgages. 
Plaintiff does not dispute executing and delivering to Defendant a Warranty Deed 
on February 24, 1997, nor a Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. However, Plaintiff, in his 
verified complaint omitted any reference to the 1997 warra...TJ.ty deed. The only '\vritings" 
in any way referencing a transaction between the parties are the deeds themselves. No 
note or any other integration in writing was created to memorialize any agreement the 
parties may have reached. 
Both parties testified they understood the deeds to transfer an interest in the real 
property, but that the interest would be deeded back if Plaintiff repaid the monies given 
him by Defendant. Defendant testified the money was to be paid back as soon as 
possible, within a reasonable time, while Plaintiff testified no time was set when the 
money must be repaid. Both parties testified no specific agreement was :reached 
regarding the exact amount of money required to be paid from Plaintiff to Defendant to 
trigger :re-conveyance of title. 
When Plaintiff executed his Complaint, before he had any documentary evidence, 
he swore he executed a quitclaim deed in exchange for a loan received from Defendant in 
May, 2000. When Plaintiff executed his affidavit, after he had documents from 
Defendant's checking account :records and a title history, he swore ·Defendant agreed to 
loan him $2,000 in 199i and he agreed she could have a mortgage on his real property. 
At trial Plaintiff testified he and Defendant agreed in 1997 that Defendant would loan 
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him $5,000 in exchange for the Warranty Deed. Obviously, these stories are not clear 
and consistent. In addition to the time frame issues, Plaintiff has not been clear and 
consistent with regard to the purpose of the exchange of money for deeds. He has told 
the court the money was for back taxes in one version, and in another version, that the 
money was to fix the building up for a bar business. 
Defendant testified she had difficulty with her memory due to her disabilities, and 
associated medication. Defendant t~stified she kept her records in bags throughout her 
home. Defendant testified she could only locate a few documents associated with her 
having given money to Plaintiff. Defendant testified she was certain she had given 
Plaintiff two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to February 1997. Defendant was equally 
certain she had given Plaintiff five thousand dollars ($5,000) in five hundred dollar 
($500) consecutive monthly payments beginning ID February of 1997. 
Defendant stated she received the warranty deed from Plaintiff for a one half (1/2) 
interest in the real property in exchange for, or in repayment of the initial two thousand 
dollar ($2,000) loan. Defendant testified she received the quitclaim deed transferring the 
entire title to the property in the year 2000, because the five thousand dollar ($5,000) had 
not been paid back. Defendant testified she paid all delinquent taxes and all current taxes 
due on the property, after she acquired full ownership thereof in 2000. Defendant 
testified at some point when no monies had been re-paid to her by Plaintiff, any 
obligation she may have had to re-convey the properties had expired. 
Counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant, cooperatively attempted to retrieve 
bank statements and cancelled checks, and verified that the banks simply do not have 
records from the mid-to-late 1990s. Therefore, it is impossible to verify exactly how 
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much money changed hands and when. Certainly, if all the documents relative to 
payments made, were available, the intent of the parties may be easier to discern. 
However, lack of supporting documents for a transaction that occurred more than a 
decade ago, cannot be dispositive of the intent of the parties. In fact, the key documents 
are available, filed with the recorder of deeds and admitted into evidence as exhibits 201 
and 202; the warranty and quitclaim deeds. 
Also submitted into evidence were the baJ1.k records Defendant v;as able to dig 
from her old storage. The last of those records, dug from Defendant's bags of belongings 
the night before trial, absolutely verify payment of not $2,000, but at least $2,500. 
Plaintiff, at trial, testified emphatically he received from Defendant only four checks of 
$500 over four consecutive months.in 1997. The actual documents prove Defendant paid 
Plaintiff $400 on February 25, 1997; $100 on March 3, 1997; $500 on April 1, 1997; 
$500 on May 1, 1997; $500 on June 1, 1997; and $500 on July 1, 1997. (Exhibits 203, 
204,205,206,207,208,212,213,214 & 215) .. 
Thus, Defendant's recollection of events is in fact confirmed, at least in part, 
while Plaintiff's certain memory of events is disproved by the existing records. For this 
Court to find for Plaintiff in his request to deem the deeds mere mortgages, it would have 
to forgive the inconsistency in his statements. The court would have to believe a man 
would execute and deliver a warranty deed, giving away a one half (1/2) interest in his 
home, without having received a cent from the grantee. Defendant's recollection of 
events plainly makes more sense and is more consistent with the documentary evidence. 
If, as recalled by Defendant, she had previously loaned Plaintiff two thousand 
dollars ($2,000), which had not been paid back, then it makes sense Plaintiff would have 
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deeded an interest in the property as a form of repayment. Likewise, in the year 2000, 
three years after the second loan of five thousand dollars ($5,000), it makes sense he 
would have deeded the property in repayment of the loan. 
Plaintiff knew Defendant would neither demand rent nor evict him, because he 
knew she was compassionate and of generous · demeanor. This result, borne of 
Defendant's charitable spirit, was the perfect set up for a work shy hustler; no rent, no 
maintena...11ce, no taxes, not e·ven fil1)7 utility bills. Plaintiff sho\ved nc interest in title to 
the neglected property until he discovered it had redevelopment value to the Valley Co-
Op. 
In addition to the testimony of the parties, coupled with the scant documentary 
evidence, the Court is required to analyze certain criteria to determine the intention of the 
parties. Among those criteria is the existence of a debt to be secured and the satisfaction 
or survival of the debt. Plaintiff fails to provide any argument or analysis as to whether 
an enforceable debt exists. In fact if a debt existed, it certainly does not survive. Before a 
deed can be declared to be an equitable mortgage there must exist a debt which must be 
personal in its nature and enforceable against the person independent of the security. 
Shaner v. Ratgdrurn State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) Idaho Code 
Section 5-217 requires an action on an oral contract to be brought within four ( 4) years. 
If such an action is not brought within the required period of time, it is forever barred. 
Therefore, a complete defense exists as to any action brought for the debt, and Plaintiff 
cannot satisfy this criteria. 
The law requires a Plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the 
concurrent understanding of both parties, grantor and grantee, the transaction in question 
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was intended as a mortgage, rather than a transfer. Plaintiff has not made a showing 
sufficient even to find he believed he entered into mortgages, rather than having 
transferred interest in real property. Certainly, Plaintiff has not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence a concurrent understanding of both grantor and grantee that 
mortgage transactions were being agreed to. The intention of the parties at the time 
money changed hands may have been a loan. However, when Plaintiff executed and 
delivered, first 2000 5 deeds to the pro:pe1iy 
than clear that the transactions were intended to be mortgages. Therefore, the Court must 
find Plaintiff failed to overcome the legal presumption that the deeds transferred titled 
ownership of the real property. 
LACHES & ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of laches is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and 
not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim 
which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice to the 
adverse party, and operates as s bar in a court of equity. (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th 
Edition) Here, Plaintiff alleges he believed a mortgage was created first in 1997 and 
again in 2000. Yet, during those years between the creation of the mortgages and 
bringing his action in equity against Defendant, he did nothing to assert ownership of the 
property. Plaintiff claims to have resided in the building, yet the building was without 
heat, bathing facilities or even a roof. Defendant, not Plaintiff, paid all taxes due on the 
property for all years in question. 
The law imposes Emitations .of time as to most claims, for good reasons; fading 
memories, availability of witnesses and documentary evidence. Idaho has long 
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recognized laches and estoppel as relevant equitable doctrines in this realm of law. 
Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965); Shaner v. Ratgdrum State 
Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916). 
AMOUNT OF MONEY/LOANED & OWED 
In the event the Court finds for Plaintiff on his claim that the transactions of the 
parties were mortgages, rather than transfers of a fee interest in the real property, and not 
barred by laches a...11d estoppel, then it must determine the a.'Tlount of money owed by 
Plaintiff to Defendant. Defendant's testimony was unambiguous; she directly gave 
Plaintiff seven thousand dollars ($7,000), all prior to the end of 1997. Thereafter, 
beginning in the year 2000, she paid all delinquent and then current taxes. 
Admitted into evidence was Defendant's Exhibit 211, a demonstration of interest 
calculation on monies lent. If the court has determined the deeds are mere mortgages, the 
debt secured, with interest must be paid prior to release of the lien. Under these 
circumstances the amount due would be thirty five thousan·d two hundred fifty dollars 
and ninety seven cents, ($35,250.97) plus per diem interest accrued since July 1, 2011. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the law is clear that conveyance of real property by deed is 
conclusive as to transfer of ownership. Even in equity a presumption exists against the 
arcane fiction that a deed, absolute on its face be construed as a mortgage. A century of 
sparse Idaho case law on this topic all hold against the party seeking to have a court find 
a security interest contrary to the presumption of validity of a deed. The Plaintiff has 
failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that anything other than a transfer with 
an agreement to re-convey title was intended by the parties. 
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STOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DATED 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 'Z-? day of August 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to Robert E. 
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East 
Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DON.ALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
On July 13, 2011, the court trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter. The plaintiff 
was present and represented by Counsel, Robert E. Williams. The defendant was present and 
represented by Counsel, Christopher P. Simms. 
Testin1011y of w1tnes:ses was received and exhibits were admitted into evidence. At 
the conclusion of the trial the parties were each given additional time to secure bank records of 
the defendant and, thereafter, the parties were given fourteen (14) days to submit written closing 
argrnnents and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; and, thereafter, seven (7) days 
to submit any rebuttal argument or supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law; after 
which the matter would be deemed submitted for decision. 
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The final briefs were filed with the court on August 24, 2011. This matter was deemed 
submitted to the Court for decision on August 25, 2011. The Court, having considered the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel as contained in their post-trial memorandums and 
counsel's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, makes the following findings of fact 
and conclusions oflaw. 
I. 
SUMM.A l{Y OF TESTIMONY ~4~"J\l"D EY ...... 1IIBITS 
DONALD E. STEUERER is the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and is a 67-year-old 
resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho and has been a permanent resident since 1990. He resides 
at 110 North Green wood, the subject property. The plaintiff purchased the subject property from 
the Odd Fellas on a "hand shake" in December 1987 for the sum of$3,000.00, which was paid in 
installments over a period of approximately 7 months. At the time of the purchase the plaintiff 
was a resident of the State of New York. The plaintiff, for a period of time, worked on Wall 
Street as a trader. He has not worked since 1996 and last filed tax returns in 1996. In 2003 he 
began receiving SSI disability benefits. He received those benefits until the year 2007 when he 
began receiving Social Security Benefits of approximately $800.00 per month. He had no other 
source of income. 
The plaintiff became acquainted with the defendant, N.E.M. Richards, in 1990. She was 
residing at 115 North Greenwood in the City of Shoshone. Her residence is across the street from 
the subject property. Between 1990 and 1997 they would visit a few times per week. He 
considered her a friend. In the summer of 1997 he had a conversation with Ms. Richards at her 
residence as to what he intended to do with the subject property and he indicated that he intended 
to develop the property into a bar/restaurant. She inquired as to how much he would need to 
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accomplish his plan and he indicated he would need $2,000.00 to $5,000.00. He denies that at 
the time of this discussion there was any mention of delinquent property taxes. He testified that 
Ms. Richards offered to loan him $5,000.00 for the development of a bar/restaurant. He offered 
to put her name on his deed if she loaned him the money and he intended the deed as collateral 
for her loan. He did testify that he had offered to make her a partner in the bar/restaurant but she 
declined. There was no discussion between the parties as to the date or time for repayment, 
ever received the sum of $5,000.00 and testified that he only received the sum of $2,000.00, in 
the form of four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00. He executed a Warranty Deed [Exhibit 101] 
as the collateral for the loan and placed Ms. Richards' name on the deed. The deed was executed 
on February 25, 1997. He testified that Ms. Richards told him that she did not have any other 
money to loan to him. 
After he received the $2,000.00 from Ms. Richards he did not have much contact vvith her 
between 1997 and 2000 because she was in and out of the hospital. He testified that he only saw 
her a "few times a month." Sometime in the year 2000, Ms. Richards came to his residence and 
they discussed his delinquent property taxes. She offered to catch him up on the property taxes 
for three years if he would deed all of the subject property to her as collateral. Concerning this 
loan, regarding the property taxes, she said "pay me back when you can." Regarding these loans 
there was never any discussion about interest to be paid on the loans. He executed a Quitclaim 
Deed [Exhibit 102] to Ms. Richards on May 8, 2000. 
After the year 2000, he did not see Ms. Richards again until either 2003 or 2004 when he 
was at the VA hospital in Boise for medical treatment. Ms. Richards was also at the hospital for 
medical care. He testified that he told Ms. Richards that he was now receiving SSI benefits and 
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could start repaying the loan. She said that he should call her to discuss the repayment. He 
testified that he attempted to call her and write to her but his mail was returned undeliverable and 
his calls were not returned. When he would call the phone was either busy, she did not answer, 
or the voice mail was full. It was not until March 2007 that he was able to speak with Ms. 
Richards concerning the repayment of the loan. This was after Valley-Coop expressed an interest 
to him in purchasing the subject property. He drove out to a ranch where she was staying and 
property and wanted to know what he owed her on the loan. He offered to pay her interest on 
what he owed but she said, 'just pay me what you owe me." He admits that after the year 2000 
Ms. Richards paid all of the property taxes, except for the June 2011 taxes, which he paid. 
Sometime in May 2007 he and Ms. Richards had dinner in Twin Falls and he wanted to talk 
about repayment of the loan. He testified that Ms. Richards was "in too much of a hurry" to talk 
about it. About three weeks later he tried to call her and discovered she was in the hospital. He 
followed up with letters but they were again returned undeliverable. 
He did not have any opinion as to the value of his property in 1997, other than that he 
assumed it was worth more than what he had paid for it. He testified that Valley-Coop has 
offered him $110,000.00 for the subject property. 
On cross-examination, he was confronted with his prior affidavit, wherein he testified 
that in 1997 he was destitute. He admits he does not know what that term means. Today the roof 
of the building on the subject property is not sound and the interior of the building is open to the 
elements. The exterior of the building has not been painted since he has owned it. He did not pay 
the property taxes on the subject property for the period of 1995 to 1997. He does not recall the 
months in 1997 that he received the four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00. He only had a 
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checking account at First Security Bank, at that time. He no longer has any bank records for the 
relevant period of the time in question. He denies he ever told Ms. Richards that he was 
delinquent on his property taxes in 1997. However, in his affidavit on file with the court, he 
asserted under oath that he was destitute and "that he needed money to pay real property taxes 
and other personal expenses." He did not state that the loan was for a bar/restaurant. His affidavit 
also states that Ms. Richards agreed to loan him "$2,000.00" not the $5,000.00 referred to on his 
although he claims to have used the money to "fix up" the building. He admits that at no time 
has he ever attempted to pay back the loan by sending payments to Ms. Richards. His 
explanation is that he did not know where to send a payment, since her mail was undeliverable. 
The Shoshone Club was the name of his intended bar/restaurant. The plaintiff is also known as 
"Brooklyn Don." 
DO~"N BORDE\VYK is the General Manager of Valley Coop, which is a farm supply 
cooperative. He reports to the Board of Directors of the Coop and oversees the day-to-day 
operations, as well as the long-term objectives of the Coop. He has been the general manager 
since 1996. He is familiar with the subject property. The subject property consists of two city 
lots. The Coop owns a C-Store and a gas station that are adjacent to the subject property. The 
Coop's property was refurbished in 1998 at a cost of $1.9 million. Since the remodel, the Coop 
has acquired other property adjacent to its property. One piece of property consisting of three 
city lots was purchased in 2006 for $140,000.00 and the other piece of property consisting of 
four city lots was purchased in 2007 for $180,000.00. The Coop is also interested in purchasing 
the subject property and approached Mr. Steuerer about purchasing the property in 2007. At that 
time, the Coop thought that he was the titled owner of the subject property. He first met with Mr. 
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Steuerer in his office in Jerome. At some point in early 2010, after this meeting and after he 
became aware of the quitclaim deed to Ms. Richards [Exhibit 102], he contacted plaintiff's 
counsel to begin the process of purchasing the subject property. He had a conversation with Mr. 
Steuerer as to why his name was not on the title to the subject property. Mr. Steuerer told him 
that he had borrowed money form Ms. Richards for expenses related to opening a business. He 
testified that he had attempted to contact Ms. Richards sometime in 2008 or 2009 by telephone, 
but he was not able to reach her; on each occasion her "(-loice mail "</las ft1.ll and he could not leav .. e 
a message. He does recall talking to her on the telephone in April 2010. Ms. Richards told him 
that she would get back to him about the transaction. V/hen he did not hear back from her he 
tried to call her several more times. It was not until December 2010 that he had any substantial 
conversation with her. Ms. Richards stated that the amounts owed were a loan for a business and 
they talked about the amount owed. This was the first that he had heard there was an additional 
$5,000.00 owed. They also discussed a fair interest rate. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS is a resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho and had resided at 115 North 
Greenwood for over 20 years. Her residence is across the street from the subject property, which 
is the residence of Mr. Steuerer. She currently suffers from various physical and mental 
disabilities and has been treated for such disabilities at the VA Hospital since approximately 
1998. These disabilities have an impact on her ability to recall and organize her thoughts. She 
grew up in Hansford, Washington and went to school in the State of Washington. She went to 
nursing school at the University of Washington, but her education was interrupted by service in 
the military during the Vietnam War. After the war she returned to school at Washington State 
University and obtained a doctorate degree in veterinary medicine. She has never been licensed 
in any state to practice veterinary medicine, but has worked in a number of veterinary clinics, 
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including the Shoshone Veterinary Clinic. She moved to Shoshone in 1987. She purchased her 
current residence in 1990 and it was at this time she first met Mr. Steuerer. They would visit 
from time to time and she, on occasion, would feed him; allow him to borrow water; and allow 
him to shower at her residence. 
In approximately 1995 or 1996, Mr. Steuerer approached her and told her that he was 
behind on his property taxes. She thinks that his house was close to foreclosure based on his 
delinquent taxes. She gave lii111 $2,000.00, v.rhich she thought he was going to use to pay his back 
taxes. She did not want to see him living on the streets. She does not recall if she gave him the 
money in cash or by way of a check. She testified that there was a verbal agreement that he 
would pay her back "as soon as possible." "I didn't think it would be right away. I thought that it 
would take him sometime, because I thought he should do the taxes. I told him don't worry about 
it." By February 1997, Mr. Steuerer had not paid back the money. She had not made any demand 
for payment, because "I don't believe in pressing people for money." In February 1997, she 
talked to someone else who had lent money to Mr. Steuerer and Mr. Steuerer had given this 
person some guns as "collateral." At this time she thought that Mr. Steuerer's property was 
worth about $6,000.00, so she asked him for half of his property as an "incentive to pay me 
back." She asked him for a document saying that half of his property was hers and he gave her 
the Warranty Deed [Exhibit 101]. She believed she was a half owner of the subject property after 
receipt of the Warranty Deed. 
She does not recall if, between 1997 and 2000, she and Mr. Steuerer had any 
conversations about repayment of the $2,000.00 loan. She does recall going to dinner with Mr. 
Steuerer in Twin Falls. She testified she was hoping to talk about repayment but it was Mr. 
Steuerer who did not want to discuss the subject. She admits that this dinner was sometime after 
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the year 2000. She did testify that sometime in 1997 Mr. Steuerer approached her and indicated 
he was in need of more money because he was still behind on his property taxes. She agreed to 
give him $5,000.00, over time, in increments. She told him that "if he signed over the whole 
thing [referring to the subject property] .. .I would catch up on everything and pay taxes 
[referring to the property taxes]." She claims to have given him a series of checks totaling 
$5,000.00 over a ten month period. At the time of trial she, belatedly, provided Exhibits 212 
[ original check stubs including check #1807 dated 2/25/1997 payable to Donald E.K. 
Steuerer/Shoshone Club for $400.00; check #1809 dated 3/3/1997 payable to Steuerer for 
$100.00; check #1812 dated 5/1/1997 payable to Steuerer for $500.00], 213[original Washington 
Mutual check register listing check #425 dated 6/1/1997 payable to Steuerer in the amount of 
$500.00], 214 [Washington Mutual cancelled check to Don Steuerer #425 for $500.00 dated 
6/1/1997 and check #511 dated 7/1/1997 payable to Shoshone Club in the amount of $500.00], 
215 [ original partial check register]. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS DEPOSITION TESTIMO:NY 
The deposition of Ms. Richards was taken on March 14, 2011. As to the money she paid 
to Mr. Steuerer, she testified, in relevant part, as follows: 
[Pg. 13, L. 5-12] 
Q: .... When was the first time you agreed to loan money to Mr. Steuerer? 
A: In the late 1990's 
Q: And what was the reason that you agreed to loan him money? 
A: I didn't want him to be on the streets. And he was delinquent in his taxes, so that I could 
keep the house - - he could keep the house from foreclosure. 
[Pg., L. 5-12] 
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Q: So did you make a loan to him in the late 1990's? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how much was it for? 
A: 2,000. 
Q: How did you pay him the money that was loaned to him? 
A: I don't remember. 
[Pg. 16, L. 15-21] 
Q: And what do you say the agreement was that you made together, you and Mr. Steuerer, as 
to how you would be repaid the loan? 
A: He - - I - - he indicated he would pay me back as soon as possible. And I told him not to 
worry; I would not charge him rent, just to imagine it was his. So there was no definite time 
period to pay back. 
[Pg. 17, Line 2-8] 
Q: Did you agree on a time by which the loan had to be repaid? 
A: As soon as possible. 
Q: After you made Mr. Steuerer this $2,000 loan, did you ever ask him for the money to be 
paid back to you? 
A: No. 
[Pg. 25, L. 1-9] 
Q: So he deeded you a half interest in the property for the $2,000? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And did you consider yourself the owner of the property at that time? 
A: No. 
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Q: So what was the arrangement, why didn't you - -
A: Part Ov;,711er. 
[Pg. 25, L. 17 to Pg. 26, L.12] 
Q: V/hy didn't you take possession of it if you had a half-ownership interest in it? 
A: Because I made an agreement \\1th Brooklyn Don that he could just live there and pay me 
back. 
Q: So without trvi..r1Q to nut words in '.J'OUT mouth. Ms. Richards, this is more like a mortQ:aQe 
_,. ..._, .l. ... ._.; "-" 
then, you had basically an interest in the property, and when he paid you back, you would deed 
your interest in the property back to him, was that the intent? 
A: The intent was to have some kind of collateral. 
Q: So you viewed your half interest in the property that was acquired by this deed as 
collateral? Was there some other kind of collateral, other than this deed? 
A: No. 
Q: So let's just say, what would you have done then, let's say in the year 1998, had he paid 
you back the $2,000? 
A: I would have signed it back over to him, as I told him I would. 
[Pg. 26, L. 23 to Pg. 29, L.8] 
Q: Between 1997 and the date of Deposition Exhibit No. 2, at least the last page of 
Deposition Exhibit No. 2, which the document says is May 3rd, 2000, - - maybe May 8th, 2000, it 
appears. Did you make any more loans to Mr. Steuerer over and above the $2,000 you've already 
told me about? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How much did you loan to him and when did you loan it to him? 
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A: 5,000. And I'm not sure when. It was not all at one time. 
Q: Do you remember when any part of the $5,000 was loaned to Mr. Steuerer? 
A: Not atthis time. Late 1990's. 
Q: Was it before the date that's on that deed that we're looking at, the last page of Exhibit 3? 
A: Yes. 
Q: It would have been before May st\ 2000? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Any why did you loan the additional money to him? 
A: I don't remember what reason he gave me. 
Q: But, in any event, your testimony is that you did advance him an extra $5,000 sometime 
between February of 1997 and May of2008? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was there any new agreement reached between the two of you at that time as to how the 
new loan amount, which appears to now be up to about $7,000, would be paid? 
A: No. 
Q: Was it- -
A: Not except for as soon as possible. 
Q: Still as soon as possible? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And there still was no specific date mentioned? 
A: No. 
Q: After May 8, 2000, if Mr. Steuerer would have paid you back the $7,000, what would 
you have done? 
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A: Signed it back over to him. 
Q: Now, could you tell me, looking at the last page of Deposition Exhibit No. 3, again, 
which is the Quitclaim Deed dated May 8, 2000, why was this second deed signed and given to 
you at the time? 
A: Because of the loan. The extra loan. 
Q: The new--
A: That's why - - I'm sure he - -
Q: The new $5,000 loan? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Was it supposed to be again, collateral, like the warranty deed was to be collateral from 
the initial $2,000 loan? 
A: It was something to assure me that he was going to pay me back. 
Q: After May 8, 2000, did you ever take possession of the real property that's described in 
the quitclaim deed and the warranty deed? 
A: No. It was the same agreement, live there free. 
Q: Has that agreement - -
A: Consider it your own. 
The following exhibits were admitted at trial: 
Plaintif:f s: 
#101-Warranty Deed, dated February 24, 1997 
#102-Quitclaim Deed, dated May 8, 2000 
#103-Defendant's check stub no. 1812 
# 104- Defendant's check stub no. 1807 
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#105- Defendant's check stub no. 1809 
# 106-Defendant' s handwritten note 
#107-Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Notice, 1983/1984 
# 108-1997 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000 
#109-1998 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 5/8/2000 
# 110-1998 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000 
# 111-1999 Lincoln Countv Tax Collector Bill/ReceiDt, dated 12/20/2000 ., " 
#112-2000 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000 & 6/20/2001 
#113-2001 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/21/2001 & 6/19/2002 
#114-#122-Lincoln County Tax Collector Tax transaction details, 2002 to 2010 
#123-#136-Lincoln County Assessor History Reports, 1997 to 2010 
#137-Affidavit Donn W. Bordevvyk 
#138-Litigation Guarantee 
Defendant's: 
#211-Interest Rate Calculation 
#212-Richards original check stubs for check #1801 to 1825 for the period of 11/24/96 to 
5/25/97 
#213-Richards original check register for the period of 4/09/96 to 10/28/98 
#214-Richards cancelled check#425 dated 6/01/97 
#215-Richards partial original check register 
The exhibits above do shed some light on the testimony of the parties in this action. In 
tem1s of the payment of property taxes on the subject property it is apparent from the records of 
the Lincoln County Tax Collector that Mr. Steuerer paid the property taxes, interest, and 
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penalties due for 12/20/95 and 6/20/96 on April 2, 1997, in the total sum of $201.58. According 
to the testimony of Ms. Richards, he also paid the property taxes due on 6/20/2011, in the sum of 
$281.91. Ms. Richards appears to have paid all of the current and delinquent property taxes on 
the subject property for the tax years of 1997 to 2010, in the total sum of $6,784.91; with her first 
payment being on May 8, 2000 and her last payment being December 20, 2010. 
The exhibits above also shed light on the testimony of the parties as to the monies paid by 
J'v1s. Richards to 1'Ar. Steuerer. According to t.cli.e. original check stubs, the original check registers 
and the one cancelled check, Ms. Richards, during the year 1997, paid to Mr. Steuerer or the 
Shoshone Club the total sum of $2,500 as follows: 
Check# Date Paid Amount Paid 
1807 2/25/1997 $400.00 
1809 3/03/1997 $100.00 
495 4/01/1997 $500.00 
1812 5/01/1997 $500.00 
425 6/01/1997 $500.00 
511 7/0111997 $500.00 
II. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action relates to the ownership of certain real property located in the County of 
Lincoln, State ofidaho, legally described as Lots 4 and 5 of Block E of the Shoshone Town site, 
110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idaho (subject property) and the amount due and owing to 
N.E.M. Richards (Richards). 
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2. Steuerer purchased the subject property in December of 1987 for the sum of $3,000.00. 
The subject property has a two story structure on it and the property consists of two city lots. 
Richards lives at 115 North Greenwood which is across the street from the subject property. 
Steuerer became a fulltime resident of the City of Shoshone in 1990. Richards purchased her 
current residence in 1990. In 1990 Richards and Steuerer became acquainted as friends. 
3. Steuerer was capable of paying his property taxes on the subject property from the time 
he pmchased it up u..11til approximately 1995. The evidence is unclear as to Steuerer's incorne for 
those years. Steuerer has not filed any income tax returns since 1996. Between 1995 and 1996 
his gross income was not more than $8,000.00 from part-time work. From 1995 forward, 
Steuerer did not pay his property taxes. 
4. Richards, from time to time, would help Steuerer by feeding him, providing him with 
water, and allowing him to shower at her residence. At some point in time, Richards and Steuerer 
had discussions regarding the subject property. The testimony of the parties is in conflict as to 
when these discussions took place and as to the content of those discussions. According to 
Richards, these discussions first took place sometime between 1995 and 1996. According to 
Steuerer, these discussions first took place in 1997. As to the content of the discussions, 
according to Richards, they concerned Steuerer' s delinquent property taxes and according to 
Steuerer the discussions concerned his desire to develop his property into a bar/restaurant, to be 
known as the Shoshone Club. Richards denies any discussion of the idea of a bar/restaurant and 
Steuerer denies any discussion of delinquent property taxes. What is not in dispute is that these 
discussions concerned Steuerer's need for money and Richards' willingness to assist Steuerer 
financially. It is clear to the court that the current recollections of the parties, in their testimony, 
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are not necessarily reliable, 15 years later. This case is a classic example of why friends and 
handshakes do not always work. 
5. There is no dispute that, at some point in time, Richards agreed to loan money to Steuerer 
and did in fact loan money to Steuerer. There is conflict in the testimony of the parties as to 
when the money was loaned and how much money was loaned. According to Richards, in 1995 
or 1996 she initially paid to Steuerer the sum of $2,000.00; however, she does not know if the 
money was paid in cash or by check. Furd1er, Richards testified t.liat she loa...11ed an additional 
$5,000.00 to Steuerer sometime in 1997, which was paid in monthly payments over a period of 
ten (10) months. According to the testimony of Steuerer, he only received the sum of $2,000.00 
in 1997, which was paid to him in the form of four (4) checks, each in the sum of $500.00 over 
four (4) consecutive months. From the notations on the original check stubs [Exhibit 212], it 
would appear that Richards originally agreed to loan $5,000.00 in February 1997. 
6. There is no reliable evidence, either through the testimony of the parties or the 
documentary evidence, that Richards loaned any money to Steuerer in 1995 or 1996. The 
documentary evidence [Exhibits # 212-215] reflect that Richards issued six (6) monthly 
consecutive checks totaling $2,500.00 to Steuerer, which is contrary to his testimony that he only 
received four ( 4) monthly, consecutive checks for $2,000.00. The evidence supports the 























The documentary evidence [Exhibit 212] also supports the finding that Richards agreed 
to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 in February 1997; by reason of the notations she made 
on her check stubs #1807, 1809, and 1812. On each of these check stubs there is a notation 
written by Richards at the time the check was issued. The notation for check #1807 is 
«$5000-+B::ilance 4600"; the notation for check# 1809 is "Balance for }Aarch 1st $4,500"; and 
the notation for check# 1812 is "May Balance $3,500." This is consistent when one considers 
the April 1, 1997 check, issued to Steuerer for $500.00, check #495, which was written from a 
different account. It is clear that, for a period of time, Richards was tracking how much of the 
original $5,000.00 had been paid to Steuerer. This court has also examined Exhibit 213, the 
original check register of Richards, which appears to cover the period of 4/9/96 to 10/28/98, and 
during this entire period there were only two checks written from this account. They were check 
#495, dated 4/1/97 for $500 payable to Steuerer, and check# 511, dated July 1, 1997 for $500, 
written to the Shoshone Club. The court also finds that the first check Richard wrote [ check # 
1807] made reference to both Steuerer and the Shoshone Club. 
7. It appears from the testimony of Richards and Steuerer that their recollections of the 
events are not necessarily reliable, as to the amounts loaned and when. The court finds that the 
testimony that Richards loaned $2,000 to Steuerer in 1995 or 1996 is not reliable and that the 
testimony of Steuerer that he only received four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00 each is not 
reliable. The court further finds that in February 1997 Richards agreed to loan $5,000.00 to 
Steuerer and that Richards would pay the money to Steuerer in monthly payments. Based on the 
evidence, the court can only find that the amount paid by Richards to Steuerer over six (6) 
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months totaled $2,500.00. Richards has retained records that support the six (6) payments to 
Steuerer, but has not retained or provided to the court documentary evidence of any other 
payments to Steuerer. The testimony of Steuerer and Richards as to the number of payments 
made is not reliable and the best evidence is the documentary evidence that has been admitted. 
The court finds that of the $5,000.00, Richards paid $2,500.00 to Steuerer. 
8. As noted above, the first payment by Richards to Steuerer was on February 25, 1997. A 
Warranty Deed dated February 24, 1997 was prepared, whereby Steuerer conveyed to Richards a 
one-half interest in the subject property. The deed was notarized and recorded on February 26, 
1997. The deed was signed by both Steuerer and Richards. Steuerer testified that the purpose of 
the deed was to be collateral for the $5,000 loan from Richards. Richards testified in her 
deposition that the purpose of the deed "was to have some kind of collateral." 
9. Both parties were of the expectation and agreement that the amounts paid to Steuerer by 
Richards would be repaid by Steuerer and, upon repayment, Richards would re-convey her 
interest in the subject property to Steuerer. The parties did not agree as to a definite time for 
repayment, other than to agree that Steuerer would repay the monies as soon as possible or when 
he could. Richards, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, has never made a demand for repayment. 
There was no agreement as to any interest to be paid and it was not a topic of discussion in the 
original agreement. 
10. Prior to June 20, 2011, the last time that Steuerer personally paid any real property taxes 
on the subject property was on April 2, 1997, in the amount of $201.58 [Exhibit 107]. This was 
for the 1994 property taxes, which were delinquent and the payment was inclusive of the tax, 
interest, and penalties owed to Lincoln County. In May 2000, Steuerer was delinquent in the 
payment of his property taxes on the subject property for the prior years of 199 5 to 1999. 
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Richards brought the property taxes current by her payments to Lincoln County dated May 8, 
2000 and December 20, 2000 [Exhibits 108-112]. 
11. On May 8, 2000, the same day that Richards paid part of the delinquent property taxes on 
the subject property; Steuerer executed a Quitclaim Deed to the subject property, wherein he 
conveyed his remaining interest in the subject property to Richards. The deed was notarized and 
recorded on May 8, 2000. As with the Warranty Deed, the Quitclaim Deed was signed by both 
Steuerer and Richards. The testimony of Steuerer and Richards is again in conflict as to t.1-ie 
reason for the quitclaim deed; however, what is clear is that it was executed contemporaneously 
with Richards' agreement to pay the property taxes on the subject property. Richards testified 
that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was the same as the warranty deed, as collateral or 
"something to assure me that he was going to pay me back." 
12. Between May 8, 2000 and December 20, 2010, Richards paid all of the property taxes, 
including any interest and penalties, in the sum of $6,784.91 as follows: 
























13. At all times relevant, between 1997 and 2010, Steuerer continued to occupy the subject 
property and was not paying any rent to Richards; nor had Richards demanded the payment of 
rent. 
III. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. From the facts above the legal question is whether the monies paid by Richards to 
Steuerer, between February 1997 to July 1997, and the property taxes paid by Richards, between 
May 8, 2000 to December 20, 2010, were loans and whether the Warranty Deed, executed on 
February 25, 1997, and the Quitclaim Deed, executed May 8, 2000, were intended as a 
conveyance of title or a mortgage. 
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2. "It is settled law of this state that a deed, absolute in form, the terms of which are not 
ambiguous, may constitute a mortgage." Jaussaud v. Samuels, 58 Idaho 191, 71 P.2d 426, 431 
(1937). It is undisputed that the plaintiff signed a warranty deed and quitclaim deed at different 
times over to the defendant. "\Vb.ere an instrument in writing in the form of a deed of 
conveyance is executed and delivered as security for a debt, such instrument becomes a 
mortgage, and not a deed, notwithstanding the form of the instrument." Bergen v. Johnson, 21 
Idaho 619, 123 P. 484, 484 (1912). "This cou.."'i: is aware t.liat the burden is on the plaintiff to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale, was intended." 
Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 440 P.2d 143 (1968). The court is also 
aware that parol evidence may be considered when determining whether a deed was intended to 
be a mortgage. Id The criteria to consider when determining if a deed was intended to be a 
mortgage includes, 
( a) existence of debt to be secured; (b) satisfaction or survival of the debt; ( c) previous 
negotiations of parties; ( d) inadequacy of price; ( e) financial condition of grai.1tor; mid (f) 
intention of parties .... While all these factors are to be considered, the controlling test to 
be applied is whether the grantor sustains the relation of debtor to the grantee after the 
execution of the instrument. A mortgage is an incident of the debt, and without a debt 
there can be no mortgage. 
Id It is undisputed that the plaintiff owed money to the defendant before and after the deeds 
were executed and/or recorded; therefore, the debt existed at the time of the deed transfer and 
survived after the transfer. "The fact that the grantee retains in his possession without 
cancellation the written evidence of a debt raises a strong presumption that a conveyance given 
did not extinguish the debt, and that a mortgage was intended." Dickens v. Heston, 53 Idaho 91, 
21 P.2d 905, 908 (1933). 
[TJhe consideration passing between the parties, or the amount to be paid by the grantor 
on exercising his right to repurchase, would be fairly proportioned to the value of the 
property, if considered as a debt or loan secured by a mortgage thereon, but grossly 
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inadequate if regarded as the price of the land upon an absolute sale, this will tend 
strongly to show that a sale could not have been intended, but that the transaction should 
rather be treated as a mortgage. It is true inadequacy of price is not by itself alone 
enough to justify a finding that the deed_ was intended as a mortgage, contrary to the 
presumption arising from the face of the papers, but it is entitled to great weight when 
coupled with other circumstances ... 
Id at 909 (quoting 41 C. J. 33 7, § 101 ). 
While the court does not have evidence of the fair market value of the subject property, 
other than the value for purposes of property taxes, both parties agree that at the time of the loans 
the subject property was expressly intended as collateral. It is clear that, at the time of the 
execution of the two deeds, Steuerer was not intending to sell and Richards was not intending to 
purchase the subject property. 
3. "If the grantor was severely pressed for money at the time of the transfer, so as not to be 
able to exercise a perfectly free choice as to the disposition of his property, and raised the sum 
needed by conveying his property in fee with a right of repurchase, his necessitous condition, 
especially in co:r~11ection v,rit.11 the inadequacy of t}1e price, will go far to show that a mortgage 
was intended." Dickens, 21 P.2d at 909 (quoting 41 C. J. 288, § 24). It is clear that, at the time of 
the loans and the execution of the deeds, Richards had the subjective and objective belief that 
Steuerer was possibly going to lose his property, due to the delinquent property taxes, and that 
she did not want his property to be foreclosed on by County Collector. 
4. "The intention of the parties at the time an agreement to execute a deed is consummated 
is determinative of whether the title is irrevocably transferred, or the conveyance is merely as 
security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 
546, 290 P. 205, 207 (1930). Again, as indicated above, the parties testified, in one form or 
another, that the subject property, at the time of the loan, was intended as collateral. Richards 
cannot unilaterally alter the intent of the parties at the time the deeds were executed. Since the 
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deeds were intended to be a mortgage, Richards' remedy would have been a judicial foreclosure, 
which she has not sought. 
5. Based on the evidence presented at the trial and the law as set forth above, the court finds 
that in February 1997, Richards agreed to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 and that she paid 
part of this amount to Steuerer in monthly payments. The documentary evidence shows that 
Richards paid to Steuerer the sum of $2,500.00 between February 25, 1997 and July 1, 1997. 
Richards has been u..riable to present a.._71y additional doc1.1.tT1entai-::v evidence of any payments to 
Steuerer after July 1, 1997. The court must find that Steuerer received the sum of $2,500.00 from 
Richards over the period of February 25, 1997 to July 1, 1997. The court must further find that 
the execution and recording of the Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000 was intended as collateral for 
the repayment of the property taxes paid by Richards on behalf of Steuerer and, therefore, at the 
time of the agreement, the parties intended the deeds to be mortgages. 
6. The parties also contest the issue of interest. It is clear that the amount of interest to be 
paid or whether interest was to be paid on the loans was not discussed by the parties. When there 
is no express agreement in writing fixing a rate of interest to be paid on "money lent," the 
interest is allowed at the rate of 12% per annum and the interest is not to be compounded. LC. § 
28-22-104(3); Doolittle v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 814, 919 P.2d 
334 (1996). 
7. The interest to be paid is governed by I.C. § 28-22-104 (2) for "money lent." The parties 
did not state a definite period for repayment of the monies loaned by Richards to Steuerer; 
however, they each testified that the money was to be repaid as soon as possible or when 
Steuerer could make repayment. Richards testified that she would have liked to have had 
Steuerer at least make payments of $50.00 a month, in an effort to repay the loans; yet, she made 
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no demand for any type of repayment and this appears to only have been a subjective belief that 
was never communicated to Steuerer. Steuerer testified that he was in a position to bef':in maki11i:r - _. -- -o 
payments to Richards in 2003; yet, he made no effort to send a payment even by way of "general 
delivery." Prejudgment interest begins to accrue only after the money becomes due. Swanson v. 
Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 519, 5 P.3d 973 (2000). '"\Vb.ere no time is expressed in a contract for 
its performance, the law implies that it shall be perfom1ed within a reasonable time as 
determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the 
circumstances attending the performance."' 97 Idaho at 178-79, 540 P.2d at 1357-58, quoting 
Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906, 908 (1963)." Wolcott v. Booth, 101 
Idaho 89, 92, 609 P.2d 156, 159 (1980). Steuerer testified that he had the ability to repay the 
$2,500.00 in the year 2003 and, based on his ability to repay at that time, it is reasonable that 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum would commence to accrue as of January 1, 2003. The 
annual interest on the sum of $2,500.00 is $300.00 per year/$0.8219178 per day. The total 
prejudgment interest due on the $2,500.00 loan, as of September 6, 2011, is $2604.66. 
8. Steuerer would also be obligated to pay prejudgment interest, for the same reasons as set 
forth above, as to the property taxes paid on his behalf by Richards, beginning in May 2000. 
Although the interest would not commence to accrue until January 1, 2003, as to the property 
taxes paid by Richards prior to January 1, 2003. Otherwise, interest would accrue on the property 
tax payments made by Richards after January 1, 2003 from the date of said payments. The total 
prejudgment interest due on the payment of the property taxes as of September 6, 2011 1s 
$4,755.22. The court has calculated the interest on the property taxes as follows: 
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Interest Calculated to September 6, 2011 
Date of I ;;:~e~tf / Interest per I Days Since I ~~terest I Pavment . Day I Due* j ....... I...__ ...... _. 
5-8-2000 $466.02 $.15 3169 $475.35 
12-20-2000 $995.97 $.33 3169 $1045.77 
6-20-2001 $114.49 $.04 3169 $126.76 
12-21-2001 $239.65 $.08 3169 $253.52 
6-19-2002 $234.95 $.08 3169 $253.52 
12-19-2002 $217.87 I $.01 3169 $221.83 
6-20-2003 $217.87 $.07 2999 $209.93 
12-20-2003 $275.23 $.09 2817 $253.53 
6-20-2004 $275.23 $.09 I 2634 $237.06 
12-20-2004 $283.19 $.09 2452 $220.68 
6-20-2005 
1 
$283.19 'I: t)O 2269 I $204.21 I...., • ...,.,. 
12-20-2005 $304.30 $.10 2087 $208.70 
6-20-2006 $304.30 $.10 1904 $190.40 
12-20-2006 $303.10 $.10 1722 $172.20 
6-20-2007 $303.10 $.IO 1539 $153.90 
12-20-2007 $287.47 $.09 1357 $122.13 
6-20-2008 $287.47 $.09 1174 $105.66 
12-20-2008 $292.09 $.10 992 $99.20 
6-20-2009 $292.09 $.10 809 $80.90 
12-20-2009 $262.81 $.09 627 $56.43 
6-20-2010 I $262.81 $.09 444 $39.96 
12-20-2010 $281.91 I $.09 262 I $23.58 
* All loans prior to January of 2003 began to accrue interest on January 1, 2003. All loans post January of 2003 
began to accrue interest on the date of payment. The days since due are only counted to September 6, 2011. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The Court, having considered all of the evidence and having entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, without giving undue influence to any one factor, and good cause appearing, 
it is ORDERED, ADJUGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The court finds that the deeds executed by the plaintiff conveying the subject 
property to the defendant were intended by the parties to be a mortgage to secure loans and 
payment of real property taxes made by the defendant to or on behalf of the plaintiff. 
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The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $9,285.11, plus prejudgment 
interest in the sum of $7,359.88, for a total judgment in the sum of $16,644.99, said sum shall 
bear interest at the legal rate for post judgment interest until paid in full. 
3. Upon satisfaction of this Judgment, the defendant shall re-convey title of the 
subject property to the plaintiff by delivering to the plaintiff a duly executed and notarized 
Quitclaim Deed. The plaintiff shall bear the cost of the recording of the Quitclaim Deed. 
4. The determination of the prevailing party, if any, ai,d claims for attorney fees or 
costs, if any, will be determined post-judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. Rule 54. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDth.is i.Q dayof~{~l 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the~ day of s.e-qoti:mJ:)..(' _fL-; 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Robert E. Williams 
Attorney at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
400 S. Main St. 
Ste. 303 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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On September 6, 2011 the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order in the above entitled matter following a court trial. The Court, having considered all of the 
evidence and having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, without giving undue 
influence · to any one factor, and good cause appearing, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES, as follows: 
1. The court finds that the deeds executed by the plaintiff conveying the subject 
property to the defendant were intended by the parties to be a mortgage to secure loans and 
payment of real property taxes made by the defendant to or on behalf of the plaintiff. 
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2. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $9,285.11 plus prejudgment 
interest in the sum of $7,359.88 for a total judgment in the sum of $16,644.99, which sum shall 
bear interest at the legal rate for post judgment interest until paid in full. 
3. Upon satisfaction of this Judgment the defendant shall re-convey title to the 
subject property to the plaintiff by delivering to the plaintiff a duly executed and notarized 
Quitclaim Deed. The plaintiff shall bear the cost of the recording of the Quitclaim Deed. 
4. The determination of the prevailing party, if any, and claims for attorney fees or 
costs, if any, will be determined post-judgment in accordance \V:ith I.R.C.P. Rule 54. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this __ '7-'-. _ day of ~-t, , 2011 
\ 
</~ldi? It J 1 \1, I 
John K. Butier, District 'Ju1tf)_., 
I . I 
! 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the 'l, day of ~_/)h11 )A--2fil 1, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JlJDGMENT was maiied, postag~ paid, and/or hand-delivered to 
the following persons: 
Robert E. Williams 
Attorney at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
400 S. Main St. 
Ste. 303 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Attorney for Defendant 
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fl ROBERT E. \\TJLLIArr1S 
IDAHO STATE BARN0.1693 
WILLIA.MS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P. 0, Box 168 
Jerome; Idaho 83338 
Telephone: (208) 324-2303 
Facsimile: (208) 324·3135 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFIB WDICIAL DISTJUCT OF 1RE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Lil~COLN 
DONALD E. STEURER, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 2010 212 
MEMORANDUM vs 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY 
RICHARDS, 
RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES; 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY 
Defendant 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Jerome ) 
Robert E. W:illiams, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and snys: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed and practicing law in the Stan· ofldaho. I am a partner 
in the law firm of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP. ram the counsd ofrecord for Plaintiff, 
DONALD E. STEUERER; (hereinafter "Plaintiff') in the above entitled matter. 
2. As attorney of record for Plaintiff, I am informed as to the items of fees, costs, and 
disbursements expended in the prosecution of the above captioned action than is the Plaintiff. 
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3, The matters set furth herein are based upon my 0"'11 personal knowledge1 information 
and belief, and are also based upon the accounts, recordsi and business lee .gets kept by our finn in 
the regular and ordinary course of its business. 
4. The costs and disbursements set forth herein are to my know'.;edge and belief correctly 
stated, properly claimed, and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54. To my knowledge and beHef, all such 
costs and disbursements were incurred or expended reasonably, in good faith, for purposes of 
preparing, trying and. arguing this action. The costs and disbursements hen:·by claimed are truly and 
correctly stated, and were actually paid, and are claimed in compliance with LR.C.P. 54(d) as 
follows: 




Service of Complaint and 45.00 
Summons on Defendant 
Service of Deposition Notice 60.00 
for N.E.M. Richards 
Service of Subpoena - Duces 57.00 
Teourn on Wells Fargo Bank 
DEPOSIDON Cosrs :POR 
ORJGINALS AND/OR 
COPlES OF THE 
FOLLOWING 
DEPOSITJONS; 
Deposition ofN.E.M. 329.39 
Richards, aka Nicky Richards 
Deposition of Donald E, 177.96 
Steuerer 
Total: 
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5, I further certify that the follovving attomey fees were incm red by Plaintiff through 
August 24, 2011, which are based upon the records of your affiant's law firm; that the hours shovVn 
are accurate, and the rates are reasonable in arnount1 considering the tim, and labor required1 the 
difficulty of the questions, the requisite skill required to perform the legal services properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney involved, prevailing charges for lik,3 work, time limitations 
obtained in similar cases: 
A ATTORNEY'S FEES - I.R.C.P. 54(e); 
ATTOAATEY 
ROBERT E. WILLIAMS 










B. A true and correct coy of the itemization of the services re1tdered under 5.A above 
is attached hereto as SCHEDULE 1. 
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES CLA.IMED: $15,645.00 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this ca:;e under Idaho Code§ 
I 2-120(3 ). Plaintiff prevailed in the quiet title action, in that the Court ruled that the deeds to 
real property, signed by the Plaintiff, which resulted in record ovm.ership ,if the real property in 
the Defendant were intended to be mortgages, as advocated by the Plaintiff. The Court also ruled 
that money given by Defendant to Plaintiff in connection with the deeds were loans, also as 
advocated by Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that one of the purposes of the le.ans received by him 
from the Defendant was to allow him to open a bar on the real property th.:i.t was the subject of 
the quiet title action. The loans were therefore made for a commercial pwpose and constitute a 
commercial transaction. Wi.ere a commercial transaction constitutes the gravamen of the suit, in 
that it is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the Plamti:ff seeks to recover, 
an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) can be made. Johanns,·n vs Utterbeck, 146 
Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008). 
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Plaintiffs claims asserted in this case arose directly from the loan transactions 
between the parties, because the deeds involved were executed and recoded pursuant to the 
loans. The loans had a commercial purpose and were the basis upon whi;h Plaintiff sought to 
quiet title to the real property, Having prevailed in the case, Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded 
attorney's fees pursuant to IC.§ 12-120(3). 
7. Additional fees will be claimed in the event an additional 1.earing is required, 
8. The undersigned verifies under oath that the abo--ve c.osts~ disbursements, and 
attorney fees are true Wld accurate to the best of A:ffiant)s knowledge and ,l.!e properly and 
correctly set forth in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED thisU day of September, 
. ~ 
SUBSC!HRED and SWOKN" to before me t:b.Js J/) day of September, 2011. 
Residing at 
Commission e ires; 3/ ~J '-z:..o / b 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..2Q. day of September, 2011, I sel"Ved a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names arici addresses appear 
below by the method indicated: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
'ia US Mail, Postage Paid 
O'Via Facsimile -_______ O 
P.O. Box 1861 Hand-Delivered· Cour1 Folder 
· J Hailey, ID 83333 I CJ Other 
ROBERIE. WILLil,MS 
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. 12/20/10 .2 
1/7/10 .3 








Will~ M~ & LO(}Jspeicl,,1 W' 
Attorne:91 at Law 
P.O. Booc 166 
Jerome; ID 83338--0xoB 
SCHEDULE 1 
ATTORN.E\' DESCRIPTION 
REW Conference with Donn Bordewyk and 
Don Steuerer; Telephone Conference 
with Patti at Land, Title and Escrow; 
Research. 
REW Preparation of Complaint 
REW Review litigation guarantee 
REW Telephone conference with Tim Stover; 
tic vi.i.th Donn B. 
REW Email communication with T. Stover; 
Review correspondence 
REW Email communication with Donn B. 
REW Telephone conference with Donn B. (2x:. 
Review answer 
REW Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic 
with Tim Stover. Preparation of 
discovery requests; note ofissue and 
request for trial settin_g 
REW Revise discovery requests 
REW Teleohone conference with Donn B. 
REW Email communication with Donn B.; tic 
with Donn B. 
REW Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic 
with Don S.; tic with Tim Stover 
REW Letter to Donn B, and Dons.; telephone 
conference with Don S.; review responsE 
to request for admission and 
correspondeP,ce 
TEW Telephone conference with Donn B. 
REW Conference with Don S., Donn B, and 
Tim Stover 
REW Telephone conference with Tim Stover, 
tic with Donn B. 
REW Preparation of notice of deposition and 
subpoena 
REW Conference with clients; preparation for 
deposition; attend deposition of Nikki 
Richards 
REW Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic 
with Tim Stover 
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3/15/2011 1 REW Court appearance at hearing on Stover's 200.00 
Motion to Withdraw 
3/19/11 .2 REW Review order _granting withdrawal 40,00 
3/22/11 .1 REW Telephone conference wi.th Tim Stover 20.00 
3/23/11 '] REW Telephone conference with Donn B. 20.00 
4/7/11 .4 REW Telephone conference with Alison B; tic 80.00 
with DonnB. 
4/14/11 1.5 REW Letter to Allison B.; review deposition 300.00 
and file; research elements of deed as a 
mort:;1:asi;e 
4/20/11 .3 REW Email communication with Allison B.; 60.00 
revise letters 
5/2/11 1.6 REW , Letter to clients; review discovery 320.00 
I 
I responses; preparation of calculations of I loan amount owed 
5/5/11 .2 REW Revise letter to Dons. 40.00 
5/7111 3 REW Research and prepare motion for 600.00 
summary judgment, affidavit, brief, 
notice of hearing 
5/1 I/11 2 REW Revise brief and affidavit 400.00 
5/12/11 .3 REW Preparation of affidavit of Donn B. 60.00 
5/12/11 1.5 REW Revise brief and affidavit I 300.00 
5/13/11 1.8 REW Conference with Don S .. Donn B.; letter 360.00 
to clients; citation check; final revisions 
to brief 
5/16/11 
/ ·5 REW Telephone conference with Alison B.; 100.00 
letter to Don S,; reviev,,,r fax 
5/27/11 .3 REW Preparation of pretrial statement 60,00 
5/30/11 1 REW Revise pretrial statement 200.00 
6/3/11 .2 REW Telephone conference with Alison B. 40.00 
617/11 2.3 REW Telephone conference with client; 460.00 
prepare for and attend pretrial oonferenci: 
6/8/1 l .2 REW Telephone conference with Alison B, 40.00 
6/20/11 5.6 REW Telephone conference with Chris S.; 1,120.00 
review new filings; preparation for 
I 
hearing on pending motions; attend 
hearing 
7/1/11 3.5 REW Prepare for and attend Steuerer 700.00 
deposition 
7/4/11 2 REW Research and prepare trial brief 400.00 
7/5/11 1.7 REW Telephone conference with Chris S.; 340.00 
review and revise trial brief 
7/6/11 .2 REW Telephone conference with Donn B. 40.00 
7/9/11 1 REW Review deposition of Don S. 200.00 
7/11/11 1.5 REW Conference with Donn B., Don S.; 300.00 
preparation or meeting 
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7/12/1 J 7.5 REW Telephone conference with Chris S.; r, preparation for trial; attend trial; preparation of subpoena; Email 
communication with Donn B. 
7/14/11 .3 REW Letter to Wells Pargo 60.00 
7/19/11 .4 REW Telephone conference with Kay at Wells &0.00 
Fargo; preparation of new subpoena for 
reco:rds 
7/22/11 .2 REW Telephone conference with Wells Fargo; 40.00 
tic with C. Simms 
8/11/11 2.5 REW Preparation of proposed findings of fact 500.00 
and conclusions of law 
8/13/11 3 REW Revise proposed findings of fact and I 600.00 
conclusions of law I I 
8/16/11 6.5 REW Research and revise proposed findings of I 1,300.00 
fact and conclusions of law 
8/17/11 .4 REW Review defendant's proposed findings of 80.00 
fact and conclusions of law 
8/22/11 2 REW Research and prepare rebuttal to 400.00 
plaintiff's findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw 
8/23/11 3.5 REW Revision of rebuttal to plaintiff's :findings 700.00 
of fact and conclusions of law 
74.2 $14,840,00 
6/15/11 .2 JBL Review ml"ltinn, siffirt~vit tri 
I 
35.00 I 
withdraw, notice of appearance and 
motion to continue 
6/20/11 4.4 JBL Telephone conference with REW, 770.00 
review file, brief and affidavit; 
research 
4.6 805,00 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
H~ilPy, Trhh() R1111 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 










Defendants. ) ----~~~~~------. 
CV-2010-212 
OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & 
ATTORNEY FEES AND 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
I.R.C.P. 54 
COMES NOW Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, by and through counsel, and files 
these objections to Memorandum Re: Costs and Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff herein 
and therefore states as follows; 
1. Plaintiff, on or about September 20, 2011, filed a Memorandum Re: Costs and 
Attorney Fees; Affidavit of Attorney, requesting this Court to award costs and attorney 
fees, claiming entitlement to same under LC. Section 12-120(3). 
2. Defendant objects to said requests in that Plaintiff is entitled to neither costs or 
attorney fees for the following reasons; 
a. Plaintiff is not the prevailing party. 
b. Plaintiff failed to request and cite to the specific legal basis for a claim of 
costs and attorney fees at his first opportunity. Fournier v. Fournier, 125 
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Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1994); Bingham v. Montane 
Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999) 
c. Plaintiff has not incurred costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff himself 
testified to this fact at trial, as did witness Borde·wyck, who testified Mr. 
Williams worked for him and represented the Co-Op. O'Neil v. 
Schckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 480 733 P.2d 693, 701 (1986); Bowles v. Pro 
Indiviso. Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999) citing Swanson v. 
Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1989) 
d. No underlying basis, contract, statute, or rule supports the award of 
attorney fees. Plaintiff claims I.C. 12~120(3) as a statutory basis for his 
claim of fees, apparently relying on the catch-all language " ... any 
commercial transaction ... " However, the plain language of the statute 
defining "commercial transaction" excludes transactions for personal or 
household purposes. Clearly, the gravemen of the transaction between the 
parties hereto was not commercial in nature. The money provided from 
Defendant to Plaintiff, was given because Defendant felt sorry for Plaintiff 
and she didn't want him to lose his house. Where gravemen of the case is 
not a "commercial transaction" attorney fees should be denied. Spence v. 
Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995) The award of attorney fees is 
not warranted every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected 
with the case. Brower v. E.I. Dupont, 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990) 
e. The Court in its discretion should deny Plaintiff's request for fees due to 
the equities involved in the case. Certainly, this was a close case. Plaintiff 
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prevailed, not as a matter of law, but upon a balancing of the equities. 
Defendant should not be punished for submitting to the court her 
interpretation of the facts and law, when in fact she held deeds absolute, 
had given money to Plaintiff, and never been repaid. Defendant paid 
Plaintiffs taxes, because she did not want Plaintiff to lose his home. If 
Plaintiff were awarded attorney fees and costs it would be the classic case 
of "no good deed goes unpunished." 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Court to deny Plaintiffs request for costs 
and attorney fees and to order the parties to each bear their own costs and fees. 
CHRJSTOPHERP. SLMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ORNEY AT LAW 
DATED 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of September, 201 L a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORl\TEY FEES 
AND MOTION TO DISALLOWwas delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 
CHRJSTOPHER P. SIMMS 
OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOWge )3410 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73 
P.O. Box 1861 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
ISB No. 7473 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
N.E.M. RJCHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 










_____ D_e_£_en_d_an_t_s~ _____ ) 
CV-2010-212 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L4 $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, DONALD E. STEURER, AND HIS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT E. \VILLIAMS, PO BOX 168, JEROME, 
IDAHO, 83338 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, appeals against the above-named 
Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment in the 
above-entitled action dated on 8th day of September, 2011, the Honorable Judge John K. 
Butler, presiding.· 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 11411 
2. The Defendant-Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment 
and order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.AR. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal are as follows: 
(a) The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Warranty 
Deed executed by Plaintiff to· Defendant, granting a Yi interest in the 
property in question, was a mortgage and not a sale of an interest in 
real property with a right of repurchase. 
(b) The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Quitclaim 
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a complete fee 
simple interest in the property in question to Defendant, was a 
mortgage and not an outright sale with a right of repurchase. 
4. No order has been entered seaiing aii or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests preparation of a 
reporter's transcript of all proceedings in the compressed transcript format pursuant to 
I.AR. Rule 26. 
6. Appellant requests preparation of the clerk's record to include each and every 
document filed with the Clerk of the District Court, except and excluding notices of 
hearing and stipulations relating thereto 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 2412 
Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County 
Candice Childers 
233 West Main 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
(b) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the 
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporter's 
transcript as required by Rule 24. 
( c) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the 
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record and all 
appellate fees. 
(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.AR. 
Dated 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page !3413 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of October, 2011, a copy of 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon Robert E. Williams, Attorney 
for Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main 
Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 and the Court 
Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County, Candice Childers, 233 West Main, 
Jerome, Idaho 83338. 
Christopher P. Simms 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· Page4l 414 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
ISB No. 7473 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 












A.MENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants. ) --------'=:..====-'-------· 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, DONALD E. STEURER, AND HIS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT E. WlLLIAMS, PO BOX 168, JEROME, 
IDAHO, 83338 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT: 
l. The above named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, appeals against the above-named 
Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment in the 
above-entitled action dated on 8th day of September, 2011, the Honorable Judge John K. 
Butler, presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL Pagti I 415 
2. The Defendant-Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment 
and order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a}(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal are as follows: 
(a) The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Warranty 
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a Y:z interest in the 
property in question, was a mortgage and not a sale of an interest in 
real property with a right of repurchase. 
(b) The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Quitclaim 
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a complete fee 
simple interest in the property in question to Defendant, was a 
mortgage and not an outright sale with a right of repurchase. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's limited transcript is requested. The appellant requests preparation of 
a reporter's transcript of the Court Trial Hearing which trial hearing took place on July 
13,2011. 
6. Appellant requests preparntion of the clerk's record to include each and every 
document filed with the Clerk of the District Court, except and excluding notices of 
hearing and stipulations relating thereto. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL Pag~l 416 
Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County 
Candice Childers 
233 West Main 
(b) The Court reporter has been paid directly the requested sum for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript at the request of the Clerk of the District Court 
and after personal communication with the C~mrt Reporter. 
(c) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the 
filing of the Notice of Appeal, the estimated fees for preparation of the 
clerk's record and all appellate fees. 
( d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.AR. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS A:~ /ZANTNPELLANT 
/tJZ7-r( 
Dated 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of October, 2011, a copy of 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE O_F APPEAL. was served upon Robert E. 
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 
and the Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County, Candice Childers, 233 
West Main, Jerome, Idaho 83338. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
CV-2010-0000212 
Donald E Steuerer vs. N .E.M. Richards 
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 11/1/2011 
Time: 9:50 am 
Judge: John K Butler 
Court reporter: Candace Childers 
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli 
950 Court introduces case 
Mr. Williams present on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Simms present on behalf of the Defendant 
951 :Mr. Williams begins argument. 
954 :Mr. Simms argument. 
956 Further comments from Mr. Williams 
956 Courts comments as to entitlement to attorney's fees. 
1001 Court denies plaintiffs request for Attorney's fees. Mr. Williams will prepare the 
order. 
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11 
ROBERT E. WILLIAMS 
lDAHO STATE BAR NO. 1693 
\VILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
153 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Telephone: (208) 324-2303 
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
DONALD E. STEUERER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-212 
ORDER ON MEMORANDUM 
RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A hearing regarding the Memorandum RE: Costs and Attorney's Fees filed by the 
Plaintiffin this matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John K. Butler at 9:45 a:m. in 
the District Courtroom of the Lincoln County Courthouse. Robert E. Williams appeared on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. Christopher P. Simms appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court, 
having reviewed the Memorandum RE: Costs and Attorney's Fees, and the Objection to Costs 
and Attorney's Fees and Motion to Disallow filed by the Defendant, and having heard the 
arguments of counsel, has determined that: 
1. Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter and is entitled to claim costs as a matter of 
right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c). 
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\\SERVER\sHAREIDATA\STEUERER, DONALD1RICHARDS\0RDER ON MEMO RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES.DOCX 
11 2. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §12-120(3) for 
the reason that the quiet title action plead by Plaintiff does not qualify as a commercial 
transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
a. Plaintiff is awarded its costs as a matter ofright in the amount of $757.35; 
b. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §12-120(3). 
SO ORDERED this //{day of JV (}Jev4<: 2011. 
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II CEKTU1LATE UJ:l SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lh day of November, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear 
below by the method indicated: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Robert E. Williams 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
.ffU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery - Court Folder 
D Facsimile Transmission 
D Federal Express 
ffU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery - Court Folder 
D Facsimile Transmission 
D Federal Express 
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\\SERVER\sHARE\DATA \STEUERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\0RDER ON MEMO RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES.DOCX 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 








Supreme Court Docket No. 
39274-2011 









STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS 
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY 
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
) 
___ D=-.,:.efi==e=n=d=an=t=-s--=-A"""p"-*p'-=e=ll=a=nt=s;;_. ______ ) 
COMES NTOW.. CO TUNS ET, FOR A PPFT T A" iT r'l11·1· C'trvni,,,,,. P c::;,.,.,m"' .,~r1 - _ -- - --- ""~ ~ ,_,.,_,; .. .;.lJ', ~ l '-' v V_t-'H'-'J. i, UUHH .::,l UHU 
advises the Court of the STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS in the above styled matter 
pursuant to the Court's Order of January 30, 2012, and states the following; 
1. The above named parties were scheduled for mediation with the Honorable Mark 
Ingram, Magistrate Judge, Fifth Judicial District at 1 :30 pm on March 20, 2012, in the 
Lincoln County Courthouse. 
2. The Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendants-Appellants, as well as their respective 
counsel appeared ready for the mediation hearing on March 20, 2012. However, the 
Honorable Mark Ingram was not present due to an ongoing trial in a different venue. 
3. The mediation hearing was rescheduled for 9:00 a.rn. on March 29, 2012, in the 
Lincoln County Comthouse. 
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS Page 1423 
4. On March 29, 2012, all parties were present for the mediation hearing. The 
Honorable Mark Ingram, Magistrate Judge, appeared and conducted the mediation 
hearing. Progress was made toward resolution, but the case was not settled. 
5. Judge Ingram, concluded the mediation session, but adjourned the mediation 
hearing for further consideration by the parties, regarding the offers of settlement made, 
. . 
to be called back into session within the next thirty days, by request of either party or the 
Court. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS ·' 
ATTOENBY FOR DEFEND ~T-APPELLANT '// 1 , ./ / i~ 112~/ // / / 
Ii 1/ 1 1 • .,,//) I 1·1,/ / f /v·· r·\/" 
I ;, · I · 
·'l -:, .-.. . -.. 
"'.:::i _)v'_/ L 
Gitristopher P. Simms Dated 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 30th day of March, 2012, a copy of 
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS was served upon Robert E. Williams, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, 
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Faa to 27.3131 
. /1);/~ 
icz,=./ __ ,,__ ____________ _ 
. Christopher P. Simms 
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
Donald E. Steuerer, ) 
) 







Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011 
Lincoln County District Court No. 2010-212 
N.E.M. Richards, a.k.a Nicky Richards, 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
) 
I, Ruth Petruzzelli, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, do hereby certify that the following is a list of exhibits 
that have been lodged with the Supreme Court. 
EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION DATE FILED 
Deposition of N.E.M. Richards 
212 Check carbons July 13,2011 
213 Check register July 13,2011 
214 Check# 425 July 13,2011 
215 Check register July 13,2011 
101 Warranty deed from Plaintiff dated February July 13,2011 
24,1997 
102 Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and defendant to July 13,2011 
defendant dated May 8,2000 
103 Check stub from defendant's check no. 1812 July 13,2011 
104 Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1807 July 13,2011 
Certificate of Exhibit's Page 425 
105 ) Check stub for Defendant's Check no. 1809 July 13,2011 
I 
106 Defendant's handwritten note, dates February July 13,2011 
25,1997, March 3,1997, April 1, 1997 in the left 
hand column 
107 Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency July 13,2011 
Document 1983/1984 
108 1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector dated December 20,2000 
109 1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector dated May 8,2000 
110 1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector dated December 20,2000 
111 1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax I July 13,2011 
Collector dated December 20,2000 
112 2000 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector dated December 20,2000 and June 
20,2011 
113 2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector dated December 21,2001 and June 
19,2002 
114 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2002 
115 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2003 
116 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2004 
117 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2005 
118 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2006 
119 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2007 
120 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2008 
121 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2009 
122 Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax July 13,2011 
Collector for the year 2010 
123 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1997 
124 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1998 
Certificate of Exhibit's Page 426 
125 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1999 
126 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2000 
127 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2001 
128 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2002 
129 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2003 
130 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2004 
131 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2005 
132 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2006 
133 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2007 
134 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2008 
135 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2009 
136 History report from the Office of the Lincoln County July 13,2011 
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of 
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2010 
137 Affidavit of Donn W. Bordevryk July 13,2011 
I 
138 Litigation Guarantee Order number: L-39662 July 13,2011 
Policy Number: 2200504 Dated September 17,2010 
and Guarantee Date-Down Endorsement dated June 
10,2011 on Lots 4 and 5 in Block E of Shoshone 
Townsite 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal of Said 
Court on the \ 6 Day o~\MV _ 2012. 
Certificate of Exhibit's 
Suzanne McConnell 
CLERK OF THE DI 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
Donald E. Steuerer, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




) Certificate of Clerk 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011 
) Lincoln County District Court No. 2010-212 
) 
) 
) ______________ ) 
1, Ruth Petruzzelli, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, 
in and for the County ofldaho do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and correct 
Record of, the pleadings and documents under C Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules~. 
1 do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted in the 
above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the 
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record retained in the possession of the undersigned), as 
required by C Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits if there 
are exhibits and no Reporter's Transcript or not listed in the Reporter's Transcript.) 
IN WITNESS WYEOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
this 15__day o (&V\...Q ~ , 2012. 
Suzanne McConnell 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
Donald E. Steuerer, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
N.E.M., a.k.a Nicky Richards 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) Certificate of Service 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011 






I, Ruth Petruzzelli, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any 
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
Robert E. Williams 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this day of , 20 _ . 
Suzanne McConnell 
Clerk of the District Court 
B~~QK 
Ruth Petruzzelli, Deputy 
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